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Abstract
Distributed protocols allow a cryptographic scheme to distribute its operation among a
group of participants (servers). This new concept of cryptosystems was introduced
by Desmedt [56]. We consider two different flavours of distributed protocols. One
of them considers a distributed model with n parties where all of these parties are
honest. The other allows up to t − 1 parties to be faulty. Such cryptosystems are
called threshold cryptosystems. The distribution of cryptographic process is based
on secret sharing techniques and is usually applicable to public-key cryptosystems.
In this thesis we consider distributed protocols for digital signatures and public key
encryption schemes.
First we consider two flavours of digital signatures - aggregate signatures and
multisignatures- and explore the uniqueness property of these constructions. We show
that it gives rise to generic constructions of distributed verifiable unpredictable func-
tions (DVUF), whose outputs can be made pseudorandom in the shared random string
model using the techniques from [120]. This gives us the first generic construction of
distributed verifiable random functions (DVRF) that do not impose assumptions on
trusted generation of secret keys and whose outputs remain pseudorandom even in a
presence of up to n− 1 corrupted servers. We provide a DVRF construction which
follows immediately from the proof of uniqueness for the multisignature scheme [26].
Then we consider blind signatures as another flavour of digital signatures, and
propose the first standard-model construction of (re-randomizable) threshold blind
signatures (TBS), where signatures can be obtained in a blind way through interaction
with n signers of which t are required to provide their signature shares. The stronger
security notions for TBS schemes formalized in our work extend the definitions
from [144] to the threshold setting. We further show how our TBS construction can
be used to realize a distributed e-voting protocol following the template from [158]
that guarantees privacy, anonymity, democracy, conjectured soundness and individual
verifiability in the presence of distributed voting authorities.
The important applications of distributed digital signatures - threshold e-voting
and distributed e-cash - motivated us to consider the nowadays meaningful and crucial
cloud data storage techniques. We realize the idea of distributed cloud data storage,
viii
which becomes possible as an application of threshold public key encryption with
keyword search. First, we model the concept of Threshold Public Key Encryption
with Keyword Search (TPEKS) and define its security properties - indistinguishability
and consistency under chosen-ciphertext attacks. Our definition of indistinguishability
includes protection against keyword guessing attacks, to which all single-server-based
PEKS constructions were shown to be vulnerable. We provide a transformation for
obtaining secure TPEKS constructions from an anonymous Identity-Based Threshold
Decryption (IBTD) scheme, following the conceptual idea behind the transformation
from [2] for building PEKS from anonymous IBE. A concrete instantiation of a secure
TPEKS scheme can be obtained from our direct anonymous IBTD construction, based
on the classical Boneh-Franklin IBE [31], for which we prove the security under the
BDH assumption in the random oracle model. Finally we highlight the use of TPEKS
schemes for better privacy and availability in distributed cloud storage and provide a
comparison with the dual-server PEKS (DS-PEKS)[50] regarding the functionalities
of the both schemes, PEKS and DS-PEKS.
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Introduction
1.1 Cryptographic Background
Cryptography is the science of writing or solving secret codes. According to the
Oxford Dictionary it is described as the art of code writing. Security plays a significant
role in the age of the Internet. While classical cryptography has been mostly used by
the military and intelligence organizations, modern cryptography finds its applications
everywhere in our everyday life. It is useful in the telecommunications industry as the
communication can take place between untrusted parties. In comparison to previous
times, cryptography has immensely changed since its invention in the last century.
Cryptography is required to develop secure websites, to protect software from attacks
or alteration. According to Katz and Lindell [97] cryptography has changed from the
art of coding to one of the central topics within computer science. After many years of
developing ad-hoc security guarantees, where a scheme was attacked, improved and
attacked anew, the cryptographic society experienced a new approach of achieving
security which was provided by Shannon [147]. He introduced the characterization of
a perfectly secure encryption scheme. Such a scheme requires that all three spaces,
the key space, the message space and the ciphertext space are of the same size, such
that for a uniformly chosen key there exists exactly one map which assigns a plaintext
message to the ciphertext. Shannon’s approach has been showed to be impractical for
general use, because it does not enable to generate, store and transfer a big amount
of information of the key material. Shannon’s theory was not easy to extend and no
huge research has been made in this field until a new direction of cryptography was
invented in 1976 [59]. This new invention by Diffie and Hellman that is well-known
as asymmetric cryptography is an advanced development of the previously invented
symmetric cryptography.
2 Introduction
Symmetric Cryptography. To be able to provide a detailed description of symmet-
ric cryptography we assume the following example with two parties Alice and Bob
who want to communicate secretly. To do so, they need to share the same secret key
which has to be used to encode their communication. This key is not known by any
other user who targets to attack the system. To prove the security of this system we
assume that there is an adversary who knows the complete description of the complex
algorithm which describes the secret key. We present in the following an overview
of the different systems of symmetric cryptography. These systems are stream and
block ciphers, private-key encryption schemes, message authentication codes and hash
functions. We start our overview with a block cipher, also known as pseudorandom
permutation. We note that block ciphers have heuristic constructions. More formally
a block cipher is given by a keyed permutation F : {0, 1}a × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b
which takes as input a secret key k of length a and bit string of size b (which can be
the same size as the key) and returns a string of b bits. Block ciphers are important
building blocks for encryption schemes. The most popular block ciphers are DES
(Data Encryption Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). The DES was
developed in the early 1970s at IBM. Today this initial cryptographic primitive is not
considered to provide the required security because of its relatively short key length of
56 bits, but its advanced form of triple-DES is still used today. In 2000 an advanced
encryption standard (AES) was introduced. It takes as input a key of 128-, 192-, or
256-bits and a block of 128-bit length. It differs from the DES by its structure. AES
is described by a substitution-permutation network where the input block is given by
4-by-4 array of bytes and is modified in a number of rounds. AES represents a task
for the cryptographic implementations based on pseudorandom permutations. Next,
we observe the general symmetric encryption scheme which consists of the following
three algorithms. The key generation algorithm KeyGen generates the secret key, the
encryption algorithm Enc takes the shared secret key k and a message m and outputs a
ciphertext c. The decryption algorithm Dec decrypts the ciphertext using the same se-
cret key k. An encryption scheme has to satisfy two main properties, completeness and
semantic security. Completeness means that on input a message m and a secret key k,
the encrypted message can always be decrypted, i.e. Deck(Enck(m)) = m. As another
example of symmetric cryptography we observe the message authentication codes
(MACs) which guarantee message integrity. In other words, MACs enable a receiver
to identify, whether the received message is exactly the message sent by the sender.
Finally we consider hash functions which are very useful for many cryptographic
constructions and are also used in this thesis. Formally we observe a family of hash
functions which are indexed by a key k. A hash function with index k takes as input
a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs a string Hk(x) ← {0, 1}l(λ), where λ denotes the
1.1 Cryptographic Background 3
security parameter. We will provide more details about the hash function in Chapter
2, Definition 6. Next, we motivate the need of asymmetric cryptography and provide
also some examples.
Asymmetric Cryptography. The invention of asymmetric cryptography became
revolutionary in cryptography. This new field involves public-key techniques which
enable private communication between parties without learning any secret information
in advance. Examples of asymmetric cryptoschemes include digital signatures and
public key encryption schemes. A public-key cryptographic system employs two keys,
where one of them is used as a public key and the other one remains secret. A public
key is known to anyone who wants to participate in the cryptographic process. The
functionality of public key in case of public key encryption schemes is to encrypt a
message for the receiver such that the receiver can decrypt the received ciphertext
using his secret key. In case of digital signatures, a public key is used to verify the
validity of a signature σ on a message m, assuming that the signature was computed
using signer’s secret key. The secret key is only known by a single user. An adversary
who attacks the scheme knows all details about the public key and any algorithms
of the scheme, but the secret key remains unrevealed to him. We can conclude the
obvious difference between symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, which is given
by the fact that symmetric cryptography assumes complete secrecy of all cryptographic
keys, but asymmetric cryptography requires secrecy of only one out of two keys, the
secret key.
In contrast to symmetric cryptography it is impossible to reach perfect security
for an asymmetric cryptosystem. Usually, an asymmetric scheme is slower than a
symmetric scheme because of the underlying computations which mostly form the
base for asymmetric schemes. The security of an asymmetric cryptographic system is
achievable by using large enough keys, accepting that it might be theoretically possible
to recover the secret key but it must remain computationally infeasible to do so. The
main challenge behind symmetric and asymmetric schemes is to prove them secure.
The security of a cryptographic scheme is distinguished by two categories. One
of these categories describes schemes which are information-theoretically secure, or
perfectly secure. Perfect security means, that the scheme can be mathematically proven
secure, even if we assume that an adversary is unlimited regarding his computational
power. This is so, because of an adversary who does not have enough information to
succeed in executing an attack. Complexity theory provides two relaxations of perfect
security: The first one restricts the security to efficient adversaries that run in a feasible
amount of time. The second relaxation states that adversaries can succeed with some
very small probability. To describe this "very small probability" we use the notion
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of negligible functions. A negligible function is useful to describe the advantage of
an adversary in succeeding the attack of a scheme. That means that a cryptographic
system is secure if no efficient adversary can win in some communication game with
non-negligible probability. In other words, there is no efficient adversary whose
advantage in breaking the scheme differs by more than ϵ from adversary’s advantage
in case of perfect security, where ϵ is a negligible function.
Provable Security. The invention of asymmetric cryptography was the beginning of
new cryptography which stated that cryptographic systems could be secure without
achieving the perfect security [59]. The security of those schemes is covered by
the new category of computationally secure cryptographic schemes. This security
notion became one of the main aims of modern cryptographic systems. In the 19th
century, a famous cryptographer and linguist Auguste Kerckhoffs formulated the well
known principle of cryptography. His idea was that a construction of an encryption
scheme should be so that it remains secure even if an adversary has some information
about the component algorithms as long as he does not know the secret key being
used for the encryption. Kerckhoffs also stated in his other principle that "A cipher
must be practically, if not mathematically indecipherable". In other words it states
that it is already sufficient to use a cryptographic scheme that cannot be broken in
reasonable time with any reasonable probability of success. In contrast to information-
theoretical security, computational security is the weaker one, since the schemes which
are computational secure, can be broken by an adversary if it is given enough time and
resources to break the system. The following two relaxations of perfect security help
to achieve computational security:
• Security is only preserved against efficient adversaries, that run in a feasible
amount of time.
• Adversaries can potentially succeed with some very small probability, which is
also called negligible and is so small that we are not concerned if it will ever
really happen.
We conclude that a computationally secure scheme can be broken by an adversary if he
would get enough time for that. To prove a system computationally secure means that
we need to provide a lower bound on time which is needed by an adversary to break a
scheme - as stated in [14, 97]. But there is no common technique which would provide
this proof of the existence of a lower bound. To prove the existence of a lower bound we
need to show that a scheme cannot be broken by any polynomial-time adversary. (An
algorithm, e.g. adversary, is called polynomial-time if its running time is polynomial in
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the security parameter). But this approach is not satisfiable enough. To overcome this
problem there is a proof technique which is more acceptable than just assuming the
security of a scheme. This proof technique is called proof by reduction. The strategy
is given by finding a well-known low-level problem which is hard to solve and to
prove that the given scheme is hard to break under this problem. In other words this
approach shows that the given scheme is secure. The main idea of this proof technique
is the conversion of an efficient adversary A who can successfully break the given
construction into an adversary A′ against the assumed underlying hard problem. The
approach by reduction works well for proving security of asymmetric cryptosystems
but some problems occur if we try to apply it to symmetric cryptosystems. The reason
is that there is no common mathematical or computational problem to which one may
reduce the security of the underlying symmetric cryptoscheme. However we note that
generic constructions of cryptographic schemes in symmetric cryptography can still
be proven secure by reduction to another generic construction.
Since the proof by reduction technique is also useful for this thesis, we give a short
overview of how it works. We assume existence of a hard problem X which cannot be
solved by a polynomial-time adversary A but only with negligible probability denoted
by ϵ(λ) with security parameter λ. Let Π be a cryptographic scheme which we want
to prove secure. To do so we construct an adversary A′ who attacks the problem X
using adversary A against Π as sub-protocol, without any knowledge on how A works.
A′ takes the input instance of problem X and simulates the environment of A with
its output. The main assumption of this reduction is that the view of A running as
sub-protocol byA′ must remain indistinguishable from the view ofA when it interacts
with the scheme Π itself. We state that ifA can break Π, which is simulated byA′ then
it should be possible forA′ to break X . It follows thatA′ succeeds in breaking X if the
advantage ϵ(λ) is not negligible. But this fact implies a contradiction to the hardness of
X , because A′ that acts as efficient algorithm is running A as a sub-problem. Finally
this leads to the conclusion that the scheme Π is computationally secure.
Even if computational security is weaker than information-theoretic security, the
former is still essential for modern cryptography. The main difference is that the
information-theoretic security requires impractical key lengths. Computational se-
curity involves relaxations in the definition of information-theoretic security. These
relaxations are related to the running time of an efficient adversary and their success
probability. There are two possibilities to realize these relaxations. We can either
explicitly bound the maximum advantage of an adversary or we can represent his
running time and success probability as a functions depending of some parameter. In
cryptographic schemes this parameter is called security parameter which is given by
an integer λ.
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Many cryptographic schemes or protocols use public hash functions such that it
is not always easy to prove their security without making stronger assumptions. The
random oracle model (ROM) which was invented by Bellare and Rogaway [19] is
often used to simplify the security proof. Canetti et al. [44] provided later a detailed
overview for the implementation of the ideal world system into a real world system
without random oracles.
Because the random oracle model plays an important role for our cryptographic
systems, we give now an overview of it. There are many cryptographic schemes which
use a hash function in their constructions. If the hash function is collision resistant,
then a scheme can be proven secure using some mathematical assumptions. But in
case where a hash function is not collision-resistant, random oracles provide a useful
tool to prove the scheme secure by replacing each hash function by a random oracle
which represents a perfect extractor. A scheme which operates in ROM assumes an
interaction between all parties and the adversary which can issue hash queries to the
oracle. The oracle computes the hashed values on some received input and returns
the result to the corresponding party. We describe the random oracle by a function O
selected among all possible functions, which are described by a mapping from {0, 1}∗
to {0, 1}l(λ). Let l(λ) denote the length of the output depending on security parameter
and determining the set of these functions. In contrast to a scheme in the standard
model we define a scheme in the random oracle model by Π which is relied on an
oracle O. A scheme obtained in this way is denoted by ΠO. Furthermore we assume
an adversary having access to the oracle O. This assumption is necessary because
otherwise the adversary would not be able to evaluate the outputs of an oracle. While
instantiating the scheme we replace the access to the random oracle by a (collistion-
resistant) hash function. Finally we say a scheme Π is secure if for any probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A running a security experiment, the success probability
of breaking the scheme is either negligible or close to 1/2, where the difference of
these two outcomes depends on security definitions of the underlying cryptoscheme.
To make this difference clearer for the reader we consider the following two examples:
If a cryptoscheme is unforgeable then success probability of an adversary to forge the
scheme is at most negligible. In another example, if a cryptoscheme is assumed to
possess the indistinguishability property, that means that the success probability of
an adversary to distinguish the outputs of a security experiment is nearly 1/2. The
problem of using Π in the real world is that the hash function has to be fixed. But as
mentioned earlier, the security of Π is given for a random choice of O. We observe O
acting as a one-way function but it is not defined as such one because of the random
oracle which is not fixed by any hash function. A one-way function is a function which
is easy to compute but hard to invert.
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To achieve soundness of the random oracle model it is required to find a suitable
implementation, which guarantees that the security of implementations remains secure
if the ideal model is secure. Thus, to implement an ideal world system we usually
use a function which is easy to evaluate, instead of the random oracle. Canetti et al.
[44] described three ways of implementation. The first one can be realized by a single
function. The second one uses a function ensemble. And in the third formalization the
implementation can be realized by a function from the ensemble, which can only be
computed on inputs of in advance determined short length.
In the following we want to address the different methodologies of defining security
of a scheme. There are two distinct approaches, game-based approach and simulation
approach. The game-based methodology is described in more details in [19]. This
methodology allows an adversary to interact with a challenger, who is described by
a probabilistic algorithm. The role of the challenger is determined by generation
of keys in a cryptosystem and by possibility to respond to the queries made by an
adversary. The proof starts with a game which equals to the definition of the security
property. This initial game will be observed as a challenge which involves two game
partners, given by probabilistic algorithms, an attacker and a challenger. The challenger
simulates actions provided by the algorithms from the definition of the scheme. In the
following games, initial instances are replaced by randomly chosen values, such that
the result of each game differs from the results of a previous game only by a negligible
function. A game-based proof terminates when the attacker terminates its attack and
we analyze whether he has met the conditions to break the cryptosystem or not. Since
many cryptosystems are usually used as subroutines of larger systems, there is another
proof technique for those schemes, which we describe in the following paragraph.
The other methodology described by simulation-based proofs assumes a system
where an adversary is able to interact with each algorithm of the system and with a
probabilistic polynomial-time environment which represents other parties with the
access to the system. We also assume that there is an idealized cryptosystem which
can never be broken. This idealized version uses a trusted user who is responsible
for transport of data. The security of the system depends on the interaction of an
attacker with the idealized system. If the outputs of the environment and attacker are
indistinguishable from those in an idealized system, then the real cryptosystem must
be secure. Universally composable security is an example for the simulation-based
methodology. A general framework of this security was provided by Canetti [43].
There is only a rare research done on the game-based security which can also enjoy the
powerful property of composability as showed in [35]. In contrast to simulation-based
models, game-based models are supposed to be useful for the analysis of practical
protocols.
8 Introduction
After the detailed description of provable security, we also need to introduce the
notion of pseudorandomness, which has an essential meaning in cryptography. A
pseudorandom string is a string that looks like a uniformly random string and is com-
putationally indistinguishable from a real random string. A more detailed description
was provided by Goldreich [77]. The usefulness of pseudorandom strings in cryptog-
raphy and especially in private-key cryptosystems is significant as it guarantees that a
randomly looking ciphertext does not reveal any information about the plaintext to the
adversary. The notion of pseudorandom string actually refers to the randomness of a
distribution on this string. We say that a distribution D over a string is pseudorandom
if D is computationally indistinguishable from the uniformly random distribution D′
over strings of some length l.
In many cryptographic schemes it is advantageous to use pseudorandom functions
instead of pseudorandom strings. To define a pseudorandom function we also refer
to the distribution on these functions. A pseudorandom functions F is a a two-input
function F : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, where the first input denotes the key k and
the second input is a string x from the given interval. This function is efficient if there
is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm which taking as input k, x, computes the
output F (k, x). More detailed description on pseudorandom functions can be found
in [97]. As another example for the usefulness of these functions we mention the
simulation of a random oracle by Goldreich et al. [78] using a seed which is a short and
random string. Goldreich et al. [78] defined a function F (·, ·) such that considering
s being a seed, the function fs = F (s, ·) : {0, 1}a → {0, 1}b passes all efficient
statistical tests for oracles. This definition means that the output of the function fs
is indistinguishable from the output of the random oracle, even if the algorithm F is
public.
In this thesis we address the question of secure constructions of distributed crypto-
graphic protocols for digital signatures and public key encryption. We also provide
important applications of our constructions which are useful in the digital world today.
We consider that our constructions are incomparable in terms of security or functional-
ity with the already existing constructions. In the following two sections we provide a
detailed discussion on digital signatures and public key encryption.
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1.2 Digital Signatures.
The invention of modern network systems accomplished digital money transfer and
E-mail system. Digital signatures provide recognizably the best solution for digital
verifications on electronic transactions. They represent an electronic analogue for
manual signatures on the usual documents and therefore provide a stronger guarantee
than traditional handwritten signatures. The first digital signature scheme has been
developed in the 70s and is based on traditional cryptography. An overview on those
schemes has been provided by Matyas [117]. Those schemes had a quite complicated
construction procedure. After the invention of public-key cryptography by Diffie and
Hellman [59], the drawback in constructions of traditional cryptographic signatures
motivated the invention of modern digital signature schemes. A modern digital
signature provides an analogue to the private-key message authentication codes, as
described in the previous section.
Rivest et al. [140] introduced the new digital signature scheme. The advantages of
modern digital signatures is on the one hand the ability being verified by anyone using
a public key. On the other hand, the signature can not be forged or the signer can not
later deny that he did not sign the message. We can already infer from that description
that a digital signature scheme consists of a signer and a set of verifiers. Formally,
a digital signature scheme consists of three algorithms - key generation algorithm,
signing algorithm and verification algorithm. Key generation algorithm generates a
key pair (sk, pk), where sk denotes the signer’s secret key and pk is a public key. The
public key will be published by the signer. In the signing process the signer takes
his secret key sk, a message m and outputs a signature σ. In the verification process
anyone who knows the public key pk can verify the signature.
As an example presented in [96] we consider a software company which uses
digital signature when it wants to release a software patch. First, the company sends
the public key to its users. When it releases a patch m it also generates a signature on
this patch using the private key sk and publishes the patch together with the signature
on its website. If a user wants to download this patch he first checks with his public
key that the signature on m is legitimate. If a malicious party tries to modify the patch
by spoofing the webpage and posting (m′, σ′), the user would not be able to verify the
modified signature with the public key because he would realize that the patch has
been modified by some malicious party. This example shows that signatures provide
message authentication using a public channel. A digital signature enables a sender to
distribute the same message among many receivers. This operation can be realized by
distributing a public key and computing only one signature that can be verified by the
receivers using their own copy of the public key.
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Authenticity is not the only property of a digital signature scheme. There are two
other properties: Transferability and non-repudiation. The former follows from public
verifiability and means that if someone has verified the signature, then by making a
copy of the signature and showing it to another user, the later user can also successfully
verify the signature. Non-repudiation means that a signer cannot deny having signed the
message. This property is essential in case if a receiver needs to prove to a third party,
that the sender has signed (i.e. certified) a message. Digital signatures cover those
schemes which are computationally secure and cannot be perfectly secure even under
the assumption of a weak adversary. An efficient algorithm is called a polynomial-time
algorithm if it runs in polynomial time. A digital signature scheme is secure if an
adversary cannot succeed in forging a signature on a message m. This security notion
is called unforgeability. There are two differently strong notions of unforgeability.
The weaker notion assumes that an adversary succeeds in forging a signature if he is
able to prepare a valid message/signature pair m,σ, where m has not been queried
for a signature by a legitimate signer, i.e. m /∈ {m1, . . . ,mn}. The stronger security
definition states that an adversary succeeds if it outputs a new signature on already
queried message. Formally, that means (m,σ) /∈ {(m1, σ1), . . . , (mn, σn)}.
There are three different scenarios on how an adversary can control the signing
procedure [96]: (1) Random-message-attack describes a scenario where an adversary
does not have any control about the signature process and does not have any informa-
tion on which messages are signed. As an example we can describe a situation where
an adversary observes a set of signatures on random messages. (2) Known-message
attack describes an adversary who has some control over the messages which are
signed under the condition that he has to choose the messages in advance. The last
scenario is known as (3) (Adaptive) chosen-message attack. It models the strongest
attack, because it provides an adversary with complete control over the messages being
signed. This attack allows an adversary to choose messages adaptively upon seeing the
previous signature on a chosen message. To accomplish it, we provide an adversary
with the access to a signing oracle, which is used as a black box and on input of a
message outputs a valid signature. We should clarify that an oracle is just a theoretical
machine which models the interaction between adversary and the signer, assuming
that the adversary can convince the signer to sign chosen messages. There are varieties
of digital signatures which have been invented since the introduction of public-key
cryptography. We give an overview of those digital signatures which are most relevant
for this thesis.
Unique Signature. This is a signature scheme, where for each public key pk and
message m there is a unique string σ which passes the verification algorithm as a
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valid signature on message m. Unique signatures were introduced by Goldwasser and
Ostrovsky [81], who showed their close relation to non-interactive zero knowledge
proofs (NIZK). Since NIZK is especially relevant for our contribution we present here
a short overview of the concept. The concept of zero-knowledge proofs was introduced
by Goldwasser et al. [80]. We separate between interactive and non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs. An interactive zero-knowledge proof is an important tool in many
cryptographic protocols. The important feature of zero-knowledge proofs is that they
are convincing while they don’t reveal to the verifier any information about the content
of the statement, beyond the fact that the statement is valid. Zero-Knowledge is a
property of an interactive proof system. The formulation of this property considers
two probability distributions, where each of them concerns a valid assertion. The first
assertion describes the distribution of the verifier upon interacting with the prover.
We note that the verifier is running any efficient strategy. The second assertion is
the output of some polynomial-time algorithm. An interactive proof consists of two
parties, a prover and a verifier. The verifier is computationally bounded while the
prover does not have any computational limitations. The proof system for a set S
has to satisfy two properties, completeness and soundness. Completeness means that
for any element s ∈ S the verifier V always accepts after interacting with the prover
P . Soundness means that for any element s /∈ S and any potential proof strategy
P ′ the verifier rejects with a probability of at least 1/2. Randomness is essential for
an interactive proof system. Otherwise the prover could predict the verifier’s part
of interaction, such that the former could send a full transcript of interaction and let
the verifier check its validity. We note that an interaction with the computationally
weaker party is of great interest [76] for the parties of a zero-knowledge proof. To
avoid the rounds of interaction between prover and verifier, Goldwasser and Ostrovsky
[81] showed how to construct an efficient non-interactive zero knowledge proof from
invariant signatures (unique signatures).
Unique signatures are so useful because of their relation to the verifiable random
function (VRF). The latter was introduced by Micali et al. [120] and is similar to a
pseudorandom function (PRF) but with an additional property, verifiability. The initial
idea for the use of a PRF addressed the problem of implementing the random oracle
model (ROM), which was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [19]. Since the random
oracle model assumes existence of a publicly verifiable random function, the use of
PRF in implementation of ROM has some problems. Therefore, a random function
which also has the verifiability property would be favorable for the implementation.
As considered by Micali et al. [120], VRF could be constructed from an interactive
zero-knowledge proof [80] and a commitment scheme. The interaction in the zero-
knowledge proof can be removed by using random oracle. This idea was realized by
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Bellare and Goldwasser [15], who introduced the first model of non-interactive zero
knowledge (NIZK) proofs. This solution which on the one hand removes interaction
from the zero-knowledge proof, on the other hand suffers from another drawback.
The problem is, that the prover and verifier share a bit-string the shared string which
is supposed to be random. This leads to the question who is choosing the random
string. The disadvantage of such a pseudorandom oracle is that it is not verifiable.
Therefore the usage of pseudorandom oracles is limited. Micali et al. [120] suggested
an efficient way to enable the verification of random oracle by publicizing the seed
s. They provided a solution where neither a random string nor interaction between
the prover and verifier is required, but they required the owner of the function F to
publish its public key pk. This key could be used as a commitment to the function
f . Micali et al.’s construction [120] does not provide a direct construction of VRF
but a generic transformation from a verifiable unpredictable function. Verifiable
random function play an important role in many cryptographic protocols. The first
direct construction of VRF was provided by Dodis [60]. In contrast to pseudorandom
functions a VRF involves additionally to the secret key sk a public key pk with a
function Fpk(sk) : {0, 1}a → {0, 1}b which maps an a-bit string to a b-bit string.
VRF’s present an important tool for cryptographic protocols. They can also be used in
zero-knowledge proofs to reduce their round numbers of interaction.
Construction of VRF from PRF leads to many problems while solving them in
the standard model [113]. Thus, a new construction of VRF from unique signatures
was proposed by Lysyanskaya [113]. The biggest drawback of a verifiable random
function is its approach that puts too much trust into one honest party which makes it
to the single point of failure. This means that the honest party will break the security
of any application which depends on the random oracle assumption. The solution
for this problem was provided by Dodis [60]. He provided a distribution technique
of the role of the honest party among n parties. This technique is called distributed
pseudorandom function (DPRF) and distributed verifiable random function (DVRF).
In the same work, Dodis also presented the first distributed verifiable random function
DVRF.
Considering the construction of VRF from unique signatures by Lysyanskaya
[113], our first part of contribution of this thesis is given by a new construction of
DVRF from unique signatures. This approach is more advantageous than the direct
construction by Dodis [60], because our construction of DVRF from unique signatures
reduces the level of trust in the setup procedure and distribution of secret shares.
This is so, because each server of DVRF can generate her own secret and public
key from the underlying unique signature scheme. Since we address the question of
distributed verifiable random function, we cannot use just a traditional unique signature
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scheme. The signature scheme should output a set of signature/message pairs, where
the messages are signed by distinct signers, using their own secret keys. Aggregate
signature fulfills these requirements, because it considers a set of messages which are
signed by a set of signers. Our next part of contribution is to define the uniqueness
property of aggregate signatures and to provide examples for unique signature schemes.
To get a better understanding of aggregate signatures we provide an overview in the
following paragraphs.
Aggregate Signature. An aggregate signature represents a special flavour of digital
signatures which allows combination of different signatures signed by many users.
This scheme is useful for special cryptographic protocols which may benefit from an
aggregation of different signatures, because it would compress the list of signatures
to a more beneficial size. On input of n different signatures on n messages from n
distinct signers, an aggregate is a combination of all signatures to one single signature.
The first construction of aggregate signatures was introduced by Boneh et al. [32] with
applications to public key infrastructure (PKI) and border gateway protocol (BGP).
The usefulness of aggregate signatures is provided by reduction of the message size
in secure BGP protocols and by reducing the size of certificate chains in PKI. We
distinguish between two types of aggregation - general aggregation and sequential
aggregation [32]. In both cases there are n users where each of them possesses a key
pair (ski, pki) and each of the users signs a message mi. In a general signature scheme
each user signs its message using its secret key ski and outputs a signature σi. Anyone
can use the public aggregation algorithm, taking n signatures σ1, . . . , σn and compute
the aggregate signature σ. The aggregate verification algorithm checks whether the
aggregate signature σ is valid using the public keys pk1, . . . , pkn. This technique is
defined as general signature because the aggregation can be done by anyone who has
access to the scheme and without any cooperation of the signers.
The other aggregation technique is called sequential aggregation, where the aggre-
gation of signatures can only be done during the signing procedure. Each signer adds
its signature to the sequence of previous aggregate signatures. This assumes an explicit
order and a communication between the signers during the signature process. The first
construction of sequential aggregate signature scheme was suggested by Lysyanskaya
et al. [115] with its application to certificate chains. Their construction is based on
families of trapdoor permutations and is secure in the random oracle model. There
are benefits for both signature schemes. While the general signature scheme is more
powerful than the sequential aggregate one, the benefit of the use of the latter is that it
can be built from standard primitives such like RSA signature.
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Aggregate signatures are closely related to multisignatures [119, 128], where a set
of users signs the same message and the final result is a single signature. Micali et
al. [119] presented such signature and its applications. But because such applications
like certificate chains require signatures on different messages, multisignatures can
not be used in this case. Boneh et al. [32] also showed that aggregate signatures
can be applied to the constructions of verifiable encrypted signatures. An encrypted
signature scheme allows a sender to send a signature on an encrypted message which
was encrypted using third parties public key, and a receiver is enabled to verify this
signature with his public key. Applications for verifiable encrypted signatures can be
found in contract signing protocols with fair exchange, such as those in [137].
The next part of our contribution affects in particular two other flavours of digital
signatures, threshold signature and blind signature. We obtained the motivation for
this contribution from learning of the applications of verifiable random functions.
As mentioned earlier, VRF is useful as a building block in cryptographic protocols.
One of such useful protocols was presented by Camenisch et al. [38]. They used a
VRF for their design of an e-cash scheme. Camenisch et al’s scheme motivates to
use a threshold blind signature scheme to construct a distributed version of e-cash
system, which enables to distribute the role of the bank among n issuers such that
the level of trust is no longer focused on only one party. This application encourages
us to do further research in the area of distributed e-cash scheme and to provide a
secure construction of the scheme which would be valuable in the digital world of
finance. In this work we focus our interest on another essential application nowadays,
e-voting. Both, e-voting and e-cash schemes have constructions, which are based on
blind signatures [48, 49]. Our challenge was to construct a cryptographic protocol
which can be used for constructions of a distributed version of e-voting. Because of
the relevance to our work of the two flavours of digital signatures mentioned above,
we describe them in more details in the following paragraphs.
Blind Signature. This flavour of digital signatures is useful in cryptographic proto-
cols to guarantee anonymity of participants or privacy of customers, e.g. in e-voting
protocols. A blind signature scheme allows a user to obtain a valid signature for a
message m from the signer in such a way that the signer does not learn anything about
the content it is signing. On the other hand a secure blind signature scheme guarantees
that it is difficult for a user to forge a signature on any additional message. The first
blind signature scheme was presented by Chaum [48] and was used to construct an
electronic payment system protecting customer’s identity. While Chaum’s scheme is
based on RSA scheme [140], Camenisch et al.[42] presented two new blind signature
schemes. While one of them is based on a variation of DSA [1] the other one is con-
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structed from the Nyberg-Rueppel signature [124]. There are two properties, blindness
and unforgeability, which are satisfied by a secure blind signature scheme. Blindness
was first defined by Chaum [48] and means indistinguishability of an adversary in
deciding in which order the signatures have been issued by the signer. Adversary’s
indistinguishability is limited by a negligible success probability. The other property,
unforgeability, was defined by Pointcheval and Stern [135] and means that given l
signatures it is impossible for an adversary to compute l + 1 valid signatures. Later,
Chaum’s RSA based blind signature scheme was proved secure by Bellare et al. [17]
using the new computational assumption, known as "chosen-target-one-more-RSA-
inversion" assumption. Schröder [142] showed how to instantiate the random oracle
in schemes by Chaum [48] and by Poitcheval and Stern [135] and provided security
proof under the two standard assumptions, RSA or discrete logarithm. An earlier
construction by Boldyreva [27] which works in Gap Diffie-Hellmann groups was also
presented in the random oracle model. The differences of distinct instantiations of
blind signature schemes are given by round-complexity, underlying computational
assumptions and the model in which the schemes are defined.
Threshold Signature. This special signature represents a part of threshold cryptog-
raphy which was introduced by Desmedt [55] and further developed by Desmedt and
Frankel [58]. A survey of work in threshold cryptography was presented by Desmedt
in [56]. In a threshold signature scheme the secret key is distributed among a set of n
signers. If a user wants to obtain a signature on a message m, he sends it to the signers
who prepare partial signatures on the message, called signature shares and compute a
combined signature from those signature shares. We call a distributed signature scheme
a threshold signature scheme if for given threshold t ≤ n no coalition of t− 1 signers
can compute a valid signature, even if the system has computed a number of signatures
on distinct messages. The final signature is verifiable such that anyone who knows
the public key can verify the signature. The motivation for threshold signature came
from the arising interests of real-world organizations to allow a group of employees to
agree on signing a given document. Another reason for developing signature schemes
in threshold setting was the requirement to protect the secret key from an adversary
(internal or external). A distribution of the secret key among a set of signers makes
it harder for an adversary to learn that key. This is so, because an adversary would
need to corrupt at least t-out-of-n signers to be able to obtain a valid signature on the
required message and to reconstruct the secret key. The first constructions of threshold
signatures based on RSA signatures have been presented in [58, 141], and those which
are based on El Gamal signatures were introduced by Langford [104]. Gennaro et
al. [73] improved the construction of Langford by presenting a robust threshold DSS.
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In contrast to the construction in [104], Gennaro et al.’s scheme was proved secure
against dishonest signers during the signing process. The security of a threshold
signature scheme is guaranteed if the following two properties - unforgeability and
robustness - are satisfied by the construction. A t-out-of-n threshold signature scheme
is unforgeable if there is no malicious adversary corrupting at most t− 1 signer, could
perform a signature on a new message m. This should remain impossible even if this
adversary can see the signatures on chosen messages m1, . . . ,ml. The other property,
robustness, means that the system outputs a correct result even if there is a malicious
signer which was corrupted by an adversary.
As next we want to give an overview of the secret sharing techniques which are
useful for constructions of threshold signature schemes. Shamir [145] developed
a (t, n) secret sharing technique which is based on Lagrange interpolation. The
interpolation of a threshold signature scheme will be realized by choosing a polynomial
f of degree t− 1 in a field, such that f(0) equals to the chosen secret. Each party i of
the scheme receives a secret share f(i) which allows in collaboration with t− 1 other
parties to reconstruct the secret. The reconstruction follows from a subset of random
values which serve as constants of f(i) in a sum of t secret shares.
Another secret sharing technique was suggested by Feldman [65]. This method
also assumes secret shares f(i) for each signer but tolerates up to n−1
2
malicious
faults even including the dealer. The dealer broadcasts some values which allow the
signer to check whether the secret share f(i) is valid or not. We note that the value
of the secret key is only computationally secure. In contrast to this technique, the
unconditionally secure verifiable secret sharing technique [66] guarantees information
theoretic secrecy for the secret key. As another difference to the previous method the
latter tolerates up to n−1
3
malicious faults. The suggested secret sharing technique by
Pedersen [133, 134] provides secret sharing on random values, such that the shares
are uniformly distributed over the interpolation field. This scenario does not need any
dealer because all signers act as dealers of a randomly chosen secret, where the final
share is computed as the sum of the shares generated by each signer.
After the construction of the distributed e-voting we addressed the question whether
the distributed setting would be advantageous for secure e-mail transfer and for appli-
cations in cloud data storage systems. For this question we needed to consider public
key encryption schemes. In the following section we recall the main flavours of public
key encryption schemes and their security properties.
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1.3 Public Key Encryption
As described in the first subsection, public key cryptography has significantly changed
the view of cryptography. In contrast to private-key encryption, public-key cryptog-
raphy allows parties to communicate without sharing a common key, or some other
information in advance. The idea works as follows. A receiver generates a pair of
keys, where one of them is public to anyone and the other key remains secret and is
only known by the receiver. The receiver provides a sender with the public key via a
public channel which is assumed to be authenticated, such that an adversary cannot
modify that key. There is also another possibility to make the public key available
to everyone without directly interacting with the sender. The receiver can generate
the secret and public key by itself and publish the public key on his website or place
it in a public place such like a newspaper. This scenario allows multiple senders to
send multiple encryptions to the receiver using the same public key. This is one of
the advantages of public-key encryption which addresses the key distribution problem
because its participants do not need to secretly distribute a secret key in advance. But
in case when one receiver is communicating with many senders, it is easier to store
only one secret key than to share and to manage a number of different keys. Since
the public key is also visible to any potential adversary, the consequence is that the
security of a public-key encryption scheme relies on secrecy of sk.
The main drawback of public-key cryptography is that it is slower than private-key
cryptography. In case of implementations of public-key encryptions in hardware
devices it is less time-efficient than to implement a secret-key encryption. The conse-
quence is that a private-key encryption can be used in public-key models to increase
the efficiency of encryption of long data [97].
A public-key encryption consists of three algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec). The key
generation algorithm KeyGen outputs a key pair of public/secret keys. The encryption
algorithm Enc takes a message and a public key as input and generates an encryption on
this message using the public key. The decryption algorithm Dec takes the encrypted
value, the secret key and decrypts the ciphertext to obtain the original plaintext. In
cryptography which is society oriented, it is better in many situations to use a public
key for a group or a company while an appropriate number of people is required to
open a message. This requirement leads to the key distribution problem and has been
developed as theory, called threshold cryptography. As mentioned earlier, this concept
was introduced by Desmedt [55] and improved in [57] using practical non-interactive
public-key systems. It assumes a special number of people for calculating decryption
of a message. Desmedt and Franklin [57] proposed a practical solution where each
party is allowed to view the ciphertext computing their partial results of the ciphertext
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and providing an appropriate party with these results. A more detailed overview on
threshold encryption will be given in the following paragraphs.
There are different ways of defining security for a cryptographic scheme. In general
a security definition consists of two components:
(1) a detailed description of the assumed power of an adversary and how he can interact
with the users of a cryptosystem, and
(2) a description how an adversary can break the underlying scheme.
We will give a short overview on the specification of distinct power of an adversary
against encryption schemes. First, we consider a passive adversary who only observes
the encryption process or he is given a ciphertext which he tries to break. This kind of
attacks are called "ciphertext-only-attack" or "known-plaintext attack", respectively.
These both attacks are passive because the adversary is not interfering into the en-
cryption process, he is only playing the role of an eavesdropper. Considering an
active adversary we describe now two different attacks, chosen ciphertext and chosen
plaintext attack. Biryukov presented a detailed description of these attacks in [22].
A chosen plaintext attack (CPA) is a scenario where an adversary is able to chose
plaintext P and to obtain their corresponding ciphertext C after asking for encryptions
of this adaptively chosen plaintext. In symmetric cryptography, where the key is now
known to the adversary, this is given by allowing him to query the encryption oracle
OEnc on input plaintext P . The oracle is considered as a black-box that encrypts the
received plaintext using the public key which is also known by the adversary. When
the Enc algorithm is randomized, the oracle uses a fresh randomizer and returns a
new result. We use AOEnc(·) as a cryptographic notation for the computations of an
adversary with access to the encryption oracle. In contrast to symmetric cryptography,
in assymmetric cryptography the encryption of a plaintext is computed using a public
key which is known to the adversary. Therefore upon choosing a plaintext, he can
compute the corresponding encryption, using the known public key without needing
any access to an encryption oracle. The security of an encryption scheme is guaranteed
if A is not able to distinguish the encryption of two arbitrary messages.
The other security notion is security against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA),
which allows an adversary to chose ciphertext C and obtain its decryption P . In
contrast to the chosen plaintext attack, which applies to the encryption function we
note that the chosen ciphertext attack is applicable to the decryption function. So, we
allow an adversary to query a decryption oracle in addition to an encryption oracle.
The former computes decryption on input of a ciphertext using the secret key which is
not known to the adversary. Encryption oracle works in the same way as described
before for a chosen plaintext attack in case of symmetric encryption, and analogously
there is no encryption oracle needed in case of asymmetric encryption because of the
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public key that is used to compute the encryption of a plaintext. The shortcoming of
this scenario is its lower practicability in the real world situations. However a cipher
can be vulnerable to one of these two attacks. Therefore chosen ciphertext attack is
not less important in public key cryptography. We emphasize that the access to the
decryption oracle is unlimited, which means that an adversary may issue decryption
queries on ciphertext of his choice but considering some limitation. This limitation is
related to the following scenario: assuming that C is the ciphertext computed by an
adversary on some plaintext, the queries to decryption oracle may contain all possible
ciphertexts, apart of the previously computed C.
In the following paragraphs we recall the public-key encryption in threshold setting
and the different flavours of a standard public-key encryption, such as identity-based
encryption, public-key encryption with keyword search. These two flavours are
meaningful for the last part of our contribution, where we construct a distributed public
key encryption with keyword search.
Threshold Encryption. In comparison to the described digital signature schemes
there also exist encryption schemes which are defined in the threshold setting. One
of the strongest adversarial models in threshold cryptography is the adaptive erasure-
free model. This means that the adversary corrupts the player not at once but over
time, where its decision about corrupting the next player depends on its view of the
computation. After corrupting a player, this player needs to provide the adversary with
its entire computation history, such that nothing can be erased. Threshold public key
encryption is a system where the secret key is distributed among n decryption servers,
but only t of those servers are required to decrypt a ciphertext successfully. Usually
there is a function, called "combiner", which sends the ciphertext to the n servers
and receives n decryption shares from them. The designated party is able to decrypt
the ciphertext if it received a minimal number of valid partial results. The main aim
of a threshold cryptographic system is to keep its security even if a partial number
of servers became malicious. This technique shares the secret among many people
with the advantage that if someone forgets its secret share, there should be enough
other shareholders to reconstruct the initial secret. There are the same secret sharing
techniques as in threshold signatures which we talked about in the last Subsection
1.2. Using this techniques, the servers do not need to interact with each other to
prepare their decryption shares. The first threshold encryption scheme based on
RSA was presented by De Santis et al. [141] and was proved secure against chosen
plaintext attacks but it does not guarantee security against chosen ciphertext attacks.
Shoup and Gennaro [149] presented practical threshold encryption schemes which
are secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model. Boneh et al.
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[29] presented a threshold encryption scheme which can withstand chosen ciphertext
attacks and is secure in standard model. This scheme provides so the first construction
without using the random oracle methodology. In Chapter 4 we will look deeper into
the different scenarios regarding the attacks.
Identity-Based Encryption. Another very useful public key encryption scheme is
called identity-based encryption (IBE). The very basic concept of IBE was introduced
by Shamir [146] but the main interest on IBE schemes has arisen since the beginning of
this century. The motivation for an identity-based encryption scheme was to simplify
the e-mail transfer, described as follows. Assume Alice who encrypts a message and
sends it via e-mail to Bob. When Bob receives the encrypted e-mail, he authenticates
himself to the public key generator, who gives Bob the corresponding secret key. Using
this key, Bob can decrypt and read the message. An IBE contains an arbitrary string,
which can describe recipient’s identity and serves as a public key. The scheme consists
of four algorithms, where three of them - KeyGen, Enc, Dec - are the same as those of a
public key encryption. The additional algorithm is the private key derivation algorithm
KeyDer which takes as input an arbitrary string id and master key mk and outputs a
private key which is dependent on the identity id. In other words this algorithm extracts
a secret key from the given master key. The security model of an IBE scheme was
introduced by Boneh and Franklin [31] who provided the first solution for a provable
security in random oracle model. The security notion of an identity-based encryption
presents an extension of the previously described indistinguishability notion of a public
key encryption scheme. Attrapadung et al. [9] extended the security notions of an
IBE and proved the relations between the distinct notions. Those notions target three
essential security aims which are semantic security (SS), non-maleability (NM) and
indistinguishability (IND). There are also three attack models, namely chosen plaintext
attack (CPA), non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA1) and adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attack (CCA2). The combinations of these attack models with the security
targets result in nine security notions. We provide a detailed overview on definitions
of security notions of an IBE scheme in Chapter 5. An IBE has been presented in
the threshold setting by Boneh at al. [29]. Relating to this threshold setting there is
a difference between two identity-based schemes. We distinguish between threshold
identity-based encryption (TIBE) scheme, which was presented by Boneh at al. [29],
and threshold identity-based decryption (TIBD) scheme, introduced by Baeng and
Zheng [11]. The former generates first the master key share and the corresponding
verification keys of each share, finally using these shares, computes the private key
shares of each user. There is an algorithm which verifies the private key shares and a
combiner that collects at least t-out-of-n private key shares to reconstruct the secret
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key. Using this public key, one can encrypt some plaintext, which can be decrypted
by the decryption algorithm using the reconstructed secret key. In contrast to TIBE,
threshold decryption [11] is useful if someone is interested in decentralization of the
power to decrypt. In a threshold identity-based decryption scheme, there are a number
of users who possess their own secret key shares, to compute decryption shares of a
ciphertext. Upon receiving at least t-out-of-n decryption shares, the receiver verifies
first each of the shares and finally computes the decryption of a ciphertext.
Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search. Next, we want to discuss another
flavour of public key encryption, namely the public key encryption with keyword
search (PEKS). PEKS covers a problem of searching on encrypted data using public
key encryption. As motivation we observe a case where Bob wants to send an encrypted
e-mail to Alice using Alice’s public key for the encryption process. The e-mail will be
routed to a gateway which checks whether the encrypted e-mail contains a keyword
that is meaningful for Alice. If so, the gateway forwards the corresponding e-mail
to Alice. To make this scenario possible Boneh et al. [30] introduced the first PEKS
scheme and proved it secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the random oracle
model. To realize the search, the sender of the e-mail computes a ciphertext on some
keywords and sends this ciphertext (=PEKS) together with the encrypted e-mail to the
gateway. On the other side, the receiver computes a trapdoor on the required keyword
and forwards it to the gateway. Upon receiving the encrypted message and the trapdoor,
the gateway runs a test algorithm, which tests, whether the PEKS ciphertext includes
the keyword or not. This scenario enables the receiver to request e-mails on special
keywords which remain unknown to the gateway as well as the content of the e-mail
remains unrevealed. The security notions of a PEKS are indistinguishability and
consistency which we define in Chapter 5. Boneh et al. [30] also provided concrete
constructions of PEKS from an identity-based encryption scheme defined by Boneh
and Franklin [31].
Our contribution to the public key encryption consists of the new construction of a
threshold public key encryption with keyword search. As mentioned earlier, we were
motivated by the application of our scheme to the secure e-mail transfer and distributed
cloud data storage. More details about the content of this thesis follows in the next
section.
1.4 Outline of This Thesis
In Chapter 2 we observe the computation process of a Distributed Verifiable Random
Function (DVRF) on some input specified by the user involving multiple, possibly
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malicious servers, and resulting in a publicly verifiable pseudorandom output to the
user. Previous DVRF constructions assumed trusted generation of secret keys for the
servers and imposed a threshold on the number of corrupted servers. In this work we
propose the first approach for building DVRFs under much weaker setup assumptions,
where we only require existence of a shared random string. More precisely, we first
aim at constructions of Distributed Verifiable Unpredictable Functions (DVUF) that
can then be converted to DVRF using inner products with a random string as specified
by Micali, Rabin, and Vadhan (FOCS’99) for the non-distributed VUF/VRF case. Our
main contribution in this Chapter 2 are generic DVUF constructions from multisigna-
tures that satisfy the property of uniqueness. We define additionally the uniqueness
for two flavours of aggregate signatures (with public and sequential aggregation) and
refer later that they can also be used to obtain DVUF which we do not explicitly show
in this thesis. In contrast to the results in [101], where the two DVUF constructions
were given from unique aggregate signature and unique sequential aggregate signature
schemes, we deal in this thesis with multisignatures proving their uniqueness prop-
erty and applying them for the construction of a distributed verifiable unpredictable
function.
In Chapter 3 we formalize the concept of threshold blind signatures (TBS) that
bridges together properties of the two well-known signature flavours, blind signatures
and threshold signatures. Using TBS, the users can obtain signatures through interac-
tion with t-out-of-n signers without disclosing the corresponding message to any of
them. Our construction is the first TBS scheme that achieves security in the standard
model and enjoys the property of being rerandomizable. The security of our construc-
tion holds according to most recent security definitions for blind signatures by Schröder
and Unruh [144] that are extended in this work to the threshold setting. Rerandom-
izable TBS schemes enable constructions of distributed e-voting and e-cash systems.
We highlight that our TBS scheme can be used to construct a e-voting scheme that
simultaneously achieves privacy, soundness, individual verifiability in the presence of
distributed registration authorities, following the general approach by Koenig, Dubuis,
and Haenni [100], where existence of TBS schemes was assumed but no concrete
construction given. The authors [100] suggested RSA TBS and Schnorr TBS scheme
as possible building blocks for realization of distributed e-voting schemes. With our
TBS construction we provide a building block for their e-voting scheme. Some results
following from this chapter are presented at the conference InTrust2014 and published
in [102]. In this thesis, in contrast to paper [102] we carried out some improvements
regarding the security property. In [102], we defined a new unforgeability property in
the distributed setting. In this thesis we recall the stronger definition of unforgeability
from [144], called "honest-user unforgeability" and define the distributed version of it.
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We also modified the security proof of TBS scheme according to the new definitions
and showed that the in [102] presented short description of an e-voting scheme is not
publicly but individually verifiable. We also emphasize that a more advanced e-voting
scheme which also fulfills the requirement of receipt-freeness and public verifiability
is a goal for our future work.
In Chapter 4 we introduce Threshold Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search
(TPEKS), a variant of PEKS where the search procedure for encrypted keywords
is distributed across multiple servers in a threshold manner. TPEKS schemes offer
stronger privacy protection for keywords in comparison to traditional PEKS schemes.
In particularly, they prevent keyword guessing attacks by malicious servers. This
protection is not achievable in a single-server PEKS setting. We show how TPEKS can
be built generically from any anonymous Identity-Based Threshold Decryption (IBTD),
assuming the latter is indistinguishable, anonymous and robust. In order to instantiate
our TPEKS construction we describe an efficient IBTD variant of the Boneh-Franklin
IBE scheme. We provide an appropriate security model for such IBTD schemes and
give an efficient construction in the random oracle model.TPEKS constructions are
particularly useful in distributed cloud storage systems where none of the servers alone
is sufficiently trusted to perform the search procedure and where there is a need to split
this functionality across multiple servers to enhance security and reliability. Finally
we compare our construction with the Dual-Server PEKS introduced by [50]. Most of
the results we provide in this chapter are presented at the conference InTrust2015 and
published in [103]. However there are several improvements in the proofs of IBTD
and TPEKS schemes. In this Chapter 4 we prove the IBTD indistinguishability under
the computational BDH assumption, instead of the decisional BDH assumption as
presented in [103]. We also provide a clearer and more detailed description of the
application of PEKS to cloud setting. We omit the second scenario of our application
in [103], because in the end it represents the same case as the first one.
1.5 Conclusion
This thesis presents useful solutions to multi-party computation problems. Secure
multi-party computation deals with scenarios where a certain group of parties with
private inputs which should stay secret to other parties respectively, wants to compute
a particular function of these inputs in a common way of computation. A tutorial-
like introduction of secure multi-party computation problems has been provided by
Lindell and Pinkas [109]. Distributed cryptography has close relations to multi-party
computations, since the reason of distributed or threshold cryptography is given by the
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fact that a number of distinct parties jointly contribute to the computation of certain
functions which are useful for the constructions of secure cryptographic protocols in
distributed setting. As Lindell and Pinkas [109] noted, the aim of secure multi-party
computations is to make those computations secure in the distributed setting. Thus
we state that the results of this thesis provide useful solutions which help to satisfy
the main aim of secure multi-party computation problems. The underlying work was
motivated by developing solutions for different real world applications which require
distributed settings in their construction to improve their level of security. The research
started first with developing an important cryptographic tool - distributed verifiable
random function - which can be used as a building block and plays an inevitable role
in many cryptographic protocols. The further research continued after observing multi-
party computation tasks such as e-voting and searchable encryption techniques which
were used as motivation in Chapter 3 and 4. Through this research I learned how to
construct the nowadays meaningful applications and to improve their security notions
by defining cryptographic primitives in the distributed setting in order to distribute
the single point of failure among multiple parties. This work encourages to continue
the research on distributed cryptography and to provide new solutions to the current
cryptographic problems.
Chapter 2
Unique Aggregate Signatures with
Applications to Verifiable Random
Functions
2.1 Introduction
Goldwasser and Ostrovsky [81] established the equivalence between unique signatures
and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZK) for hard-to-predict languages. The
main application of unique signatures, e.g. in [61, 114], has been the construction
of Verifiable Random Functions (VRF) [120] — these are pseudorandom functions
with a corresponding private/public key pair (sk, pk) that on some input x output a
pair (F (sk, x), π(sk, x)) where F (sk, x) is pseudorandom and π(sk, x) represents a
proof for the correctness of the computation that can be verified in a public fashion
using pk. In order to construct VRFs from unique signatures one first needs to
construct a so-called Verifiable Unpredictable Function (VUF) and then apply the
transformation from [120] to convert VUF into VRF. For the actual construction of
VUF out of a unique signature scheme one simply considers the signer’s secret key
as a secret seed and treats the resulting unique signature (or its unique component)
as a VUF output, whose correctness can be checked publicly using the verification
procedure of the signature scheme and the signer’s public key. As observed in [4], who
constructed VRFs in the identity-based setting, VRFs turned out to be very useful for
many applications, including resettable zero-knowledge proofs [121], micropayment
schemes [122], updatable zero-knowledge databases [110], and verifiable transaction
escrow schemes [91].
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Distributed VRFs In a distributed VRF (DVRF) setting, considered by Dodis [60],
there are multiple parties (servers), each in possession of its own secret and public
key such that any subset of n servers can participate in the computation process.
The approach taken in [60] to build a DVRF scheme was to first propose a concrete
VRF construction and then turn it into DVRF by using the (t + 1, n)-secret sharing
technique [145] to equip servers with individual shares ski of the private VRF key
sk. In addition, for each party i an individual public key pki is derived from ski. In
order to compute the DVRF output (F (sk, x), π(sk, x)) the input x is communicated
by the user to each of the n parties that reply with their intermediate VRF outputs
(F (ski, x), π(ski, x)). If at least t + 1 intermediate VRF proofs π(ski, x) are valid
(which is checked using corresponding public keys pki) then the final DVRF output
(F (sk, x), π(sk, x)) can be computed by the user through polynomial interpolation.
The validity of the resulting DVRF proof π(sk, x) can be checked publicly using the
original pk of the underlying VRF scheme.
The DVRF construction from [60] is reasonably efficient, yet has a few limitations,
as discussed in the following. One consequence of using (t+ 1, n)-secret sharing is
that in order to guarantee pseudorandomness of F (sk, x) at least t+1 parties involved
in its computation process must remain honest. The DVRF scheme from [60] requires
a trusted setup procedure for the generation and distribution of shares ski, which is a
strong assumption. The assumption on trusted setup could possibly be removed by
adopting a matching Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocol, e.g. [74], yet at the
cost of reduced efficiency and possibly further restrictions on the ratio between the
threshold value t+ 1 and n.
We observe that the approach taken in [60] to apply threshold cryptography on top
of a non-distributed VRF scheme is so far the only known way to construct DVRF
schemes.
The original motivation for DVRF schemes given in [60] is the practical realization
of random oracles, a theoretical construct introduced in [19] that is frequently used in
security proofs of cryptographic schemes. In a nutshell, random oracle is a mathemati-
cal function that on any new input outputs a random string from the output domain.
Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali [78] were the first who showed how to simulate a
random oracle for fixed-length input and output strings by using a PRF. Canetti et al.
[44] showed that no fixed public function can generically replace the random oracle.
They demonstrated that a PRF should not be expected to offer a general solution for
realizing random oracles. Micali, Rabin, and Vadhan [120] suggested that a random
oracle can be realized using VRF schemes. Dodis observed that this would require
a significant amount of trust put into a single party that computes VRF outputs and
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argued that it is desirable to distribute this trust across multiple, ideally independent
parties.
Our DVRF approach from Multisignatures In this work we propose another ap-
proach for building DVRF schemes without imposing trust assumptions on the genera-
tion of secrets keys ski for the involved servers and without requiring any particular
threshold on the number of honest servers. Our main contribution is to build DVRF
scheme generically from a multisignature scheme [26] that represents a special case
of aggregate signatures in that all signers are required to use the same message in
the execution of the signing protocol. A multisignature scheme was introduced by
Itakura and Nakamura [90] and was later intensively researched in works such as
[26, 86, 87, 119, 126–128]. All schemes differ in the number of signers that are
required to prepare a multisignature. While schemes in [126, 127] require all players
of the group to sign the message, the signatures in [26, 119] support also subgroups of
signers. The signing process of multisignature schemes from [12, 18, 119] requires
several rounds of interaction amongst the participating signers. Those schemes, if
unique, can be possibly used to realize a DVUF but at the cost of increased communi-
cation overhead, in comparison to the more efficient multisignature scheme in [26]
used in our constructions, which requires only one round of communication. On the
other hand, there exist several multisignature schemes where the signing process is
non-interactive, e.g. [26, 28, 112, 160]. These schemes seem to satisfy the unique-
ness property and could possibly be used to obtain communication-efficient DVUF
constructions. For instance, Boldyreva’s scheme [26] that uses Gap Diffie-Hellman
groups and is based on BLS signatures [33], when realized using pairings, offers an
efficient performance for a DVUF, in the random oracle model.
Just as in case of a VRF that can be obtained from a VUF we show that multisigna-
tures can be used to build a distributed VUF (DVUF), which can then be converted to a
DVRF using the techniques from [120]. In order to construct DVUFs from multisigna-
tures the latter require some sort of uniqueness. Since the property of uniqueness in the
context of multisignatures and aggregate signatures has not been considered so far, we
first need to define it. We define uniqueness for both primitives, multisignatures [26]
and aggregate signatures with public aggregation (cf. [32]) and denote such schemes
by UMS or UAS, respectively. We also provide definition of uniqueness of ordered
multisignatures [28] and of sequential aggregate signatures (cf. [143]), denoted by
UOMS or USAS, respectively. Our definition of uniqueness in both cases roughly
means that for any multisignature or aggregate signature σ¯ produced on the same set
of messages m or on the set of different messages using the same set of private keys
28 Unique Aggregate Signatures with Applications to Verifiable Random Functions
sk = {sk1, . . . , skn} there exists no other multisignatures/aggregate signature σ¯ such
that Vrfy(pk,m, σ¯) = Vrfy(pk,m, σ¯) = 1.
At a high level, our DVUF construction from any multisignature scheme proceeds
as follows: the DVUF public key pk consists of all UMS/UOMS public keys pki while
each UMS/UOMS secret key ski is generated individually by the respective DVUF
server i. The DVUF output (F (sk, x), π(sk, x)) is essentially given by (unq(σ¯), σ¯)
where unq(σ¯) determines the unique component of multisignature σ¯, which in turn
plays the role of the proof. Note that each server signs the same message x that is
specified by the user as input to DVUF. The actual computation process and inter-
action differs for UMS and UOMS schemes. Our most efficient UMS-based DVUF
construction requires only one communication round in which the user sends x to each
of the n servers. A trusted party obtains their individual signatures and then computes
a multisignature to obtain the DVUF output. In the UOMS-based DVUF construction
the user needs to contact n servers sequentially and obtains the resulting DVUF output
and the proof upon contacting the last server in the sequence.
DVUF/DVRF Instantiations We obtain several concrete DVUF/DVRF instantia-
tions from existing (sequential) aggregate signatures schemes by proving the unique-
ness property for the (pairing-based) aggregate signature schemes by Boneh et al. [32]
and Schröder [143]. The scheme from [32] is a very efficient random oracle-based
construction that supports public aggregation of signatures. The scheme from [143] of-
fers sequential aggregation in the standard model and is based on the popular signature
scheme that shows how to aggregate Camenisch-Lysyanskaya [40] signatures.
Our UMS-based approach for constructing DVUF and consequently DVRF has
two advantages over [60]: (1) the uniqueness and unforgeability properties of UAMS
scheme will guarantee that the DVRF output F (sk, x) is pseudorandom even if the
adversary corrupts up to n− 1 servers; (2) since each server i can generate her own
UMS key pair (ski, pki) independently, our DVUF construction doesn’t require any
trusted setup procedure for the distribution of ski. When using the inner product-based
technique from [120] to convert out DVUF outputs into DVRF outputs we need to
impose existence of a shared random string [64] as an additional, albeit much weaker
setup assumption than the trustworthy generation of secret keys adopted in [60].
A Note on Unique (Sequential) Aggregate Signatures Our generic DVUF con-
structions can also be analyzed from the perspective of unique aggregate signatures
(UAS), yet their instantiations may not necessarily be more communication-efficient
than those of multisignatures presented in our work. This is because all existing
aggregate signatures are also non-interactive in that, just as in our construction of
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DVUF form multisignatures, at most one message needs to be exchanged between
the signers. Aggregate signatures [32, 143] are related to multisignatures and also
allow a group of players to sign different messages and to aggregate the multiple
signatures. It is possible to build DVRF schemes generically from different flavours
of aggregate signatures [32, 115] where each signer i has its own private/public key
pair (ski, pki) and a set of n signers contributes to the computation of an aggregate
signature σ¯ on some set of (possibly different) messages m = {m1, . . . ,mn} where
the size of resulting σ¯ is independent of n. The signature can be verified using the set
of public keys pk = {pk1, . . . , pkn}. One advantage of using these non-interactive
multisignatures in comparison to corresponding aggregate signatures is that by adding
further “proofs of secret key possession” from [139] one could obtain a higher level of
security against rogue key attacks that is notoriously difficult to achieve for the more
general case of aggregate signatures.
2.2 Definitions
In this section we provide the most important definitions and assumptions for this chap-
ter. We start with the definitions of Gap-Diffie-Hellman groups and Diffie-Hellman
(DH) problems of this group. The decisional and computational (DDH and CDH)
assumptions will be used in Chapter 2.6.
Definition 1 (GDH Group). A group G of order q is a GDH group if there exists an
efficient algorithm VrfyDDH(·) which solves the DDH problem from Definition 3 in G
and there is no polynomial-time (in |q|, where | · | denotes the absolute value of q, i.e.
|q| is positive) algorithm which solves the CDH problem from Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH)). Given the random
triple (g, u, v) of elements in G, to compute h = glogg u logg v.
Definition 3 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH)). Given the four elements
(g, u, v, h) from G which with equal probability can be all random elements of G or
have the property that logg u = logv h, to output 0 in former case and 1 else.
All concrete constructions used in this work are given in the setting of bilinear
groups, defined in this paragraph. Bilinear groups consist of abstract algebraic groups,
G1,G2,GT with a function e called a bilinear map which takes as input one element
from G1 and one element from G2 and outputs an element in GT . The best realization
of bilinear groups comes from elliptic curve groups, where the elements of a group
describe points on an elliptic curve. Bilinear groups were originally used to imple-
ment the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [93]. Constructions of cryptographic
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schemes based on bilinear maps gained interest since the invention of IBE scheme
based on bilinear groups by Boneh and Franklin [31]. The use of bilinear maps enabled
the construction of a polynomial-time IBE scheme which was an unsolved problem
since the proposed scheme by Shamir [146]. In the following definition we give a
formal description of bilinear groups.
Definition 4 (Bilinear Groups). Let G(1λ), λ ∈ N be an algorithm that on input a
security parameter 1λ outputs the description of two cyclic groups G1 = ⟨g1⟩ and
G2 = ⟨g2⟩ of prime order q with |q| = 1λ, where possibly G1 = G2, and an efficiently
computable e : G1 ×G2 → GT with GT being another cyclic group of order q. The
group pair (G1,G2) is called bilinear if e(g1, g2) ̸= 1 and ∀u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, ∀a, b ∈
Z : e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
Digital Signatures are used as a stand-alone application as well as a tool in other
cryptographic protocols, as we will see in the coming section on e-voting and e-cash.
Definition 5 (Digital Signature Scheme). Let M be a message space, 1λ a security
parameter. A digital signature scheme consists of the following algorithms:
KeyGen(1λ) : On input the security parameter 1λ it generates a public and secret key
pair (sk, pk).
Sign(sk,m) : On input the signer’s secret key sk and a message m, it outputs a
signature σ on m.
Vrfy(pk, σ,m) : On input a public key pk, a signature σ and a message m the
algorithm verifies the validity of the signature and outputs 1 or 0.
The scheme satisfies correctness and security which are defined as follows:
Correctness: If a message m is in the message spaceMpk for a given public key pk,
where sk is the corresponding secret key, then the output of Sign(sk,m) algorithm
will always be verified by the Vrfy(pk, σ,m) algorithm. More formally for all m and
1λ:
Pr[(sk, pk)← KeyGen(1λ); σ ← Sign(sk,m) : m ∈Mpk∧Vrfy(pk, σ,m) = 0] = 0.
Security: Even if an adversary A has oracle access to the signing algorithm and
receives signatures on chosen messages,A cannot create a valid signature on a message
m which was not explicitly queried to the oracle. More formally, for all ppt adversaries
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A, there exists a negligible function ϵ(λ) such that
Pr[(sk, pk)← KeyGen(1λ);(Q,m, σ)← AOSign(sk,·)(pk) :
Vrfy(pk, σ,m) = 1 ∧ (m,σ) /∈ Q)] = ϵ(λ),
Where Q is a set recording all queried inputs x and corresponding outputs (x, σ).
In the following definition we introduce the notion of collision-resistant hash
functions, which are significant for many cryptographic constructions. A hash function
is a function which takes an arbitrary string as input, compresses it and outputs a
shorter string. A hash function H(·) is called collision-resistant if for two different
strings x, x′ the output of the hash function is different too, i.e. H(x) ̸= H(x′). In the
following Definition 6 we observe a family of hash functions which are indexed by k:
Definition 6 (Hash-Function [97]). A hash function is described by a pair of probabilis-
tic polynomial time algorithms (KeyGen, Hash) satisfying the following functionalities:
KeyGen(1λ) : is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that takes as input a secu-
rity parameter 1λ and outputs a index k.
Hash(k, x) : There exists a polynomial l such that the algorithm takes as input a index
k and a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs a string Hashk(x) = Hash(k, x) ∈
{0, 1}l(λ).
If Hashk is defined only for inputs x ∈ {0, 1}l′(λ) and l′(λ) > l(λ), then (KeyGen, Hash)
is called a fixed-length hash function for inputs of length l′(λ).
In general there is no requirement on the length of input to be greater than the
length of output. This is so, because the hash function accepts as input all binary
strings and therefore especially such strings which are greater than l(λ).
Definition 7. A hash function Π = (Gen, Hash) is collision-resistant if for all proba-
bilistic polynomial-time adversaries A the success probability in Hash− collA,Π(λ)
experiment is negligible, i.e. Pr[Hash− collA,Π = 1] ≤ ϵ(λ). The experiment
Hash− collA,Π is defined as follows:
1. Choose a key k ← Gen(1λ)
2. (x, x′)← A(k)
3. Outputs 1 if and only if x ̸= x′ and Hk(x) = Hk(x′).
This situation is called a collision.
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Later in this chapter, Section 2.6 we construct the distributed version of verifiable
random functions (VRF). But now we want to recall the non-distributed version of a
VRF. As mentioned earlier in the introduction of this Chapter 2, verifiable random
functions are an extension of pseudorandom functions which allow public verifiability
of a random seed.
Definition 8 (Verifiable Random Function [60]). A family of verifiable random func-
tions (VRF) is represented by a function family F (·, ·) : {0, 1}a(λ) → {0, 1}b(λ), if
there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Gen and deterministic algo-
rithms Prove and Vrfy such that: Gen(1λ) outputs a pair of secret and public key
(sk, pk); (F (sk, x), π(sk, x))← Prove(sk, x), where π(sk, x) is the proof of correct-
ness, and Vrfy(pk, x, y, π) verifies that y = F (sk, x) using the proof π. We require
the following properties:
Uniqueness: guarantees that no value (pk, x, y1, y2, π1, π2) can satisfy Vrfy(pk, x,
y1, π1) = Vrfy(pk, x, y2, π2), when y1 ̸= y2.
Provability: if (y, π) = Prove(sk, x), then Vrfy(pk, x, y, π) = 1.
Pseudorandomness: Consider the following experiment with the PPT adversaryA =
(A1,A2) and an oracleOProve(·), that on input x outputs (F (sk, x), π(sk, x)):
1. (sk, pk)← Gen(1λ)
2. (x∗, st)← AOProve(·)1 (pk)
3. y0 = F (sk, x∗); y1 ← {0, 1}m(λ)
4. choose b← {0, 1}
5. b′ ← AOProve(·)2 (yb, st)
A succeeds if b = b′ and it did not query its oracle on input x∗. We require that
adversary’s success probability is at most 1/2 + ϵ(λ), where ϵ(λ) is a negligible
function in security parameter λ.
The definition means that no new function value can be distinguished from a
random string y1, even if the adversary can see other function values together with
the proofs. Since our construction of DVRF follows from a distributed verifiable
unpredictable function (DVUF), we recall here the original version of VUF.
A verifiable unpredictable function (VUF) was defined by Micali et al. [120].
Definition 9. A family of functions F (·, ·) : {0, 1}a(λ) → {0, 1}b(λ) describes a family
of VUFs if it satisfies the same properties of uniqueness and provability of the VRFs,
except the pseudorandomness property is replaced by the unpredictability property
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which is defined as follows:
Unpredictability: consider the following experiment with the PPT adversary A, and
an oracle OProve(·) that on input x outputs F (sk, x), π(sk, x), where π(sk, x) is the
proof that y = F (sk, x):
1. (sk, pk)← Gen(1λ)
2. (x∗, y∗)← AOProve(·)(pk)
A succeeds if y∗ = F (sk, x∗) and it did not query its oracle on input x∗. We require
that adversary’s success probability is at most ϵ(λ), where ϵ(λ) is a negligible function
in security parameter λ.
To transform a VUF into a VRF we choose a uniformly random string r, take a
VUF F (·, ·) and define a VRF F ′(·, ·) by computing ⟨F (·, x), r⟩, where ⟨·, ·⟩ denotes
inner product mod 2. This conversion technique was introduced by Goldreich-Levin
[79]. The proof, that F ′(·, x) = y′ consists of a value y such that y′ = ⟨y, r⟩ is given
by π′ and a proof that F (·, x) = y is given by π, such that π′ = (y, π).
In the following four Sections 2.3−2.6 we introduce preliminary work by recalling
aggregate signatures and multisignatures. We provide two flavours of each primitive,
namely non-sequential and sequential aggregates signature as well as non-ordered and
ordered multisignatures. We also prove their uniqueness. In the last section 2.7 we
present a construction of a DVRF function from multisignature scheme. We emphasize
that a construction from DVRF is also possible from aggregate signatures assuming
that all signers of a group sign a different message. We do not provide a detailed
DVRF construction from unique aggregate and unique sequential aggregate signatures
but leave it open for our future research.
2.3 Unique Aggregate Signatures
The uniqueness property for digital signatures, introduced by Goldwasser and Ostro-
vsky [81], guarantees that all signatures produced by one signer on the same message
remain "similar" in that there exists an efficient publicly computable function that
yields the same unpredictable value on input of any such signature. This property has
been explored for traditional signature schemes [81, 114] and more recently in the
context of advanced schemes such as group signatures [69] and ring signatures [68]
where it enabled more efficient anonymity revocation resp. linkability procedures. The
uniqueness property doesn’t require all signatures to be identical as it is the case for
34 Unique Aggregate Signatures with Applications to Verifiable Random Functions
deterministic schemes. In fact, it is sufficient for an unique signature to contain some
unique component that can be used to link different signatures of the same signer on
the same message.
In this section we recall definitions of aggregate signatures with public aggregation
and define their uniqueness property. We adopt the syntax and the security model
from [32].
Definition 10 (AS scheme). An aggregate signature scheme AS consists of the follow-
ing algorithms:
ParGen(1λ): is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter 1λ and
outputs public system parameters I .
KeyGen(I): is a PPT algorithm that takes as input I and generates a private/public
key pair (ski, pki) for an user i.
Sign(ski,mi): is a possibly deterministic algorithm that takes as input a secret key
ski and a message mi and outputs a signature σi.
Vrfy(pki,mi, σi): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a candidate signa-
ture σi, a public key pki, and a message mi, and outputs 1 if the signature is valid and
0 otherwise.
Aggreg(pk,m,σ): is an algorithm that takes as input a set of signatures σ =
(σ1, ..., σn), public keys pk = (pk1, . . . , pkn), and messages m = (m1, . . . ,mn), and
outputs an aggregate signature σ¯.
AggVrfy(pk,m, σ¯): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a candidate
aggregate signature σ¯, a set of messages m and public keys pk, and outputs 1 if the
signature is valid, or 0 otherwise.
Definition 11 (Unforgeability of AS). An aggregate signature scheme is unforgeable
if for any PPT adversary A, running in time at most t and invoking the signing oracle
at most qS times, the probability that the following experiment outputs 1 remains
negligible in the security parameter λ.
Experiment ForgeASA (λ)
1. I ← ParGen(1λ)
2. (skc, pkc)← KeyGen(I)
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3. (m∗,pk∗, σ∗)← AOSign(skc,·)(I, pkc)
Let mc be the message those index in m∗ corresponds to the index of pkc in pk∗.
4. Output 1 if all of the following holds:
• AggVrfy(σ∗,m∗,pk∗) = 1,
• mc ∈m∗ was never submitted to OSign(skc, ·)
where A is given access to the following aggregate signing oracle:
OSign(skc·): The adversarial input to the oracle contains a message mi under the
public key pkc, the oracle computes the signature σi on mi using skc and gives
the signature to A.
Our definition of uniqueness for aggregate signatures with public aggregation is
given in Definition 12. This definition fits likewise probabilistic and deterministic
schemes due to the use of function unq, even though we are not aware of any (non-
interactive) probabilistic scheme that supports public aggregation.
Definition 12 (Unique AS). An unforgeable AS scheme is said to be unique, denoted
by UAS, if there exists an efficient deterministic function unq which on input an
aggregate signature σ¯ outputs a string of polynomial-size in the security parameter of
the scheme such that for any ordered sequence of messages m = (m1, . . . ,mn) and
public keys pk = (pk1, . . . , pkn) there exist no two aggregate signatures σ¯ and σ¯ for
which it holds that Vrfy(pk,m, σ¯) = Vrfy(pk,m, σ¯) = 1, and unq(σ¯) ̸= unq(σ¯).
In the following section we recall the already introduced aggregate signature
scheme by Boneh et al. [32] and prove its uniqueness property. In this way we provide
a cryptographic tool with a new property which can be used in our future research for
creating a DVRF scheme from aggregate signatures.
2.3.1 Uniqueness of Boneh-Gentry-Lynn-Shacham AS Scheme
We recall the aggregate signature scheme with public aggregation from [32] where the
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 is modeled as a random oracle.
ParGen(1λ): On input of the security parameter 1λ this algorithm outputs public pa-
rameters I = (G1,G2, g1, g2, ψ, e,GT , q), with ψ(g2) = g1, where ψ is a computable
isomorphism from G2 to G1.
KeyGen(I): For an user i, choose randomly xi
r← Zq and compute vi ← gxi2 . It
outputs (ski, pki) = (xi, vi).
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Sign(mi, ski): For all i, it takes as input ski and a message mi ∈ {0, 1}∗. The
algorithm computes hi ← H(mi), where hi ← G1 and σi ← hxii . Output is σi ∈ G1.
Vrfy(mi, pki, σi): For all i ∈ [n] the algorithm takes as input mi and σi. It outputs 1
if e(σi, g2) = e(hi, vi) and 0 otherwise.
Aggreg(pk,m,σ): On the input pk,m,σ the algorithm computes σ¯ ←
n∏
i=1
σi. The
aggregate signature is σ¯ ∈ G1.
AggVrfy(pk,m, σ¯): This algorithm takes as input an aggregate signature σ¯,a se-
quence of messagesm = (m1, ...,mn) and a sequence of pubic keys pk = (v1, . . . , vn)
∈ G2, for all users ui. The algorithm outputs 1 if the messages mi are all distinct and
e(σ¯, g2) =
n∏
i=1
e(hi, vi). Otherwise the algorithm outputs 0.
The above scheme offers unforgeability in the random oracle model, as already
proven in [32]. Interestingly, our Theorem 1 shows that this scheme is unique without
imposing the random oracle assumption on H .
Theorem 1. The Boneh-Gentry-Lynn-Shacham AS scheme is unique according to
Definition 12.
Proof. Assume that there exist two valid aggregate signatures σ¯ and σ¯ on an ordered
sequence of messages m = (m1, ...,mi) such that the equation Vrfy(pk,m, σ¯) =
Vrfy(pk,m, σ¯) = 1. We define unq(σ¯) as an identity function. That is, unq(σ¯) = σ¯
and unq(σ¯) = σ¯. We know that σ¯ =
i∏
j=1
h
xj
j . In the following we prove by induction
on i that σ¯ = σ¯:
Base step: i = 1. The signature σ¯ must satisfy the verification process e(σ, g2) =
e(h, v), i.e. e(σ¯, g2) = e(h, gx2 ) = e(h
x, g2). It holds only if σ¯ = hx = σ¯.
Induction step: i− 1 7→ i . Let the theorem hold for i− 1. The verification algorithm
will accept σ¯i if it satisfies the verification equation e(σ¯i, g2) =
i∏
j=1
e(hj, vj). By
the induction hypothesis we have the validity for i− 1 aggregated signatures,
i.e. σ¯i−1 =
i−1∏
j=1
h
xj
j and σ¯i = σ¯i−1 · σ˜i. We put this value into the verification
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equation such that:
e
((
i−1∏
j=1
h
xj
j
)
· σ˜i, g2
)
=
i∏
j=1
e(hj, vj) =
i∏
j=1
(hj, g
xj
2 )
⇔e
(
i−1∏
j=1
h
xj
j , g2
)
e(σ˜i, g2) =
i−1∏
j=1
e(hj, g
xj
2 )e(hi, g
xi
2 )
⇔ e(σ˜i, g2) = e(hi, gxi2 ) = e(hxii , g2)⇔ σ˜i = hxii .
Therefore we have σ¯i = σ¯i−1 · σ˜i =
i−1∏
j=1
h
xj
j · hxii = σ¯i.
Note on proof: Additionally to the above provided proof which employs the well-
known induction technique, we note that there is another proof which is more direct
than the provided one. Since the unique function of signature σ is given by unq(σ) =
σ, then follows e(σ¯, g2) = e(σ¯, g2) and therefore holds σ¯ = σ¯.
2.4 Unique Sequential Aggregate Signatures
In the following we recall the definition of sequential aggregate signature using the
syntax and security model from [115] and define its uniqueness.
Definition 13 (SAS scheme). A sequential aggregate signature scheme SAS consists
of the following algorithms:
ParGen(1λ): is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter 1λ and
outputs public system parameters I .
KeyGen(I): is a PPT algorithm that takes as input I and outputs a private/public
key pair (ski, pki) for an user i.
AggSign(ski,mi, σ¯i−1,mi−1,pki−1): is a PPT algorithm that on input a private
key ski, a message mi ∈ {0, 1}∗, an aggregate-so-far signature σ¯i−1, a sequence
of messages mi−1 = (m1, . . . ,mi−1), a set of i − 1 previous public keys pki−1 =
(pk1, . . . , pki−1) and outputs the aggregate-so-far signature σ¯i for the updated se-
quences mi = (m1, . . . ,mi).
38 Unique Aggregate Signatures with Applications to Verifiable Random Functions
AggVrfy(σ¯i,mi,pki): Takes as input an aggregate-so-far signature σi, a sequence
of messages mi and public keys pki and outputs 1 if the signature is valid, or 0
otherwise.
Completeness A SAS scheme is said to be complete, if for any sequence (sk1, pk1),
. . . , (skn, pkn) with each (ski, pki) ← KeyGen(I), (m1, ...,mn) with each mi ∈
{0, 1}∗, and some non-empty σ¯i−1 for which AggVrfy(σ¯i−1,mi−1,pki−1) = 1, for
any σ¯i ← AggSign(ski,mi, σ¯i−1,mi−1,pki−1, pki): AggVrfy(σ¯i,mi,pki) = 1.
Definition 14 (Unforgeability of SAS). A SAS scheme is unforgeable if for any PPT
adversary A, running in time at most t and invoking the signing oracle at most qS
times, the probability that the following experiment outputs 1 remains negligible in the
security parameter λ.
Experiment ForgeSASA (λ)
1. I ← ParGen(1λ)
2. (skc, pkc)← KeyGen(I)
3. (m∗,pk∗, σ∗)← AOAggSign(skc,·)(I, pkc)
Let C denote the list of all registered key pairs (ski, pki) and mc be the message
whose index in m∗ corresponds to the index of pkc in pk∗.
4. Output 1 if all of the following holds:
• for any pair pki, pkj ∈ pk∗ with i ̸= j: pki ̸= pkj
• AggVrfy(σ∗,m∗,pk∗) = 1,
• mc ∈m∗ was never amongst the inputs to OAggSign(skc, ·),
where A is given access to the following sequential aggregate signing oracle:
OAggSign(skc, ·): The adversarial input to the signing oracle consists of a mes-
sage m, an aggregate-so-far signature σ¯i−1, a sequence of messages mi−1
and public keys pki−1. The oracle computes σ¯i ← AggSign(skc,m, σ¯i−1,
mi−1||mc,pki−1||pkc) and returns σ¯i to A.
Our definition of uniqueness for unforgeable SAS schemes is given in Definition 15.
Note that by requiring the existence of an appropriate deterministic function unq we
can cover uniqueness in deterministic and probabilistic SAS schemes. For example,
USAS instantiations that we focus on later are all probabilistic SAS schemes that
output signatures consisting of multiple components from which one component
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remains unique. We will prove the uniqueness property of those schemes by using
appropriate unq functions for each scheme.
Definition 15 (Unique SAS). An unforgeable SAS scheme is said to be unique, denoted
by USAS, if there exists an efficient deterministic function unq which on input the
aggregate-so-far signature σi outputs a string of polynomial-size in the security param-
eter of the scheme such that for any ordered sequence of messages mi and public keys
pki there exist no two aggregate-so-far signatures σ¯i and σ¯i for which it holds that
AggVrfy(σ¯i,mi,pki) = 1, AggVrfy(σ¯i,mi,pki) = 1, and unq(σ¯i) ̸= unq(σ¯i).
Note that the uniqueness property of an SAS scheme as defined above respects the
order of messages in m = (m1, ...,mn). That is, the resulting aggregate signatures
output on permuted sequences of messages in m for the same set of public keys pk
will differ from each other.
In the following section we recall the sequential aggregate signature scheme
introduced by Schroeder [143] and prove its uniqueness. The reason for doing so is
to provide a possible building block - which possesses the meaningful property of
uniqueness - for the future cryptographic constructions.
2.4.1 Uniqueness of Schröder SAS Scheme
The SAS scheme proposed by Schröder [143] offers sequential aggregation for
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signatures [40]. The SAS scheme slightly modifies the
original CL signatures by introducing an additional signature component, denoted in
the following by D. We will essentially rely on this new component when proving the
uniqueness property of the scheme.
ParGen(1λ): Output the public parameters I = (G,GT , g, e) for the bilinear group
setting according to Definition 4, such that G1 = G2 = G.
KeyGen(I): For each signer i choose xi ← Zq and yi ← Zq and sets Xi = gxi , Yi =
gyi for i ∈ [n]. The algorithm returns ski = (xi, yi) and pki = (Xi, Yi).
AggSign(ski,mi, σ¯i−1,mi−1,pki−1): The algorithm takes as input a secret sign-
ing key ski, a message mi ∈ Zq, an aggregate-so-far σ¯i−1 a sequence of messages
mi−1 = (m1, ...,mi−1) and a sequence of public keys pki−1 = (pk1, ..., pki−1).
The algorithm first checks that |m| = |pk| and that the sequential verification
AggVrfy(σ¯i−1,mi−1,pki−1) = 1. If the verification holds, then it parses σ¯i−1 =
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(A′, B′, C ′, D′), where unq(σ¯i−1) = D′ is the unique component.
A′ = gr, B′ =
i−1∏
j=1
gryj , C ′ =
i−1∏
j=1
gr(xj+mjxjyj), D′ =
i−1∏
j ̸=k
gmjxjyk ,
and it computes the signature σ¯i = (A,B,C,D):
A = A′, B =B′ · A′yi =
i∏
j=1
gryj , C = C ′(A′)xi+mixiyi =
i∏
j=1
gxj+mjxjyj ,
D = D′
(
i−1∏
j=1
X
mjyi
j · Y mixij
)
=
i∏
j ̸=k
gxjmjyk .
AggVrfy(σ¯i,pki,mi): On input of a sequence of public keys pki, sequence of
messages mi and σ¯i = (A,B,C,D). The verification algorithm first checks if |m| =
|pk|. It then validates the structure of the elements A,B,D:
e(A,
i∏
j=1
Yj) = e (g,B) and
i∏
j ̸=k
e (Xk, Yj)
mk = e(g,D)
and checks that C is also formed correctly:
i∏
j=1
(e (Xj, A) · e (Xj, B)mj) e(A,D)−1 = e(g, C).
If all equations are valid, then the algorithm outputs 1; otherwise it returns 0.
Theorem 2. Schröder SAS Scheme is unique according to Definition 15.
Proof. Let unq be a function that outputs the fourth component of the aggregate
signature σ¯ = (A,B,C,D), i.e. unq(σ¯) = D. Assume that there exists another
aggregate signature σ¯ that passes the verification procedure on the same set of messages
and public keys as σ¯ such that unq(σ¯) = D˜. We prove by induction on i that in this
case D˜ = D must hold. We use σ¯ to check the verification equations.
Base step: i = 2. The verification algorithm will accept σ¯, if D˜ satisfies the verifica-
tion equations.
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We check first the second equation
2∏
j ̸=k
e (Xj, Yk)
mj = e(g, D˜) and compute:
e (X1, Y2)
m1 e (X2, Y1)
m2 = e(g, D˜)
⇔ e (gx1 , gy2)m1 · e (gx2 , gy1)m2 = e(g, D˜)
⇔ e(g, g)m1x1y2 · e(g, g)m2x2y1 = e(g, D˜)
⇔ e(g, g)m1x1y2+m2x2y1 = e(g, D˜)
⇔ e(g, gm1x1y2+m2x2y1) = e(g, D˜).
The last equation holds only if D˜ = gm1x1y2+m2x2y1 = D.
Induction step: i− 1 7→ i. Let the theorem hold for i− 1. The verification algorithm
will accept unq(σ¯i) = D˜i if it satisfies the following verification equation
i∏
j ̸=k
(Xj, Yk)
mj = e(g, D˜i). By the induction hypothesis we have D˜i−1 =
i−1∏
j ̸=k
gmjxjyk such that D˜i = D˜i−1 · δ. Considering the following verification
equation we get:
i∏
j ̸=k
e (Xj, Yk)
mj = e(g, D˜i) ⇔
i∏
j ̸=k
e (gxj , gyk)mj = e(g, D˜i)
⇔
i−1∏
j ̸=k
(g, g)mjxjyk
i−1∏
j=1
e(g, g)mixiyj+mjxjyi = e(g,
i−1∏
j ̸=k
gmjxjyk · δ)
=
i−1∏
j ̸=k
e(g, g)mjxjyke(g, δ)⇔
i−1∏
j=1
e
(
g, gmixiyj+mjxjyi
)
= e(g, δ).
The last equation holds if δ =
i−1∏
j=1
gmixiyj+mjxjyi . We therefore obtain the desired
equality D˜i = Di = unq(σ¯i).
Note on proof: We note that the above proof has an alternative solution which does
not require the well-known induction technique. Since the unique function of signature
σ is given by unq(σ) = D, then follows e(g,D) = e(g, D¯) and there fore holds
D = D¯.
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2.5 Unique Multisignatures
In this section we recall the definition of multisignatures and define their uniqueness
property. A multisignature allows a group of signers to sign a message such that
a verifier can be sure that everyone from the group has signed the message. There
are different multisignature schemes which differ in whether the subset of signers is
known in advance [86, 119] or not [26].
Definition 16. A multisignature scheme MS consists of the following algorithms:
ParGen(1λ): is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter 1λ and
outputs public system parameters I .
KeyGen(I): is a PPT algorithm that takes as input I and generates a private/public
key pair (ski, pki) for an user i.
Sign(ski,m): is a probabilistic protocol run by an arbitrary set of signers. The
input of signer i consists of his secret key ski and a message m. The output of the
protocol is a triple (m,L, σ), which consists of a message m, description of a subgroup
L of signers and a multisignature σ. Note that σ can be produced through central
aggregation of intermediate values σi that are independently computed and output by
each signer i.
Vrfy(pk,m, L, σ): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a sequence of
public keys pk = (pki1 , . . . , pkil), where ij is the index of a signer in subset L, a
message m, a set L and a multisignature σ. It outputs 1 if the signature is valid and 0
otherwise.
The security of a multisignature scheme has to assure that no forgery is possible.
An adversary should not be able to forge a signature on a message which would
pass the verification process when not all signers of the subgroup L have signed this
message. In the following Definition 17, formulated by Boldyreva [26], an adversary is
allowed to corrupt all but one player and adversary’s goal is to frame that honest player.
Furthermore, an adversary is able to create arbitrary keys for corrupted players. With
respect to the rogue-key attack described by Boldyreva, the security definition in [26]
puts one limitation on the adversary. He needs to prove the knowledge of secret keys,
during the key registration. This process is modeled in [26] for simplicity by asking
the adversary to output public and secret keys of corrupted players in key generation
algorithm. This is modeled in the definition 17 by invoking a "two-stage-adversary"’,
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which takes as input in the first stage the challenge public key and outputs a set of
secret and public keys of corrupted signers. In the second stage it takes all secret keys
of corrupted signers and outputs a signature. Furthermore, we describe the honest
player by Pc. Let skc denote the challenge secret key and pkc the corresponding
challenge public key, which are given to the adversary with access to the signing oracle
on that key, where the challenge key pair refers to the honest player Pc.
Definition 17 (Unforgeability of MS ([26])). A multisignature scheme is unforgeable
if for any PPT adversary A, running in time at most t and invoking the signing oracle
at most qS times, the probability that the following experiment outputs 1 remains
negligible in the security parameter λ.
Experiment ForgeMSA (λ)
1. I ← ParGen(1λ)
2. (skc, pkc)← KeyGen(I)
3.
[
(ski1 , pki1), . . . , (skin−1 , pkin−1), state
] ← A1(I, pkc), where ij ̸= c, j ∈
[n− 1]
Let J := {(skj, pkj)}j denote the list which records skj, pkj as registered if
(skj, pkj)
r← KeyGen(I), for all j ̸= c.
4. (pk∗,m∗, σ˜∗)← AOSign(skc,·)2 (state)
5. Output 1 if all of the following holds:
• pkc is continued in pk∗
• Vrfy(pk∗,m∗, σ∗) = 1,
• m∗ was never submitted to OSign(skc, ·)
where A is given access to the following signing oracle:
OSign(skc·): The adversarial input to the oracle contains a message m. The oracle
responds on behalf of the honest party c according to the specification of the
Sign protocol.
Our definition of uniqueness for multisignatures is given in Definition 18. This
definition fits likewise probabilistic and deterministic schemes due to the use of
function unq.
Definition 18 (Unique MS). An unforgeable MS scheme is said to be unique, denoted
by UMS, if there exists an efficient deterministic function unq which on input an
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aggregate signature σ¯ outputs a string of polynomial size in the security parameter of
the scheme (i.e., unq : σ 7→ unq(σ)), such that for any message m and public keys
pk = (pk1, . . . , pkn) there exist no two multisignatures σ¯ and σ¯ for which it holds that
Vrfy(pk,m, σ¯) = Vrfy(pk,m, σ¯) = 1, and unq(σ¯) ̸= unq(σ¯).
2.5.1 Uniqueness of Boldyreva MS Scheme
In this section we provide the description of a multisignature scheme which was
introduced by Boldyreva [26] and prove its uniqueness. The scheme is defined over a
Gap-Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group.
Boldyreva Multisignature Scheme [26] A multisignature scheme over a GDH
group G is defined by the following four algorithms:
ParGen(1λ): On input the security parameter 1λ it outputs public system parameters
I = (g, q,G, H), where g is a generator of G and q = |G|, H : {0, 1}∗ → G∗.
KeyGen(I): On input the public system parameters I the algorithm computes a pair
(ski, pki) = (xi, g
xi) for each player Pi.
Sign(ski,m): Is an interactive protocol between the players from the subset of the
set P = (P1, . . . , Pn). The input of any player Pi ∈ P consists of the secret key ski
and a message m. Pi computes and broadcasts σi ← H(m)xi . Let L = (Pi1 , . . . , Pil)
be a subset of players contributed to the signing process and J = {i1, . . . , il} be a set
of indices. The output of the algorithm is T = (m,L, σ), where σ =
∏
j∈J
σj .
Vrfy(T,pk): On input T = (m,L, σ), and a set of public keys pk = (pki1 , . . . , pkil)
for the corresponding signers from L, where pkij = g
xij for each ij ∈ J , the algorithm
computes pkL =
∏
ij∈J
gxij and outputs VrfyDDH(g, pkL, H(m), σ), where VrfyDDH
is an efficient algorithm that solves the DDH problem given in Definition 3. In the
following theorem we prove uniqueness of the aforementioned multisignature scheme
[26]. In our proof we rely on an honest signature generator which generates σ =
∏
j∈J
σj .
Theorem 3. Boldyreva MS-Scheme is unique according to Definition 18.
Proof. Let define unq(σ) = σ. To prove uniqueness we need to show that the DDH
tuple does not verify for two different signatures on the same message under the same
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public key. We have as DDH tuple (g, pkL, H(m), σ), i.e.
logg
∏
j∈J
gxj = logH(m) σ = logH(m)
∏
j∈J
σj = logH(m)
∏
j∈J
H(m)xj
⇔ logg g
∑
j∈J
xj
= logH(m)H(m)
∑
j∈J
xj
=
∑
j∈J
xj
Assume σ′ being another signature on m under the same set of public keys pk. It
holds logg
∏
j∈J
gxj = logH(m) σ
′ if and only if σ′ = σ, i.e. the signature is unique.
Remark 1. Note that Boldyreva’s multisignature scheme has unpredictable uniqueness
values unq(σ).
Similar to sequential aggregate signatures there exist multisignatures which are
sequential by nature [28]. They are called ordered multisignatures. In the following
section we recall the definition of ordered multisignatures and define their uniqueness
property.
2.6 Unique Ordered Multisignatures
Definition 19 (Ordered Multisignatures [28]). An ordered multisignature scheme OMS
consists of the following algorithms:
ParGen(1λ): is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter 1λ and
outputs public system parameters I .
KeyGen(I): is a PPT algorithm that takes as input I and generates a private/public
key pair (ski, pki) for an user i.
Sign(ski,m, σi−1,pki−1): is a PPT algorithm run by a signer i. The input consists
of signer’s secret key ski, a message m and the so-far-signature σi−1 with the list of
i− 1 public keys pki−1 = (pk1, . . . , pki−1). The output is a multisignature σi or ⊥ if
the input is deemed invalid.
Vrfy(pk,m, σ): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the multisignature
σ, a sequence of public keys pk = (pk1, . . . , pkn). It outputs 1 if the signature is valid
and 0 otherwise.
In the following definition we recall the security notion of OMS from [28] which
is an adoption of the notion of security for multisignatures from [26]. The adversary is
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allowed to corrupt all but one signer. The challenge secret key and the corresponding
public key, denoted by skc, pkc are given to the adversary with access to the signing
oracle on that key. A secure ordered multisignature scheme requires the following
additional unforgeability with respect to the order of signers: The scheme assumes that
the adversary does not know a priori its signing position, he obtains this information
from the transmitted data by the previous signer [28]. This happens in the following
way: In order to confirm the signing position of the current player, the signing algorithm
must verify validity of the so-far-signature relative to the other data in the input of this
algorithm. The users are also required to prove knowledge of their secret keys during
the key generation process. Boldyreva et al. simplified it by requiring an adversary to
output the secret and public keys of corrupted signers. Similar to Definition 17 this
case is modeled in the following definition 20 by invoking a "two-stage-adversary"’,
which outputs in the first stage a set of secret and public keys of corrupted signers and
in the second stage it outputs a signature. The keys of corrupted signers are registered
in the list J .
Definition 20 (Unforgeability of OMS [28]). A OMS scheme is unforgeable if for any
PPT adversary A, running in time at most t and invoking the signing oracle at most
qS times, the probability that the following experiment outputs 1 remains negligible in
the security parameter λ.
Experiment ForgeOMSA (λ)
1. I ← ParGen(1λ)
2. (skc, pkc)← KeyGen(I)
3.
[
(ski1 , pki1), . . . , (skin−1 , pkin−1), state
] ← A1(I, pkc), where ij ̸= c, j ∈
[n− 1]
Let J := {(skj, pkj)}j denote the list which records skj, pkj as registered if
(skj, pkj)
r← KeyGen(I), for all j ̸= c.
4. (pk∗,m∗, σ∗, J)← AOSign(skc,·,state)2 (state)
5. Output 1 if all of the following holds:
• all public keys in pk∗ except pkc are registered, i.e. elements in J .
• for any pair pki, pkj ∈ pk∗ with i ̸= j: pki ̸= pkj
• Vrfy(pk∗,m∗, σ∗) = 1,
• m∗ was never amongst the inputs to OSign(skc, ·)
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where A is given access to the following sequential aggregate signing oracle and the
key registration oracle:
OSign(skc, ·): The adversarial input to the signing oracle consists of a message m,
a so-far multisignature σi−1 and a list of public keys pki−1. The oracle outputs
⊥ if not all public keys are registered. It verifies σi−1 and if the verification
is successful it computes σi ← Sign(skc, σi−1,m,pki−1) and returns σi to A,
where σi is a multisignature on m, signed by i signers. If σi−1 is not valid it
outputs ⊥.
In the following definition we define the uniqueness property of an ordered mul-
tisignature scheme.
Definition 21 (Unique OMS). An unforgeable OMS scheme is said to be unique,
denoted by UOMS, if there exists an efficient deterministic function unq which on
input the aggregate-so-far signature σi outputs a string of polynomial size in the
security parameter of the scheme such that for any message m and any ordered set of
public keys pki there exist no two aggregate-so-far signatures σ¯i and σ¯i for which it
holds that Vrfy(pki,m, σ¯i) = 1, Vrfy(pki,m, σ¯i) = 1, and unq(σ¯i) ̸= unq(σ¯i).
2.6.1 Uniqueness of Boldyreva-Gentry-O’Neil-Hyun-Yum OMS
Scheme
In this section we provide the description of an ordered multisignature scheme which
was introduced by Boldyreva et al. [28] and represented an extension of Boldyreva’s
[26] multisignature. Then we also prove its uniqueness.
ParGen(1λ): On input the security parameter 1λ it outputs public system parameters
I = (g, q,G,GT , e,H), where g is a generator of G and q = |G|, H : {0, 1}∗ → G∗.
KeyGen(I): On input the public system parameters I the algorithm chooses randomly
si, ti, ui
r← Zq and returns Si = gsi , Ti = gti , Ui = gui , where pk = (Si, Ti, Ui), ski =
(si, ti, ui).
Sign(ski,m, σi−1,pki−1): Takes as input the signer’s secret key ski, a message m,
and the so-far-signature σi−1 with the list of i−1 public keys pki−1 = (pk1, . . . , pki−1).
It first verifies Vrfy(pki−1,m, σi−1). In case i = 1 the verification step is skipped and
the signature is set σ0 = (1G, 1G). If σi−1 is valid, outputs 1, else 0. Then it parses
σ˜i−1 = (Q,R), chooses r
r← Zq and computes: R′ = Rgr, X = (R′)ti+iui , Y =
(
i−1∏
j=1
TjU
j
j )
r, Q′ = H(m)siQXY . It returns σi = (Q′, R′).
48 Unique Aggregate Signatures with Applications to Verifiable Random Functions
Vrfy(pk,m, σ): Takes as input the set of ordered public keys pk = (pk1, . . . , pkn),
a message m and an ordered multisignature σ. It parses σ = (Q,R) and checks
whether:
e(Q, g) = e
(
H(m),
n∏
i=1
Si
)
e
(
n∏
i=1
TiU
i
i , R
)
If so, it returns 1, else it returns 0.
Theorem 4. BGOH-OMS scheme is unique according to Definition 21.
Proof. According to the definition of the scheme above, follows:
σ = (Q,R) =
(
H(m)
n∑
i=1
si
g
n∑
i=1
r(ti+iui)
, gr
)
.
The unique function of the signature is given in the following equation:
unq(σ) =
e(Q, g)
e
(
n∏
i=1
TiU ii , R
) = e(H(m), n∏
i=1
Si
)
Since unq(σ) = e
(
H(m),
n∏
i=1
Si
)
is deterministic, then given m and a set of servers
{Si}, unq(σ) is independent of Q and R. It follows that for two different valid
signatures σ and σ¯ the unq-function is equal. This property corresponds to the
Definition 21.
Remark 2. Note that this ordered multisignature scheme has predictable uniqueness
values unq(σ). Therefore we can not use this scheme for our later DVUF construction
in Section 2.7.1.
2.7 Applications to VRF
In this section we provide a construction of Distributed Verifiable Random Functions
(DVRF) from unique multisignatures. Before we can do so, we describe first the
concept of DVRF and define its security property. The so-far only known DVRF
construction in [60] was obtained by first constructing a non-distributed VRF scheme
(based on a variant of the well-known Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption) by using
an encoding function before applying the Naor-Reingold construction of pseudoran-
dom function [123] and then by making it distributed using threshold secret sharing
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techniques; more precisely by issuing secret shares of the VRF secret key sk to the n
servers and then by combining their individual VRF outputs into the DVRF output,
whose validity could be checked publicly using the original VRF public key pk. This
approach, however, imposed undesirable trust assumptions on trustworthy generation
of secret keys (shares) for the n servers and resulted in a threshold on the number of
corrupted servers. As showed by Lysyanskaya [114], unique signatures are related
to VRF. Unique signatures have the properties of uniqueness, unpredictability and
verifiability. Therefore they are especially suitable for efficient VRF constructions.
In general, constructing VRF from PRF is not notably efficient in comparison to the
construction from unique signatures. Because of the definition of PRF, it is not known
how to solve the problem in the standard model, that the output should be indistin-
guishable from random and verifiable, too. It is possible to use a zero knowledge proof
to prove conformity of a PRF output with the committed seed of that PRF, as described
in [114]. But this solution is not attractive because of its expense of communication
rounds. Using unique signatures, Lysyanskaya showed the advantage of such VRF
construction regarding communication rounds. Being motivated by this idea we can
reduce the complexity of DVRF scheme using unique multisignatures and achieve a
more efficient result than Dodis’ VRF [60].
In contrast, our approach for building DVRF is generic, proceeds under much
weaker setup assumptions, and requires only one server to remain uncorrupted. Ad-
ditionally we note that in contrast to the DVRF in [60], our scheme achieves a more
efficient result regarding the communication and complexity. As a guideline we
adopt the approach by Micali, Rabin, and Vadhan [120] that has been used in a non-
distributed VRF case, namely to first focus on a weaker family of functions those
outputs are unpredictable but not necessarily pseudorandom, the so-called Verifi-
able Unpredictable Functions (VUF). We observe that the generic transformation
from [120] for converting VUF outputs into VRF outputs — by adding a random string
r to the VUF public key pk and then computing VRF outputs as inner products of
VUF outputs and r (which takes its roots in [79]) — works just fine for the case where
the VUF output has been previously obtained in a distributed way. In a distributed
VUF setting the required random string r can be made part of a shared random string
(SRS) [64], which we consider as the only setup assumption in our DVRF schemes.
Note that the SRS model is much weaker than the assumed trustworthy generation of
secret keys in [60] and belongs to standard cryptographic assumptions.
Following the above approach we thus need to define the notion of Distributed
VUF (DVUF). Our Definition 22 essentially tweaks the original definition of VUF
from [120] to the distributed setting.
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Definition 22 (Distributed Verifiable Unpredictable Function (DVUF)). Let F(·)(·) :
{0, 1}a(λ) → {0, 1}b(λ) denote a family of functions with associated algorithms:
KeyGen(1λ) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter 1λ and
outputs a private/public key pair (ski, pki) for a server i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let sk =
{sk1, . . . , skn} and pk = {pk1, . . . , pkn}.
Prove(sk,pk, x) is an interactive protocol executed between an user and n servers
with common input x chosen by the user and pk = (pk1, . . . , pkn) such that at the end
of the execution the user obtains a VUF value F (sk, x) = y and the corresponding
proof π.
Vrfy(pk, x, y, π) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input pk, x, y and a
candidate proof π, and outputs 1 if π is a valid proof for y = F (sk, x) and 0 otherwise.
F is a family of Distributed Verifiable Unpredictable Functions (DVUF) if it satisfies:
Uniqueness: The DVUF value y = F (sk, x) with proof of correctness π is unique
if there exists no tuple (pk, x, y1, y2, π1, π2) with y1 ̸= y2 but Vrfy(pk, x, y1, π1) =
Vrfy(pk, x, y2, π2) = 1.
Provability: For all (y, π)← Prove(sk,pk, x): Vrfy(pk, x, y, π) = 1.
Residual Unpredictability: For any PPT algorithm A = (A1,A2) the probability
that A succeeds in the following experiment is negligible in the security parameter
1λ :
1. (skc, pkc)← KeyGen(1λ)
2. (ski, pki, state)← A1(pkc) for all i ∈ [n] \ c.
3. (x∗, y∗, π∗)← AOProve(skc,·)2 (state).
4. A succeeds if x∗ ∈ {0, 1}a(λ) , Vrfy(pk, x∗, y∗, π∗) = 1 and x∗ was not queried
to the OProve(skc, ·) oracle by A,
where
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OProve(skc, ·): The adversarial input to the oracle is a DVUF input x ∈ {0, 1}a(λ).
The oracle responds on behalf of server c according to the specification of the Prove
protocol with a fixed set of public keys based on steps 1 and 2.
The following lemma from [120] when applied to the distributed setting shows how
to convert DVUF outputs into DVRF outputs. The resulting transformation holds in
the shared random string model that provides involved parties with the random string
r. Lemma 1 essentially allows us to focus on DVUF constructions in the remaining
part of this work.
The transformation from DVUF to DVRF in Lemma 1 corresponds exactly to the
transformation in [120] in non-distributed setting. The proof of transformation of VUF
to VRF in [120] relies on the unpredictability of y∗. The security notion of residual
unpredictability of our DVUF construction in Definition 22 actually differs from the
notion of unpredictability in [120] by the additional output π∗ of the adversary in the
second stage. Therefore, the structure of the lemma is similar to [120]. However, in
our definition an adversary has to predict the value y∗ and the corresponding proof
π∗ that F (sk, x) = y. This additional prediction of π∗ in our security definition is
necessary in Definition 22, because the reduction proof of Theorem 5 relies upon this
but this has a negligible impact on this proof of Lemma 1. The fact that from the
definition of residual unpredictability in Definition 22, π∗ is also unpredictable can be
carried through as an additional assumption but does not impact on the proof because
if y∗ is unpredictable, π∗ is unpredictable too. Later, in Theorem 5 we prove the
residual unpredictability under assumption that the underlying unique multisignature
is unforgeable and its uniqueness value is unpredictable. In the reduction proof we will
need to build an adversary against an unique and unforgeable multisignature (UMS)
scheme which will need to simulate the output for an adversary of DVUF scheme.
Lemma 1 (From DVUF to DVRF [120]). For any DVUF (KeyGen, Prove, Vrfy)
from Definition 22 with input length a(λ), output length b(λ), security s(λ) and
unpredictable output values y, there exists a DVRF in the SRS model with the following
three algorithms:
(
KeyGen, Prove, Vrfy
)
with input length a′(λ) ≤ a(λ), output
length b′(λ) = 1, and security s′(λ) = s(λ)1/3/(poly(λ) · 2a′(λ)):
KeyGen(1λ, r) where r ← {0, 1}b(λ) is shared random string computes public/pri-
vate keys (ski, pki)← KeyGen(1λ) and outputs (sk,pk) = (sk, (pk, r)).
Prove(sk, x, r) computes (y, π)← Prove(sk, x), y = ⟨y, r⟩ as inner product of y
and r, π := (y, π) and outputs (y, π).
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Vrfy (pk, x, y, π) outputs 1 if Vrfy(pk, x, y, π) = 1 and y = ⟨y, r⟩. Otherwise it
outputs 0.
Proof. Since any DVUF/DVRF family F is also a VUF/VRF family the proof of this
lemma is implied by the result from [120, Section 5].
2.7.1 Generic Construction of DVUF from UMS Schemes
We obtain our first generic DVUF construction from UMS schemes where the ag-
gregation process is public. The major benefit of this construction is that it requires
only one communication round between the user and the n servers and is thus as
efficient in terms of communication as the approach in [60]. The algorithms of our
UMS-based DVUF construction are detailed in the following using the UMS syntax
from Definition 16:
KeyGen(1λ) computes public parameters I ← ParGen(1λ) of the UMS scheme. Each
server Si, i ∈ [n] computes its private/public UMS key pair (ski, pki) ←
KeyGen(I). Let sk = (sk1, ..., skn) and pk = (pk1, . . . , pkn).
Prove(sk, x) Protocol: This is a protocol between user U and a set of servers Si ∈ S
contributing to the signing process, where S := {S1, . . . , Sn}, with each server
Si ∈ S in possession of ski ∈ sk. The common input is x. Each server
Si ∈ S computes and publishes σi ← Sign(ski, x). U computes σ and outputs
(y, π) = (unq(σ), σ).
Vrfy(pk, x, y, π): Parse π as σ. If Vrfy(pk, x, σ) = 1 and y = unq(σ) then output
1, else output 0.
Complexity analysis. Our protocol is more efficient than the so-far existing protocol
by Dodis [60]. We achieve a constant round complexity because the signatures are
computed in a parallel way. Since an user is communicating with all n users, we claim
a communication complexity of O(nλ), where λ is the security parameter. In contrast,
Dodis scheme [60] employs a public key for each bit in message x and because each
signature depends on the previous one, the round complexity is O(l), where l denotes
the message length of message x. Since Dodis’ scheme requires t-out-of-n servers to
prepare a valid signature, the communication complexity is O(tlλ). In the following
Theorem 5 we consider security of our scheme.
Theorem 5. Let UMS be a unique multisignature scheme according to Definitions 17
and 18. Then assuming that its unique values are unpredictable, our DVUF construc-
tion from UMS fulfills the properties of Definition 22.
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Proof. The uniqueness of UMS scheme implies the uniqueness property of DVUF.
Because individual UMS signatures σi, from the signing protocol from Definition 16
can be calculated into a signature σ, which satisfies the UMS Vrfy algorithm, we can
conclude that for all (y, π) ← Prove(sk, x) we have Vrfy(pk,m, y, π) = 1, where
y = unq(σ¯), π = σ¯ and x is a value to be signed. This implies the provability of our
DVUF scheme.
In the following we thus focus on the residual unpredictability of our DVUF
construction. Assuming an adversary A which breaks the unpredictability of the
DVUF scheme, i.e. outputs a valid tuple (x∗, y∗, π∗) according to the experiment in
Definition 22, we construct an adversary B that simulates the environment of A and
breaks the unforgeability of the underlying UMS scheme by outputting a valid tuple
(m∗,pk∗, σ∗) according to the unforgeability of multisignatures from Definition 17.
The UMS forger B is initialized with system parameters I and the challenge
public key pkc. For all i ∈ [n], i ̸= c, where c is treated as a random index in [n] it
computes (ski, pki) ← KeyGen(I) using the key generation algorithm of the UMS
scheme and invokes the two-stage DVUF adversary A = (A1,A2). First it invokes
A1(pk) where pk is comprised of all generated pki and pkc whereby index c for pkc
in pk is assigned randomly by B. If the index c output by A1(pk) doesn’t match
that of pkc the simulation aborts. The probability that the index matches is given by
1/n. Otherwise, B invokes A2(sk′), where sk′ is comprised of all generated ski (i.e.
doesn’t include skc which is unknown to B) and answers the OProve(skc, ·) oracle
queries ofA2 using its own oracleOSign(skc, ·). That is, B performs the computation
step of the protocol Prove on behalf of the honest server Sc by obtaining individual
signature σc on a given DVUF input x and the corresponding function unq(σc) from
its own signing oracle. At some point, A2 outputs a tuple (x∗, y∗, π∗) aiming to break
the unpredictability property of the DVUF scheme. This tuple is valid if A2 never
queried x∗ to its OProve(skc, ·) oracle and Vrfy(pk, x∗, y∗, π∗) = 1. B checks the
validity of the tuple and if valid outputs (m∗,pk∗, σ∗) = (x∗,pk, π∗) where x∗ is a
set consisting of n values x∗ as its own forgery.
LetAdvB denote the probability thatB outputs a valid forgery for the UMS scheme
and AdvA denote the probability that A = (A1,A2) breaks the DVUF construction.
If the index c assigned by B matches the one output by A1 then its simulation for A
is perfect. It is easy to see that in this case the resulting tuple (x∗,pk, π∗) constitutes
a valid forgery for the UMS scheme since B never queried the message x∗ to its
OSign(skc, ·) oracle. Considering that indices match with probability 1/n we get
AdvA ≤ n ·AdvB.
Remark 3. Note that Theorem 5 requires the underlying multisignature scheme
to have unpredictable uniqueness value unq(σ). As mentioned in Remark 1, the
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Boldyreva’s multisignature scheme has this property and can therefore be used for the
DVUF construction. In contrast, the ordered multisignature scheme from Section 2.6.1,
which has predictable unq(σ) values, doesn’t fit for this purpose.
Note on Aggregate Signatures: We note that it is also possible to provide a
DVUF construction from unique aggregate signatures and unique sequential aggregate
signatures. However, since the aggregate signatures handle different signers signing a
different message, and our DVUF construction presented in this chapter handles the
same input for all servers, it requires a deeper research to find a suitable application
for a DVUF which considers distinct inputs. We believe that such an application might
be a useful building block for significant cryptographic protocols and therefore we
leave this new challenge for our future research.
Chapter 3
Threshold Blind Signatures with
Applications to E-Voting
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we formalize the concept of threshold blind signatures (TBS) and
present an instantiation that enables the user to obtain a signature through interaction
with a distributed set of n signers on some message of user’s choice without revealing
any information about the message. Each signer is in possession of a secret key share
which is used in the signing process. The distribution of secret key shares in our
scheme is performed by a trusted dealer, albeit alternative methods, e.g. [74], can also
be applied. The signature generation process cannot be forged unless the adversary
corrupts t signers. The blindness property ensures that even if all n potential signers are
corrupted no information about the message is leaked. When defining these properties
for TBS we adapt new security definitions from Schröder and Unruh [144], introduced
originally for blind signatures, to the threshold setting. The requirements modeled for
blind signatures in [144] are considered as being stronger than those given previously
by Pointcheval and Stern [135]. In particular, they prevent an attack by which the
adversary queries the signing oracle twice on the same message and then outputs a
forgery on a different message.
Threshold Signatures Threshold signatures, introduced by Desmedt [55] distribute
the ability to sign a message across t-out-of-n signers. This distribution process
is typically carried out using secret sharing techniques and is therefore helpful for
the distribution of trust in various cryptographic applications. In addition, threshold
signatures can be used to achieve reliability and thus improve on the availability of
services. Security properties and constructions of threshold signatures have been
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explored in [73, 116, 148]. Well-known constructions of threshold signatures in the
random oracle model under the RSA assumptions have been proposed by Desmedt
and Frankel [58] and Shoup [148]. Boldyreva [27] showed how to construct threshold
signatures in the random oracle model in Gap Diffie-Hellman groups. More recently,
Li et al. [106] distributed the signing process of the well-known Waters signature
scheme in the standard model under the CDH assumption in bilinear groups.
Blind Signatures Blind signatures, introduced by Chaum [48], allow users to obtain
a signature on some message through interaction with the signer in a way that doesn’t
expose the message. This property, which is called blindness is the distinctive property
of blind signatures, in addition to the unforgeability requirement, which guarantees that
no more signatures can be produced in addition to those output through the interaction
with the signer. Blind signatures are considered as an important building block for a
variety of applications, including e-voting [23, 24, 71, 105] and e-cash schemes [48],
anonymous credential systems [37] and oblivious transfer [41]. Security properties
and constructions of blind signatures have been explored in numerous subsequent
works: Pointcheval and Stern [135] defined and proved the security requirements
for blind signatures in the random oracle model. Juels et al. [95] defined a blind
signature scheme which is secure under general complexity assumptions. Recently,
Schröder and Unruh [144] showed that security definitions from [135] have some
drawbacks and came up with an improved definition of honest-user unforgeability.
A lot of work has been done on the constructions of blind signature schemes, both
in the random oracle model, e.g [5, 8, 16, 27, 136], and in the standard model, e.g.
[7, 23, 39, 72, 88, 98, 118, 131].
Our Threshold Blind Signature Scheme Our TBS scheme is based on the tech-
niques underlying the blind signature scheme introduced by Okamoto [131] that
deploys bilinear groups. Our TBS is more than an adaptation of the scheme from [131]
to a threshold setting since we introduce further changes to the original construction
to enhance its performance. In particular, by using non-interactive zero-knowledge
(NIZK) proof techniques from [83, 85] we can remove several rounds of interaction
between the user and the signers, thus obtaining the same round-optimality as in case
of (non-threshold) blind signatures in [67]. The NIZK proof from [83], which is
based on the DLIN assumptions, gives us concurrent security for the overall TBS
construction in the Common Reference String (CRS) model.
The standard assumptions and stronger definitions of unforgeability (honest-user
unforgeability) make our scheme superior to the existing TBS constructions from [99,
153] that were proven secure in the random oracle model with respect to the (weaker)
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definitions from [135]. This weaker definition makes them less attractive than our
TBS scheme that satisfies stronger definition of honest-user unforgeability which has
been originally provided in [144] and extended to the threshold setting in this thesis.
We present a conjecture on the honest-user unforgeability of our scheme providing the
corresponding proof of it, which relies on the hardness of CDH assumption and the
soundness of the NIZK proof. We prove the blindness of our TBS scheme assuming
zero-knowledge property of the NIZK proof and the hardness of DLin problem. Our
TBS construction enjoys the re-randomization property, which makes it especially
attractive for a range of applications such as distributed e-voting and e-cash. We show
how our TBS scheme can be used to realize e-voting in presence of distributed voting
authorities.
Applications of TBS. The use of blind signatures in e-voting schemes goes back
to Chaum [49] and various e-voting schemes utilizing blind signatures have been
introduced since then, e.g. [13, 21, 23, 71, 129]. The blindness property in most
e-voting constructions is necessary to ensure privacy of the submitted votes, while
the unforgeability property is used for authentication. The corresponding signature
is typically issued by the registration authority, which is supposed to check that the
voter is eligible to participate in the election. The use of threshold blind signatures
in this context is a helpful alternative for that case where the registration authority
needs to be distributed across multiple not necessarily fully trustworthy entities. Such
distributed approach for voter registration has been proposed by Koenig, Dubuis, and
Haenni [100] assuming existence of threshold blind signatures, yet without offering
concrete constructions of this primitive. As proven in [100], existence of a public
registration board is necessary in order to prevent potential abuses.
Public verifiability, originally defined in [94], is a property that guarantees the
validity of the election outcome, preventing voting authorities from biasing the results.
Xia and Schneider [158] presented an e-voting scheme from blind signatures on
committed values. Their scheme achieves public verifiability, privacy and receipt-
freeness.
We claim that our re-randomizable TBS construction, assuming some modifications
in the signing process, can be used to obtain a distributed e-voting scheme where
the properties of anonymity, privacy and individual verifiability hold simultaneously.
Our TBS can be applied to the template from [158]. In contrast to [158] using our
TBS scheme as a building block we can extend the e-voting scheme to a scheme in
distributed setting. Thus it allows the concept of an individually verifiable distributed
e-voting scheme, which distributes the level of trust of one signer among a certain
number of parties (signers), where each signer is represented by a voting authority.
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Such an e-voting scheme based on TBS also achieves the main properties as they
were required in [100], such as privacy, anonymity, completeness, democracy and
individual verifiability. Since the power of one signing authority is distributed amongst
a number of signers, the signature on a vote will be accepted if and only if t out of n
voting authorities provide their signature shares on a blinded vote to the voter, who
finally computes the combined signature and sends the signature together with the
corresponding vote to a public board.
3.2 Building Blocks and Hardness Assumptions
In this section we recall several hardness assumptions and building blocks that will be
used in our work.
Definition 23 (DLIN-Assumption). Let G be a cyclic group of order q. The DLIN
assumption states that given a tuple
(
g, gx, gy, gxa, gyb, gc
)
for random a, b, x, y, c ∈
Z∗q , it is computationally hard to decide whether c = a+ b or a random value. When
(g, u = gx, v = gy) is fixed, a tuple
(
ua, vb, ga+b
)
is called a linear tuple, whereas a
tuple
(
ua, vb, gc
)
for a random and independent c is called a random tuple.
Definition 24 (CDH-Assumption). Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime
order q, with generator g. The CDH assumption states that given g, ga, gb for random
a, b ∈ G it is computationally hard to compute gab.
3.2.1 Zero-Knowledge Proof
The first proof technique which allowed to prove theorems without revealing why they
are true, was introduced by Goldreich et al. [80]. They showed that the information
transmitted from a prover P to a verifier V can be limited using their proof technique.
Those proofs refer to the language membership problem which decides whether an
input I is a member of a language L. The name "zero knowledge proof" does not
mean that the verifier does not learn any information at all, because the prover reveals
a little bit of knowledge, namely that some input I belongs to the language L. In
later work [63] the authors showed that it is possible even to extend the initial notion
of zero knowledge proof to a "truly zero knowledge proof", where no information
can be leaked to the verifier. The idea is defined in the technique called "knowledge
about knowledge", which means that the prover does not prove that some input I
belongs to language L but proves the knowledge of status of input I in relation to
L. The verifier does not get any information about the real situation of I , he only
learns that the prover knows the state of knowledge about this status. The definitions
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of "proof of membership" and "proof of knowledge" are different, because the notion
of "knowledge" does not make it clear what these proofs of knowledge actually prove.
The use of zero knowledge paradigm for proofs of knowledge has been described in
many works [51, 80]. In [63] Feige et al. presented an interactive proof of knowledge,
which means that the prover is not unlimited in time and both the prover and the
verifier are probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines. To provide the proof, we
assume that the prover is given access to an oracle, which satisfies a PPT predicate
P (I, S). The prover is not allowed to ask the oracle several additional questions about
the same inputs and he has to rely on the witness S in his proof of knowledge. This
model defines a problem in NP. An example which describes this proof of knowledge
could be as follows: "Witness S is a state of input I".
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof [84] The concept of non-interactive zero
knowledge proof (NIZK) was invented by Bellare et al. [25] and played an essential
role in achieving feasibility for cryptographic primitives such like first public key cryp-
tosystem secure against ciphertext attack. A non-interactive proof system (G,K,P ,V)
for a relation R with setup consists of four PPT algorithms: a setup algorithm G, a
common reference string (CRS) generation algorithm K, a prover P and a verifier V .
The setup algorithm outputs public parameters I and a commitment key ck. The CRS
generation algorithm takes (I, ck) as input and outputs a CRS ρ. The prover P takes
as input (I, ρ, x, ω), where x is the statement and ω is the witness, and outputs a proof
π. The verifier V takes as input (I, ρ, x, π) and outputs 1 if the proof is acceptable and
0 otherwise. (G,K,P ,V) is non-interactive proof system for R if it has the following
properties:
Completeness. A non-interactive proof is complete if an honest prover can convince
an honest verifier whenever the statement belongs to the language and the prover
holds a witness testifying to this fact. For all adversaries A we have:
Pr[(I, ck)← G(1λ);ρ← K(I, ck); (x, ω)← A(I, ρ) :
π ← P(I, ρ, x, ω) : V(I, ρ, x, π) = 1 if (I, x, ω) ∈ R] = 1.
Soundness. A non-interactive proof is sound if it is impossible to prove a false
statement x which is not an element of a language L. We say (G,K,P ,V) is
perfectly sound if for all adversaries A we have:
Pr[(I, ck)← G(1λ); ρ← K(I, ck); (x, π)← A(I, ρ);
V(I, ρ, x, π) = 0 if x /∈ L] = 1.
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Knowledge Extraction. We say that (G,K,P ,V) is a proof of knowledge for R if
there exists a knowledge extractor E = (E1, E2) with the following properties:
For all PPT adversaries A we have
Pr[(I, ck)← G(1λ); ρ← K(I, ck) : A(I, ρ) = 1]
= Pr[I ← G(1λ); (ρ, ξ)← E1(I, ck) : A(I, ρ) = 1].
For all adversaries A holds
Pr[(I, ck)← G(1λ); (ρ, ξ)← E1(I, ck); (x, π)← A(I, ρ);
ω ← E2(ρ, ξ, x, π) : V(I, ρ, x, π) = 0 or (I, x, ω) ∈ R] = 1.
Zero-Knowledge. We say that (G,K,P ,V) is a composable NIZK proof if there
exists a PPT simulator (S1,S2) such that for all PPT adversaries A we have
Pr[(I, ck)← G(1λ); ρ← K(I, ck) : A(I, ρ) = 1]
≈ Pr[I ← G(1λ); (ρ, τ)← S1(I, ck) : A(I, ρ) = 1],
and for all adversaries A holds:
Pr[(I, ck)← G(1λ); (ρ, τ)← S1(I, ck); (x, ω)← A(I, ρ, τ);
π ← P(I, ρ, x, ω) : A(π) = 1]
≈ Pr[(I, ck)← G(1λ); (ρ, τ)← S1(I, ck); (I, x, ω)← A(I, ρ, τ);
π ← S2(I, ρ, τ, x) : A(π) = 1]
where A outputs (I, x, ω) ∈ R. We obtain a strong notion of zero-knowledge,
called composable zero-knowledge [83]. It implies standard zero-knowledge
and is simpler to work with, because it separates the computational indistin-
guishability into two parts considering the CRS and the proofs respectively.
3.2.2 Blind Signatures
In this section we recall the scheme of blind signatures and provide definition for its
security properties, unforgeability and blindness.
Definition 25. A blind signature scheme consists of PPT algorithms BParGen, KeyGen,
BVrfy along with interactive PPT algorithms S,U , such that:
BParGen(1λ) : On input a security parameter it generates public parameters I (possi-
bly containing a common reference string crsBS).
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KeyGen(I) : On input public parameters I the algorithm outputs a key pair consisting
of a public key pk and a secret key sk.
BSign(·) : This is a protocol between a user U and a signer S. The input of U is pk
and a message m. The input of the signer S is the secret key sk. The protocol
results in a signature σ output by U .
BVrfy(pk, σ,m) : On input a public key pk, a signature σ and a message m, outputs
a decision bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
In the following definitions we consider two security properties - honest-user
unforgeability [144] and blindness. Blindness property means that the signer does
not learn anything about the messages he receives from the user. To describe the
honest-user unforgeability we assume an attacker having access to a transcript oracle
OTrace that on input a message outputs a signature and the user’s transcript. If an
adversary engaged in qS interactions with the signer and requested signatures for
message m1, . . . ,mn from the user then the adversary cannot output signatures on
pairwise distinct messages m∗1, . . . ,m
∗
qS+1
which are all different from the previously
queried messages m1, . . . ,mn. (Definition 1, [144]).
Definition 26 (Honest-User Unforgeability [144]). A blind signature scheme is honest-
user-unforgeable if for all PPT Aunf who have access to a signing oracle, the advan-
tage of winning the following experiment is negligible:
ExpAunf(1
λ)
1. I ← BParGen(1λ)
2. (sk, pk)← KeyGen(I)
3. (m∗1, σ
∗
1), . . . , (m
∗
qS+1
, σ∗qS+1)← A
OBSign(sk),OTrace(sk,pk,·)
unf (I, pk)
Let m1, . . . ,mn be the messages queried to the OTrace(sk, pk, ·) oracle
4. Output 1, if
m∗i ̸= mj , for all i, j
m∗i ̸= m∗j for all i ̸= j, and
BVrfy(pk, σ∗i ,m
∗
i ) = 1 for all i ∈ [qS + 1], where at most qS interactions with
BSign(sk, ·) were initiated.
Otherwise output 0.
The two oracles work as follows:
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OBSign(sk): On input a secret key sk the oracle invokes the BSign protocol on
behalf of an user U which interacts with Aunf . The oracle gives a signature σ to U .
OTrace(sk, pk, ·) : On input a secret and public key pair, a message m the oracle
runs the blind signature protocol BSign and outputs a signature σ and the user’s
transcript trans of all messages exchanged between the parties in that interaction.
The advantage of Aunf is defined by the following equation:
AdvunfBS(λ) = Pr[ExpAunf(1
λ) = 1].
In the following definition we recall the blindness property. The strongest notion
of blindness is given in the malicious signer model [129]. This model allows the
adversary to create a public key pk. In contrast to malicious signer model, in honest-
signer model [39] the private and secret key is set up by the experiment. We present in
the next definition the strongest notion of blindness. By BSignU(·) we denote the joint
execution of BSign protocol by an honest user U and a signer S.
Definition 27 (Blindness [144]). A blind signature scheme is called blind if for all
PPT S∗ with access to two user oracles such that the advantage of S∗ in the following
experiment is negligible:
ExpS∗(1
λ)
1. I ← BParGen(1λ)
2. (pk,m0,m1, stfind)← S∗(I)
3. b r← {0, 1},
4. stissue ← S∗BSignUb (pk,mb),BSignU1−b (pk,m1−b)(issue, stfind).
Let σb, σ1−b be the local outputs of Ub(pk,mb),U1−b(pk,m1−b).
5. If σ0 = ⊥ or σ1 = ⊥, then (σ0, σ1)← (⊥,⊥),
6. b∗ ← S∗(guess, σ0, σ1, stissue)
7. If b = b∗, return 1, otherwise return 0.
The advantage of S∗ is defined by the following equation:
AdvblindBS =
∣∣Pr[ExpS∗(1λ) = 1]− 1/2∣∣ .
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The definition of blindness states that it should be infeasible for a malicious signer
S∗ to decide which of the messages m0,m1 has been signed first in the two executions
of the BSign protocol with an honest user. As described earlier in the introduction
of this chapter, our goal is to construct a threshold blind signature scheme. A blind
signature scheme is a variety of digital signatures and is mostly used in such schemes
where the user identity should remain unrevealed. In the next chapter we are giving a
description of a threshold blind signature scheme.
3.3 Threshold Blind Signatures
A threshold blind signature scheme gives the user the ability to get a signature on a
message without revealing its content and it distributes the secret key among a certain
number of signers. We observe a t-out-of-n threshold blind signature scheme. It means
that it is not possible to construct a valid blind signature on a message by contacting
less than t-out-of-n servers. The threshold blind signature scheme is applicable to
many constructions of cryptographic schemes because of its role in the decentralization
the power of the signer.
Definition 28 (Threshold Blind Signature). A t-out-of-n threshold blind signature
scheme TBS in a Common Reference String model consists of the following four
algorithms:
TBParGen(1λ): A PPT algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ and outputs
public parameters I (possibly containing a common reference string crsTBS).
KeyGen(I): On input public parameters I this algorithm outputs a secret share ski
for each signer Si, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and a public key pk.
TBSign(·): This is a protocol between a user U and the signers Si, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The input of U is pk and a message m. The input of each server Si is the secret
share ski. The protocol results in a signature σ output by U .
TBVrfy(pk,m, σ): A deterministic algorithm which on input a public key pk, message
m, a signature σ outputs 1 if the signature is valid and 0 otherwise.
TBS Honest-User Unforgeability. We recall the honest-user unforgeability defini-
tion for blind signatures by Schröder and Unruh [144] and adopt it to the threshold
setting. The definition requires that m∗i ̸= mj for all i, j and m∗i ̸= m∗j for i, j with
i ̸= j, where m1, . . . ,mn are the messages submitted to the user to obtain the corre-
sponding signatures. In comparison to the earlier definition by Pointcheval and Stern
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[135] the honest-user unforgeability allows to tell which message is being signed in
a given interaction by introducing some extractability to the definition. This comes
from allowing an adversary to get access to a transcript oracle that takes as input a
message to be signed. The oracle outputs a signature and a transcript of all exchanged
messages in an interaction. It is assumed that a selective adversary selects up to (t− 1)
servers which it wants to corrupt. This selection of indices is presented in step 2 in the
following Definition 29. When an adversary corrupts a server, it is given the entire
computation history of that server, and it gets control over this server for the running
time of the system. An adversary against honest-user unforgeability of TBS has the
target to generate qS + 1 valid message/signature pairs after it has interacted at most
qS times with the honest signer. We assume that A has access to the OTBSign oracle
which allows A to communicate simultaneously with all uncorrupted servers. This
means that for each round of the TBSign protocol A needs to submit round messages
intended for uncorrupted servers that will be processed and eventually replied to by
the oracle.
Definition 29 (TBS Honest-User Unforgeability). A threshold blind signature scheme
TBS, consisting of five algorithms (TBParGen, KeyGen, TBSign, TBVrfy) is unforge-
able if for all PPT adversaries A the probability that the following experiment
ExpTBSAunf (λ) evaluates to 1 is negligible in the security parameter λ.
1. I ← TBParGen(1λ)
2. {ski}1≤i≤n, pk ← KeyGen(I)
3. {it, . . . , in} ← Aunf (pk), where {t, . . . , n} ≠ {1, . . . n − t} are indices of
uncorrupted servers
4.
(
(σ∗1,m
∗
1), . . . ,
(
σ∗qS+1,m
∗
qS+1
))← AOTBSign(·),OTrace(pk,{ski}1≤i≤n,·)unf (pk, {skij}j∈[t−1]),
where ij are the indices of corrupted servers. Let m1, . . . ,mn be the messages
queried to the OTrace(pk, {ski}1≤i≤n, ·) oracle.
5. If TBVrfy(pk,m∗i , σ
∗
i ) = 1 for all i ∈ [1, qS + 1],
m∗i ̸= mj for all i, j,
m∗i ̸= m∗j , for all j ̸= i
and signer returned "ok" in at most qS interactions which includes the OTrace
executions,
then return 1, otherwise return 0.
OTBSign({ski}i∈[n], ·): is an oracle that runs TBSign(·) and communicates with A.
The oracle receives from A round messages intended for n− t+ 1 honest servers and
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responds on behalf of these servers. The total number of invoked TBSign sessions is
denoted by qS .
OTrace(pk, {ski}1≤i≤n, ·): The oracle takes as input a message m and outputs a
signature σ and a transcript trans of all messages exchanged between the parties in
that interaction.
The advantage of Aunf is defined by the following equation:
AdvunfTBS,Aunf (λ) = Pr[Exp
unf
TBS,Aunf (1
λ) = 1].
Note on key generation consistency: Assume an adversary Aind which outputs
two different sets of valid secret key shares S1 = {sk(1)1 , . . . , sk(1)t } and S2 =
{sk(2)1 , . . . , sk(2)t } such that the shares from the first set reconstruct secret key sk(1) and
shares from the second set reconstruct sk(2). Consistency of key generation guarantees
that the two secret keys sk(1) and sk(2) are not equal. We note that this property hold
also for the following definition of TBS Blindness.
TBS Blindness. The TBS blindness property prevents signers from linking generated
signatures to corresponding sessions of the signing protocol. Therefore, it should be
impossible for a malicious signer S∗ to decide on the order in which two messages, m0
and m1, were signed in two protocol sessions with an honest user U . By TBSignU(·)
we denote the joint execution of TBSign protocol by an honest user U and a signer S .
Definition 30 (Blindness). A threshold blind signature scheme TBS, consisting of
four algorithms (TBParGen, KeyGen, TBSign, TBVrfy) is called blind if for any PPT
adversary S∗ the probability that the following experiment TBlindTBSS∗ (λ) evaluates
to 1 exceeds 1/2 by at most a negligible amount in the security parameter λ.
1. I ← TBParGen(1λ)
2. (m0,m1, pk, stfind)← S∗(I, find)
3. Choose b r← {0, 1}
4. stissue ← S∗TBSignUb (·),TBSignU1−b (·)(stfind, issue). Let σb, σ1−b be the local outputs
of Ub,U1−b. If σb = ⊥, or σ1−b = ⊥ then (σb, σ1−b)← (⊥,⊥).
5. b∗ ← S∗(guess, σ0, σ1, stissue).
6. If b = b∗, then return 1, otherwise return 0.
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The advantage of S∗ is defined by the following equation:
AdvblindTBS,S∗ =
∣∣Pr[ExpblindTBS,S∗(1λ) = 1]− 1/2∣∣ .
A note on key generation. There exist several approaches for the distribution of
keys amongst multiple signers. The approach by Shamir [145] applies secret sharing
and distributes secret key shares to corresponding signers through a trusted dealer. The
protocol by Feldman [65] minimizes this trust assumption on the dealer by requiring
the latter to broadcasts information that can then be used by the signers to individually
check the validity of their shares and detect incorrect shares at reconstruction time. The
key generation protocol by Gennaro et al. [74] proceeds in a pure distributed fashion,
where each signer defines its own share of the secret key and participates in a protocol
with all remaining signers to setup the key. During the protocol parties can determine
malicious signers whose contributions will be dropped. The distributed key generation
protocol by Abe and Fehr [6] for discrete logarithm-based keys achieves adaptive
security in the non-erasure model and avoids the use of interactive zero knowledge
proofs.
3.4 TBS Construction in the Common Reference String
Model
3.4.1 Our TBS Scheme
In this section we present our TBS scheme based on the techniques underlying
Okamoto’s blind signature scheme [131] and the NIZK proof from [85]. We use
the scheme of Okamoto [131] and extend it to the threshold setting where the role of a
single signer is distributed among multiple signer in order to distribute the single point
of failure. We chose Okamoto’s scheme for our construction because of its higher
effectivity in many applications and security in the standard model in contrast to the
existing blind signature schemes in the standard model mentioned in the introduction.
We assume the existence of a trusted dealer for the distribution of secret key shares.
Our commitments are binding under the CDH assumption and they are hiding under
the DLin assumption. The binding property means that it is impossible to find two
openings with different messages of the same commitment. The hiding property means
a dishonest receiver should not be able to obtain any information about m from the
commitment c. We construct commitments which have two different flavours of keys.
The commitment is called perfectly binding if a commitment uniquely defines one
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possible message. The commitment is also perfectly hiding, which means that it does
not reveal any information about the message. We create perfect hiding commitment
together with some trapdoor information, such that it is possible to open a commitment
to any message. We require that these two keys are computationally indistinguishable.
Parameter Generation: The algorithm TBParGen(1λ) outputs the common refer-
ence string CRS = (G,GT , q, g, e, ck), where ck = (u
′
k, uk,j), j = {1, . . . , ℓ} (we
note that ℓ denotes the bit-size of a message), and k = {1, 2, 3} is the commitment
key. The perfect binding key consists of the following values u1,j =
(
u
′
1
)ξ1,j
, u2,j =(
u
′
2
)ξ2,j
, u3,j =
(
u
′
3
)ξ1,j+ξ2,j+ζ ; ξ1,j, ξ2,j, ζ r← Z∗q and u′1 = gρ, u′2 = gτ , u′3 = g. The
corresponding extraction key is given by xk = (ck, ρ, τ, ζ). The perfect hiding key has
a similar form as the perfect binding key except the value u3,j =
(
u
′
3
)ξ1,j+ξ2,j . During
the generation process of perfectly hiding key, the algorithm outputs the following
trapdoor key tkj = (ck, ξ1,j, ξ2,j), j = {1, . . . , ℓ}.
Key Generation: The algorithm KeyGen(I) chooses two generators g1, g2 ofG, picks
x
r← Zq, computes g1 = gx. It chooses a random polynomial f r← Zq[Z] of degree
t− 1, with t ≤ n being a threshold and f(0) = x. Let f(z) =∑t−1i=1 aizi. The algo-
rithm computes xi = f(i) for each server i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let vk = (vk1, . . . , vkn) =
(gx1 , . . . , gxn). The outputs consist of the public key pk = (g1, g2,vk) and a separate
secret share ski = gxi2 for each Si, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Signature generation: The TBSign protocol on a ℓ-bit message m = (µ1, . . . , µℓ)
proceeds in two stages:
Stage 1: For all i = {1, . . . , n}, user U chooses a random ri r← Z∗q and computes
Xi ←
{(
u
′
k
∏ℓ
j=1 u
µj
k,j
)ri}
k∈[3]
. U then prepares a NIZK proof for the well-
formedness of Xi, i.e. ∀ri ∃µ1, . . . , µl such that Xi ←
{(
u
′
k
∏ℓ
j=1 u
µj
k,j
)ri}
k∈[3]
.
This is done by proving to signer Si that U knows values αk,j , for k ∈ [3], j ∈ [ℓ],
such that Ak,j = (u′k)
αk,j uk,j or Ak,j = (u′k)
αk,j . The proof consists of two
parts π(1)i and π
(2)
i . In the first part π
(1)
i proves that all µj are bits using the
NIZK proof from [85], i.e. U proves to each server Si knowledge of αk,j
such that Ak,j =
(
u
′
k
)αk,j for µj = 0 or Ak,j = (u′k)αk,j uk,j for µj = 1 and
j = {1, . . . , ℓ}, k = {1, 2, 3}, where α3,j = α1,j + α2,j + ζ .
We recall from parameter generation algorithm the values u′1 = g
ρ, u′2 =
gτ , u′3 = g with g
ρξ1,j = (u′1)
ξ1,j =: u1,j, g
τξ2,j = (u′2)
ξ2,j =: u2,j, g
ξ1,j+ξ2,j =
(u′3)
ξ1,j+ξ2,j =: u3,j . To commit to a set of message bits the user takes αk,j
r← Z∗q
for k = 1, 2, 3 and computes Ak,j =
(
u
′
k
)αk,j uµjk,j for j = {1, . . . , ℓ}, k =
{1, 2, 3}. The corresponding NIZK proof is constructed according to the proof
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in [85] and is given by π(1)i = (π¯1, . . . , π¯ℓ). It consists of ℓ components π¯j ,
j = {1, . . . , ℓ}. Each of these proofs π¯j = (π11, π12, π13, π21, π22, π23) is com-
puted as follows using a randomly chosen tj
r← Z∗q:
π11 =
(
u
2µj−1
1,j
(
u
′
1
)α1,j)α1,j
, π12 = u
(2µj−1)α2,j
2,j
(
u
′
2
)α1,jα2,j−tj
π13 = u
(2µj−1)α1,j
3,j
(
u
′
3
)(α1,j+α2,j)α1,j+tj
, π21 = u
(2µj−1)α2,j
1,j
(
u
′
1
)α1,jα2,j+tj
π22 =
(
u
2µj−1
2,j
(
u
′
2
)α2,j)α2,j
, π23 = u
(2µj−1)α2,j
3,j
(
u
′
3
)(α1,j+α2,j)α2,j−tj
U sends the proofs πi and the commitments {Ak,j}k={1,2,3},j={1,...,ℓ} to the corre-
sponding server Si that checks the following verification equations:
e(u
′
1, π11) = e(A1,j, A1,ju
−1
1,j),
e(u
′
2, π22) = e(A2,j, A2,ju
−1
2,j),
e(u
′
3, π33) = e(A3,j, A3,ju
−1
3,j),
e(u
′
1, π12)e(u
′
2, π21) = e(A1,j, A2,ju
−1
2,j)e(A2,j, A1,ju
−1
1,j),
e(u
′
1, π13)e(u
′
3, π31) = e(A1,j, A3,ju
−1
3,j)e(A3,j, A1,ju
−1
1,j),
e(u
′
3, π23)e(u
′
3, π32) = e(A2,j, A3,ju
−1
3,j)e(A3,j, A2,ju
−1
2,j),
for each j = {1, . . . , ℓ} and π33 = π1tπ2t, t = {1, 2, 3}. The server accepts π(1)i
if all verification equations hold.
In the second part π(2)i user U proves to each server Si the knowledge of
{ri, βk,i, δi,j}k∈[3],j∈[ℓ] using the NIZK techniques from [83] and values Ak,j ,
αk,j , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}; j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} that were used to compute π(1)i by proving
that Xi =
{(∏ℓ
j=1Ak,j
)ri
(u
′
k)
βk,i
}
k∈[3]
and Xi =
{
(u
′
k)
ri
∏ℓ
j=1 u
δi,j
k,j
}
k∈[3]
,
where β1,i = ri − ri
∑ℓ
j=1 α1,j and δi,j = riµj , j ∈ [ℓ], i ∈ [n]. This proof
involves building commitments Bk,i =
(∏ℓ
j=1Ak,j
)ri
(u
′
k)
βk,i and Bˆk,i =
(u
′
k)
ri
∏ℓ
j=1 u
δi,j
k,j , k = {1, 2, 3}, i = {1, . . . , n}, j = {1, . . . , ℓ}. Note that
Bk,i = Bˆk,i = Xi. This effectively binds both parts of the proof to Xi. U
splits Bk,i and Bˆk,i into ℓ commitments such that Bk,i,j = Arik,j
(
u
′
k
)βk,i and
Bˆk,i,j =
(
u
δi,j
k,j (u
′
k)
ri
)
. The user makes then a NIZK proof for the Pedersen
commitment for each of these components. We refer to Section 4.5 [83] for
further details on the construction of π(2)i proof that is used here. Each π
(2)
i
consists of 6(ℓ − 1) + 2 components. Each server Si, i = {1, . . . , n} verifies
π
(2)
i and proceeds if the proof is valid.
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Stage 2: If Si accepts the NIZK proof in Stage 1, it randomly chooses di
r← Z∗q and
uses its secret key share ski = gxi2 to compute Yi1 ← skiXdii and Yi2 ← gdi ,
where Xi =
(
u′k
∏ℓ
j=1 u
µj
k,j
)si
is a triple for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Finally, Si sends
its signature share σi = (Yi1, Yi2) to U . For each received σi = (σi1, σi2), U
checks the equation e(Yi1, g) = e(g2, vki) · e(Xi, Yi2) using the corresponding
verification key vki ∈ vk and if successful combines at least t-out-of-n valid
signature shares to a final signature using Lagrange coefficients λ1, . . . , λt ∈ Zq
σ1 ←
t∏
i=1
(
Yi1
(
u′k
ℓ∏
j=1
u
µj
k,j
))λi
and σi2 ←
t∏
i=1
(Y rii2 g)
λi .
Finally, U rerandomizes σ = (σ1, σ2) by choosing a random value s and outputs
σ˜ = σs = (σs1, σ
s
2) as the resulting signature. (Note that σ has the same form as
in the Okamoto’s blind signature scheme from [131]).
Verification: The algorithm TBVrfy(pk,m, σ) first parses a public key pk as (g1, g2,
u′k, (uk,1, . . . , uk,ℓ)), m as (µ1, . . . , µℓ), and σ as (σ1, σ2) and outputs 1 if and only if
e(σ1, g) = e(g2, g1) · e
(
u′k
∏ℓ
j=1 u
µj
k,j, σ2
)
for all k = 1, 2, 3.
3.4.2 Security Analysis
The unforgeability of our TBS scheme is proven in Conjecture 1 through a direct reduc-
tion to the CDH assumption. Note that the blind signature scheme by Okamoto [131]
those techniques we partially apply in TBS was proven to be unforgeable using a
reduction to the original Waters signature scheme [157] that in turn holds under the
CDH assumption.
Conjecture 1 (Honest-User Unforgeability). Our TBS scheme is unforgeable in the
common reference string model with t > n/2 corrupt servers assuming the hardness
of the CDH assumption from Definition 24 and the binding property of commitments
and soundness property of the NIZK proof from [85].
Proof. In the following we provide a proof of the Conjecture 1. For the sake of
contradiction we assume that our TBS scheme is not honest-user unforgeable then
there exists an adversary A that wins the honest-user unforgeability experiment from
Definition 29. The contradiction follows then from the fact, that the underlying problem
from Definition 29 is assumed to be hard. In order to proceed with the contradiction
procedure we need to construct a simulator C which is given the CDH instance
(g, ga, gb) from Definition 24 and is internally using the unforgeability adversary A
to compute gab. The interaction of C with A proceeds according to the following
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description. C sets g1 = ga, g2 = gb as CDH instance and runs A on input pk.
Setup: The simulator chooses a value φ′ r← Zq a random vector of length ℓ: φ =
(φ1, . . . , φℓ) ∈ Zℓq and ℓ denotes the number of bits of a messagem. Next the challenger
C sets the following public parameters u′ = (ga)φ′ and uj = (ga)φj . The public
parameters (g, ga, gb, u′,u) are sent to the adversary A.
Let Sˆ = {Si1 , . . . , Sit−1}, be a set of corrupted servers and let S˜ denote the set
of uncorrupted servers (Sit , . . . , Sin). For the set of corrupted servers, C simulates
verification keys vki1 , . . . , vkit−1 by simply choosing uniformly random values χij ,
which correspond to gf(ij), i.e.
(
χi1 , . . . , χit−1
)
=
(
gf(i1), . . . , gf(in)
)
. In order to
simulate the verification keys vki for uncorrupted servers, algorithm C uses polynomial
interpolation. To do so, C has first to compute Lagrange coefficients λ0,j, . . . , λt−1,j ∈
Zq such that f(j) = λ0,jf(0) +
∑t−1
l=1 λk,jχil , where {i1, . . . , it−1} are indexes from
set Sˆ of corrupted servers and {it, . . . , in} are the indexes of uncorrupted servers in
set S˜. The required Lagrange coefficients are then computed as follows:
λk,j =
∏
k′∈S˜\{i}
(k − k′)
(j − k′) ,
where k ∈ Sˆ is the index of a corrupted server and k′ is the index of an uncorrupted
server. It is easy to determine these Lagrange coefficients because they are independent
from f . In the next step, C sets for each i ∈ S˜ and g1 = gx = ga:
vkj = g
λ0,j
a g
aχi1λ1,j · · · gaχit−1λt−1,j = gaλ0,jgχ(i1)λ1,j · · · gχit−1λt−1,j
= gaλ0,jg
∑t−1
k=1 f(k)λk,j = gf(j).
Once C has computed all the verification keys vki, it gives them to A.
Queries to OTBSign: Once the adversary A has the verification keys it provides up
to qS signature generation queries to the OTBSign oracle according to the experiment
in Definition 29. The expected input is given by {(Xi, πi)}i intended for honest
servers with indices from {1, . . . , n} excluding indices of corrupt servers from set
S = {Si1 , . . . , Sit−1}, where πi =
(
π
(1)
i , π
(2)
i
)
.
The oracle queries are processed by C that has to simulate signature shares σi =
(Yi1, Yi2) on input (Xi, Ak,j, Bk,i, Bˆk,i, π
(1)
i , π
(2)
i ), where k = {1, 2, 3}, j = {1, . . . , ℓ}
and i = {1, . . . , n} denoting the server index, excluding indices i1, . . . , it−1 of corrupt
servers. The proofs π(1)i and π
(2)
i ensure that Xi =
{(
u
′
k
∏ℓ
j=1 u
µj
k,j
)ri}
k∈[3]
is well-
formed due to the proofs presented in [83, 85].
We note that the perfect binding property of commitments guarantees soundness
of NIZK proofs (π(1)i , π
(2)
i ). The perfect binding key generation algorithm outputs a
commitment key ck and an extraction key xk. Given the commitments, C generates
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the proof as provided in ([85], Section 4.5). On a simulated string given above,
the adversary cannot distinguish between real proofs and simulated proofs. Since
the commitments are perfectly binding the adversary cannot distinguish between
commitments made on ri and commitments on 0. For more details on the proof we
refer to [83, 85].
To perfectly simulate the signing queries, C plays the role of an honest signer
against A who is supposed to play the role of a dishonest user. C extracts the values
ri, µ1, . . . , µℓ from the queries of A, when A requests C to sign Xi along with the
NIZK protocol against C’s random challenge values. After completing the NIZK pro-
tocol, C resets A to the initial state of the NIZK protocol and runs the same procedure
with another challenge values. If C finishes successfully the protocols on different
challenge values, it is able to extract the values ri and µj for i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [l].
After extracting these values, C simulates the signature as follows: It computes first
the value u′k
∏ℓ
j=1 u
µj
k,j = (g
a)φ
′
k
∏ℓ
j=1 (g
a)φk,jµj , where k ∈ [3] and φ′k, φk,j r← Zq are
randomly chosen integers. For the further simulation of the signature, since C does not
know the signature keys it uses the polynomially interpolated verification keys f(j),
which are presented in the setup procedure by f(j) = λ0,jf(0) +
∑t−1
l=1 λl,jχil , where
χil are the simulated verification keys of corrupted servers. C then picks r′i ∈ Zq and
outputs the following signature tuple σi = (Yi,1, Yi,2), where
Yi,1 =
(
gb
)∑t−1
l=1 λl,jχil (ga)φ
′
kr
′
i g
a
ℓ∑
j=1
φk,jµjr
′
i
and Yi,2 = gri , where r′i = ri +
bλ0,j
F (m)
using
a helping function F (m) = φ′k +
ℓ∑
j=1
φk,jµj for m = (µ1, . . . , µℓ). It holds then(
gb
)∑t−1
l=1 λk,iχil gaF (m)r
′
i = Yi,1. Replace r′ by the following value: r′i = ri+
bλ0,j
F (m)
such
that holds:
Yi,1 =
(
gb
)∑t−1
l=1 λk,lχil gaF (m)rigabλ0,j =
(
gb
)λ0,ja+t−1∑
l=1
λk,lχil
gaF (m)ri .
We show that the CDH challenge gab can be easily extracted from the equation above
dividing Yi,1 by g
t−1∑
l=1
λk,lχil
gaF (m)ri . We obtain the following computation:
Yi,1
g
t−1∑
l=1
λk,lχil
gaF (m)ri
=
(
gab
)λ0,j
. (3.1)
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Extracting the λ0,j-th root, we obtain gab. The signature share is correct σi = (Yi1, Yi2)
since it satisfies the following verification equation:
e (Yi1, g) = e(g2, vki)e
(
u′k
ℓ∏
j=1
u
µj
k,j, Yi2
)
,
which can be easily confirmed in few computation steps.
Queries to OTrace: Whenever A invokes the OTrace oracle on a message m =
(µ1, . . . , µℓ), then C simulates the queries by choosing a random m′ = (µ′1, . . . , µ′ℓ) and
simulates the signature as before except the extraction part in the previous paragraph.
At the end of the simulation, the algorithm C obtains a signature σ′ on the message m′.
It stores (m′, σ′) in a list and returns the signature σ′ with the corresponding transcript
to the adversary A. C repeats the above showed steps qS times. If all qS rounds are
completed, A outputs at least qS + 1 valid signatures on different messages, where all
valid message-signature pairs is different from the qS valid messages-signatures given
from C algorithm.
Analysis: We note that A aborts the game if C does not guess correctly the indices of
corrupt servers during the key simulation step or if the challenge values do not match
during the extraction step of the message and randomizer. Consider the messages
m1, . . . ,mqS and m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
n. Following the assumption that A succeeds, it follows
that all challenge pairs m∗i ̸= m∗j . Consider that all the messages m′1, . . . ,m′n which
are sent to the OTrace oracle must differ from the challenge messages m∗1, . . . ,m∗qS
which are returned by A.
If the entire signing procedure with qS rounds is finished successfully, the adversary
A outputs at least qS + 1 valid message/signature pairs, where all the messages are
distinct. We note that upon invoking the TBSign protocol qS times, the number of
signatures received by A is at most qS . This is guaranteed by the restriction on the
threshold t > n/2, i.e., if A issues OTBSign queries on input (Xi, πi) for i ∈ [1, n]
excluding indices of corrupted servers i1, . . . , it−1, thenA can obtain at most one valid
signature per session depending on whether (Xi, πi) were computed based on the same
message m. Since A can corrupt up to t− 1 servers, he needs to communicate with
only one of the uncorrupted servers in order to compute a valid signature using secret
keys of corrupted servers and the received signature shares from the OTBSign oracle.
Assuming that A wins the game after at most qS TBSign protocol executions,
it outputs qS + 1 valid message/signature pairs. We note that qS encompasses both
OTBSign queries and OTrace queries. Whenever the event of forgery occurs, B
outputs the correct solution of CDH assumption simulated by equation (3.1). This
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contradicts the assumption that the underlying CDH assumption is hard to solve, where
the advantage of the challenger C is at least as large as the advantage of TBS adversary
A considering a reduction factor that results from the abortion of the simulation.
Theorem 6 (Blindness). Our TBS scheme is blind in the common reference string
model assuming the hardness of the DLIN assumption from Definition 23, the perfect
hiding property and the zero-knowledge property of the NIZK proof from [83, 85].
Proof. We assume that the proposed signature scheme is not blind. That means the
existence of a dishonest signer S∗, which can guess b correctly with a non-negligible
advantage 1/2 + ϵ. We construct an algorithm C which can break the security of
the DLIN assumption as follows. Given the public parameters pp = (G,GT , q, e, g),
the DLIN problem instance (gu, gv, gw) = (u′1, u
′
2, u
′
3), where w = u + v, the chal-
lenger C computes (u1,j, u2,j, u3,j) =
((
u
′
1
)ξ1,j
,
(
u
′
2
)ξ2,j
,
(
u
′
3
)ξ3,j), with the values
ξ1,j, ξ2,j, ξ3,j ∈ Z∗q which he obtains from the trapdoor key of the perfect hiding
key generation, and ξ3,j = ξ1,j + ξ2,j , j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. C gives (pp, pk, u′1, u′2, u′3,
u1,j, u2,j, u3,j) to S∗ as CRS. S∗ outputs a public key pk = (g1, g2,vk) and two
messages m0,m1 ∈ Z∗q . The challenger C checks if pk ∈ G and m0,m1 ∈ Z∗q .
If it holds C picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. C chooses ri ∈ Z∗q and computes
Xi,0 = (u
′
k
∏ℓ
j=1 u
µj,0
k,j )
ri and Xi,1 = (u
′
k
∏ℓ
j=1 u
µj,1
k,j )
ri for mβ = (µ1,β, . . . , µℓ,β), β ∈
{0, 1}, k ∈ [3]. C executes the both NIZK protocols from Section 3.4.1 to prove S∗
that C knows (ri, µ1,β, . . . , µℓ,β) for both messages mβ ∈ {m0,m1}. From the proofs
in [83, 85] follows that for u3,j =
(
u
′
3
)ξ1,j+ξ2,j the commitments are perfect hiding and
the two parameter initializations are indistinguishable under the DLIN assumption.
Therefore the commitments on the messages mβ and m1−β leak no information about
the message.
The perfect hiding property of commitments guarantees zero-knowledgeness of
NIZK proofs (π(1)i,0 , π
(2)
i,0 ) and (π
(1)
i,1 , π
(2)
i,1 ). The perfect hiding key generation algorithm
outputs a commitment key ck = (q,G,GT , e, g, u
′
1, u
′
2, u
′
3, u1,j, u2,j, u3,j) and a trap-
door key xk = (ck, ρ, τ, ζ). Using this trapdoor key, the simulator computes the
commitments Ak,j, Bk,i, Bˆk,i and simulates the proofs that they commit to µj, ri, for
j ∈ [l], i ∈ [n]. C outputs Xi,b and Xi,1−b and the simulated NIZK proofs (π(1)i,b , π(2)i,b )
and (π(1)i,1−b, π
(2)
i,1−b), where π
(1)
i,b is the first part of NIZK proof, which is built to the
commitment Xi,b and π
(2)
i,b is the corresponding second part of NIZK proof to the com-
mitment Xi,b. Analogously are defined the proofs (π
(1)
i,1−b, π
(2)
i,1−b). After completing the
NIZK protocol the challenger C acts as a honest user and proceeds in the same manner
as the real one. C sends his outputs to the dishonest signer S∗. The challenger C
executes the signing process first on behalf of Ub on input (pk,Xi,b, π(1)i,b , π(2)i,b ) and then
on behalf of U1−b on input (pk,Xi,1−b, π(1)i,1−b, π(2)i,1−b). Since the commitments and the
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proofs do not leak any information about the message due to the hiding property of the
commitments, the output σi,b of signing protocol on behalf of Ub is indistinguishable
from the output σi,1−b of the protocol on behalf of U1−b. If S∗ rejects to sign one of
the inputs (Xi,b, π
(1)
i,b , π
(2)
i,b ) or (Xi,1−b, π
(1)
i,b , π
(2)
i,1−b), then for the corresponding output
holds σb = ⊥ or σ1−b = ⊥. This means that both resulting signatures are set to ⊥,
and S∗, does not gain any advantage if he would try to hinder the game execution.
Otherwise, after finishing the signing phase of the blind signature for Ub and U1−b, C
checks the validity of the obtained signatures for U0, U1 by computing the follows
e(Yi,b,1, g) = e(g2, vki)e(Xi,b, Yi,b,2). If both of the signatures σi,b, σi,1−b are valid, C
gives them to S∗. If only one of them is valid, C outputs ⊥. C obtains then the output
b′ of S∗. If b = b′, C outputs β ← 1, otherwise it outputs β ← ⊥.
Analysis: Observe that if b = b′, then the distribution of the views of malicious
on the protocols regarding the values Xi,b and Xi,1−b are indistinguishable. The
DLIN instance can be simulated by the tuple (u1,j, u2,j, u3,j) for j = {1, . . . , ℓ}
with (u1,j, u2,j, u3,j) =
((
u
′
1
)ξ1,j
,
(
u
′
2
)ξ2,j
,
(
u
′
3
)ξ3,j), with ξ3,j = ξ1,j + ξ2,j and
(u
′
1, u
′
2, u
′
3) = (g
u, gv, gw). In this case the challenger outputs β = 0 and σb, σ1−b
are perfectly simulated. Therefore Pr[b = b′|β = 0] = 1/2. Whether the challenger
C outputs ⊥ or two valid signatures σ0, σ1 depends on adversary’s reply, i.e. whether
its reply σi satisfies the verification process or not. Therefore it is completely inde-
pendent from b, since the distribution of X0 and X1 are indistinguishable from each
other. Hence Pr[b ̸= b′|β = 1] = 1/2 + ϵ. Eventually it follows that the success
probability in DLIN problem is greater than 1/2(1/2) + 1/2(1/2 + ϵ) = 1/2 + ϵ/2,
which contradicts the DLIN assumption, for negligible ϵ.
3.5 Applications to Verifiable E-Voting
First, we recall the general concept of an e-voting scheme and highlight functionalities
of its algorithms based on [46]: a voter V is a party that is authorized by a voting
authority to submit votes. The tallying authority collects individual votes and tally the
results of the election to obtain the outcome. A public board which can be considered
as a broadcast channel makes its content public to all parties and each party can add
information to the board but not remove or modify any of the published contents. This
board is typically used for the purpose of universal verifiability [52] of the e-voting
process.
Koenig, Dubuis, and Haenni [100] presented a generic template for e-voting
protocols with distributed voting authorities assuming existence of threshold blind
signatures, yet without offering concrete constructions of the latter schemes. Their
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generic e-voting protocol was shown to satisfy the security properties from [105]. By
using our rerandomizable threshold blind signature scheme we therefore enable a
concrete construction of such distributed e-voting scheme.
Blind signatures [125, 129, 130] are thought to be simple for constructing an
e-voting scheme and they are suitable for large scale elections. Xia and Schneider
[158] proposed a simple and efficient method to build a receipt-free and individually
verifiable e-voting scheme. The process of their construction works as follows: One
considers four parties which are involved into the scheme - the voter, the administrator,
the counter and the bulletin board. A voter begins the voting process by generating his
ballot form with his vote which will be encrypted by the bit-commitment {v}k and
blindly signed to obtain vote {{v}k}blind. The voter sends it to the administrator, who
only signs the received value if the voter is eligible to vote and did not vote before.
Upon receiving the signed ballot {{{v}k}blind}sig from the administrator, the voter
unblinds it to get {{v}k}sig and sends it to the counter through an anonymous channel.
Upon receiving it, the counter checks whether the ballot contains a signature which
was computed by the administrator. If so, the counter sends the encrypted vote to the
bulletin board, which is open to everyone. After a period of time the voter sends the
de-commitment key k to the counter such that the latter can decrypt the vote and put it
onto the bulletin board. In [158] the authors achieve receipt-freeness by assuming a
two-way untappable channel between voters and administrator and one-way untappable
channel from voters to counter. Thereby anonymous channels are implemented by mix
networks, which were introduced by Chaum [48]. This technology takes as input the
encrypted ballots, re-encrypts and outputs this in unrevealed and randomly permuted
order.
Distributed e-voting. As one of the major drawbacks of simple e-voting schemes is
the potential single point of failure. Therefore distributing the power among a certain
number of parties is an important aspect of security nowadays. We give a general
description of a distributed e-voting protocol, based on our threshold blind signature
scheme. We follow the generic template introduced by Koenig et al. [100]. The
construction requires public registration boards as stated in [100] to ensure democracy
of the voting process. Further properties additional to the democracy property, which
are claimed to be achieved by Koenig et al. [100] are anonymity, persistence and
privacy. Motivated by their template and by the goal to distribute the single e-voting
version introduced by Xia and Schneider [158], we provide an alternative e-voting
scheme from threshold blind signatures and thus we present another solution for the
distribution of the single point of failure in e-voting schemes.
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Our construction involves four parties, which are voter, key authority, voting
authorities and a public board. In the first phase the key authority generates public
key and secret key shares, where the latter are given to the voting authorities. The
voter sends this blinded vote to those voting authorities, which check first each voters
eligibility, i.e. they check if the voter is eligible and has not voted before. Then the
voter initiates with each of the n voting authorities a TBSign protocol where the final
output of the protocol ends in a signature on the blinded vote. Finally, he sends the
blinded vote with the received signature to the counter. In the ballot recording stage the
counter publishes all eligible ballots onto a bulletin board, which is public to everyone.
Each voter can check his ballot. In the last phase the voter sends randomizers, he used
to compute the blinded vote, to the counter anonymously, such that the counter can
unblind the vote and consider it for the counting procedure.
Security properties. In general, a e-voting scheme is required to provide the fol-
lowing properties which we recall informally here. More formal definitions can be
found in [21, 71, 105]. The first crucial property is privacy, which means that indi-
vidual votes remain hidden. The soundness property prevents dishonest voters from
biasing the voting process. Another important security notion is public verifiability. It
ensures that anyone can check whether the votes has been counted to prevent potential
falsifications of counting process. Nowadays, one of the most important properties
of an e-voting scheme is anonymity and receipt-freeness. A secure e-voting scheme
with a public board guarantees that even though there is a public board which would
question the anonymity of voters, the anonymity property is not affected. Information
about the voter cannot be learned from published entries on the board because the
initial vote appears as a blinded value. It is even not possible to trace the vote of a
certain voter. The property of receipt-freeness means that a voter cannot prove to
anyone how he has voted. Another crucial requirement of e-voting is incoercibility
which means that a voter cannot be coerced into casting a particular vote by some
coercer. Assuming that a coercer cannot observe the voter during the voting process.
Another common property of an e-voting scheme is democracy which means that
authorized voters are allowed to vote only once. We can follow that receipt-freeness
provides incoercibility and prevents vote buying. As we will see later, our e-voting
construction does not provide receipt-freeness, incoercibility and public verifiability.
This shortcomings motivate us to continue our research in this area in order to provide
efficient improvements of a distributed e-voting scheme which also provides the most
important security properties.
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3.5.1 Distributed E-Voting Template
In this section we provide a general description of a distributed e-voting scheme. Later
we discuss the security properties which can be achieved by our template and formalize
future goals by which we could achieve useful improvements of the current scheme.
We note that the scheme is run between several parties, a voter, voting authorities who
sign the blinded vote, a public board and a counter. Regarding the security of our
scheme we note that the adversary who is attacking the scheme is allowed to corrupt
up to t − 1 servers, Additionally, the adversary is required to output the indices of
servers he wants to corrupt in advance of running his attack. This defines a selective
adversary and guarantees collusion freeness of t− 1 voters with the voter.
Preparation stage: The voting process begins after the distribution of empty ballots
and the set of identities which are authorized to participate in the voting process.
We assume existence of n voting authorities for which the KeyGen algorithm
generates the secret key shares of the TBS scheme.
Administration stage: The voting authorities check each voters eligibility, if a voter
with a certain id has not voted before. The user runs TBSign protocol with
n voting authorities. Each voting authority signs the blinded vote if and only
if the voter is authorized to vote and has not previously requested a signature
on any other value. While running the first stage of TBSign protocol the voter
has to receive signature shares from voting authorities. The voter takes at least
t-out-of-n valid signature shares of his vote combines them to a final signature
σ using the second stage of the TBSign protocol.
Voting stage: The voter sends the received signature together with the corresponding
blinded vote to the public board using an anonymous channel. The board accepts
the vote if and only if the received signature is valid. The user can check
whether the published signature corresponds to the signature σ he has computed
previously as a part of TBSign protocol from Section 3.4.
Counting stage: If the voter could confirm the published signature σ, he sends the
randomizers ri, which were used to compute the blinded vote, to the counter
via an anonymous channel. Finally the counter can use these randomizers to
unblind the vote and consider it in the counting procedure.
Security Discussion. Our scheme achieves such security properties as completeness,
privacy, democracy, anonymity and individual verifiability. Anonymity follows from
the fact, that nobody can connect the published vote with voter’s id, because the
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published vote appears via a blinded value which as computed by the voter itself. This
means that blindness property of our TBS scheme guarantees anonymity of e-voting
scheme. Privacy follows from the fact, that the e-voting scheme is based on our TBS
scheme. This guarantees in case that all authorities collude against a voter, the voter’s
privacy remains preserved due to the blindness property of the TBS scheme. Individual
verifiability is satisfied because the blinded votes and the corresponding signatures
are published on the public board such that the voter who has access to the board can
verify the correctness of published votes.
Soundness is conjectured based on conjectured honest-user unforgeability of our
TBS scheme. Our scheme does not achieve public verifiability where everyone who
has access to the public board can verify the validity of votes. We note that our TBS
scheme does not provide coersion-resistance of an e-voting scheme, since the signature
σ on a blinded value together with a randomness r from our TBS scheme can be used to
prove how a voter has voted. From this missing property follows that receipt-freeness
which guarantees impossibility of a voter to prove to anyone how he has voted, is not
satisfied in our construction. Therefore, the main goals for our future research are to
provide an improvement of our e-voting scheme which would achieve the properties
of public verifiability, coercion-resistance, receipt-freeness and proven soundness.
Chapter 4
Public Key Encryption with
Distributed Keyword Search
4.1 Introduction
Cloud computing provides convenient, on-demand network access to shared services
and applications over the Internet. The main advantages of cloud computing are
the virtually unlimited data storage capabilities, universal data access, and savings
on hardware and software expenses. Despite the many technical and economical
advantages, availability and data privacy are amongst those issues that prevent potential
users from trusting the cloud services. The reason of these concerns is that upon
outsourcing their data to the cloud, users lose control over their data.
While for better availability it is advisable to distribute copies of data across
multiple cloud servers, for data privacy and its protection from unauthorized access
the use of complete encryption prior to outsourcing is indispensable. If the data is
encrypted and the user wishes to access certain files at a later stage, the cloud needs to
perform the search and retrieve the corresponding ciphertexts. In order to facilitate
the search process each outsourced file is typically associated with a set of keywords.
Since adding plaintext keywords [45] to each file prior to outsourcing would leak
information about the file contents to the cloud services, a better solution is to encrypt
the associated keywords and provide cloud services with the ability to search for
encrypted keywords. This permission comes in form of trapdoors allowing cloud
services to test whether an encrypted file contains keywords for which the trapdoors
were derived by the user. Such searchable encryption techniques are particularly
helpful to protect outsourcing of sensitive files, e.g., those containing medical and
health records [20, 107, 108]. A range of encryption schemes supporting keyword
search have been proposed, based on symmetric encryption (e.g., [47, 54, 75, 152])
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and public-key encryption (e.g., [30, 34, 82, 89]) techniques. While some schemes can
cope only with single keywords (e.g., [151, 155]), which is too restrictive in practice,
more advanced schemes (e.g., [45, 111, 150, 154]) can process multiple keywords.
The majority of searchable encryption schemes issue trapdoors for keywords and any
party in possession of those trapdoors can perform the search procedure on its own.
In a cloud-based storage setting this imposes a single point of trust with regard to the
search functionality. When it comes to the use of multiple cloud services for better
availability, a distributed search approach would therefore help to reduce this trust
requirement. Encryption schemes supporting distributed keyword search procedures
in a cloud environment exist so far only in the symmetric setting, namely in [159],
those constructions however were not formally modeled and analyzed.
Our Threshold Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (TPEKS) We
model security and propose the first constructions of Threshold Public Key Encryption
with Keyword Search (TPEKS), where the ability to search over encrypted keywords
requires participation of at least t parties, each equipped with its own trapdoor share.
The main benefits of TPEKS over traditional PEKS constructions include the dis-
tribution of trust across multiple servers involved in a search procedure and more
importantly stronger privacy protection of keywords against keyword guessing attacks
[36, 138], based on which information about keywords can be revealed from associated
trapdoors; notably, all single-server-based PEKS constructions are inherently vulnera-
ble to keyword guessing attacks. Another flavour of threshold public keyword search
was presented by Wang et al. [156]. They defined the threshold privacy preserving
keyword search (TPPKS) which guarantees data privacy and privacy of the secret and
its shares. Their scheme is useful for a scenario where users of an organization want to
store data at a large database server. To be able to search for required data, any member
has to collaborate with the others. The functionality of TPPKS is very useful for many
applications but it is not comparable with our TPEKS, since our TPEKS enables one
user to search for data by interacting with at least t-out-of-n servers. Our scheme is
applicable to distributed cloud data storage, which is receiving increasing attractions
from the big data community, which is interested in the secure storage options for this
data in the cloud.
Our security model for TPEKS is motivated by the security goals and known
attacks on single-server-based PEKS constructions (e.g. [2, 10, 36, 53, 92]). The
concept of PEKS was introduced by Boneh et al. [30], along with the formalization of
two security goals: indistinguishability and consistency. While indistinguishability
aims at privacy of encrypted keywords, consistency aims to prevent false positives,
where a PEKS ciphertext created for one keyword can successfully be tested with
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a trapdoor produced for another keyword. Initially, PEKS constructions were able
to search for individual keywords, whereas later schemes were designed to handle
conjunctive queries on encrypted keywords [82, 89, 132] and thus process keyword sets
within a single search operation. The majority of PEKS schemes offer security against
chosen-plaintext attacks [2, 30, 36, 53] and only few constructions remain secure
against chosen-ciphertext attacks, e.g. [62]. The vulnerability of PEKS constructions,
e.g. [30], against (offline) keyword guessing attacks was discovered by Byun et al. [36].
In short, a keyword guessing attack can be mounted by creating a PEKS ciphertext
for some candidate keyword and then testing this ciphertext with the given trapdoor.
Obviously, this attack works if keywords have low entropy, which is what typically
happens in practice. As shown by Jeong et al. [92], keyword guessing attacks are
inherent to all single-server based PEKS constructions with consistency, a necessary
security property of PEKS. Through secret sharing of the trapdoor information across
multiple servers, TPEKS significantly reduces the risk of keyword guessing attacks,
which are modeled as part of the indistinguishability property.
In the design of our TPEKS construction we extend the ideas underlying the
transformation by Abdalla et al. [2] for building indistinguishable and computationally
consistent (single-server) PEKS from anonymous Identity-Based Encryption (IBE).
Although our transformation also treats identities as keywords, it assumes a different
building block, namely anonymous Identity-Based Threshold Decryption (IBTD),
which extends IBE by the distributed decryption process for which a threshold number
t-out-of-n servers contribute with their own decryption shares. We show that while
IBTD anonymity is essential for the indistinguishability (with resistance to keyword
guessing attacks) of the constructed TPEKS scheme, IBTD indistinguishability informs
computational consistency property of the TPEKS scheme. Aiming to instantiate our
TPEKS construction, we propose an anonymous IBTD scheme, as a modification
of the well-known anonymous IBE scheme by Boneh and Franklin (BF) [31]. This
modification is performed by distributing the decryption process of the original BF-
scheme.
At the end of this chapter we provide a comparison between our TPEKS scheme
and the dual-server PEKS (DS-PEKS) by Chen et al. [50]. The latter withstands all
the attacks and also provides security against keyword guessing attacks. Thus, Chen et
al.’s scheme produces another possibility for searchable encryption. Their construction
employs two servers which consecutively perform the test procedure. After a detailed
view into the functionalities and security notions of DS-PEKS we follow that the two
schemes TPEKS and DS-PEKS are not comparable with each other in use, because of
their different purposes and functionalities.
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4.2 PEKS from Anonymous IBE
In this section we recall the two definitions of a public key encryption with keyword
search (PEKS) and of an anonymous identity-based encryption scheme (IBE). We
remember shortly the transformation from [2], where a PEKS has been constructed
from an anonymous IBE scheme. For our construction of a threshold public key
encryption with keyword search (TPEKS) we take these two schemes as basic and
observe the threshold version of them. We remember that the security of IBE and
PEKS schemes in Abdalla et al. [2] was defined for chosen plaintext attacks. Our
presented IBTD and TPEKS constructions are secure against chosen ciphertext attacks.
To make the differences between the two attack models more obvious, we provide
their definitions in the following subsection 5.2.1.
4.2.1 Anonymous Identity Based Encryption
An identity-based encryption scheme consists of four polynomial time algorithms:
Setup(1λ) : On input the security parameter it outputs the master keys (mpk,msk).
KeyDer(mpk,msk, id) : On input a master public key mpk, master secret key msk
and an identity id it outputs the secret key for identity id, which is given by skid.
Enc(mpk, id,m) : On input a master public key mpk, an identity id and a message
m, the algorithm outputs a ciphertext C of m.
Dec(mpk, skid, C) : On input a secret key for identity id, skid and a ciphertext C it
decrypts the ciphertext and outputs m or ⊥.
In the following two paragraphs we define IBE security properties, indistinguishability
and anonymity against chosen-ciphertext and chosen-plaintext attacks.
Indistinguishability. Boneh and Franklin [31] showed how the security of an IBE
scheme can be derived from the IND−CCA security, which is the standard acceptable
notion of security of a public key encryption scheme. However, it must be adapted to an
IBE scheme, such that the system remains secure under an attack where an adversary
attacks a public key id upon being in possession of users private keys id1, . . . , idn.
Formally their security notion [31] allows an adversary to adaptively chose the public
key to attack the scheme. Therefore a secure IBE must allow the attacker to obtain
the private key of any user idi which is different from the attacked user idj . In our
definition below we provide selective security, such that we can use this definition for
later purposes where we will present the identity-based threshold decryption scheme
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and define its selective security. We say that an IBE scheme is IBE− IND−CCA
secure if no polynomial-time adversary A has a greater advantage than a negligible
one in attacking the scheme. We describe this attack in the following experiment. Let
M(λ) be a message space in security parameter λ, then we consider the experiment:
ExpIBE−IND−CCA−bAind (1
λ)
1. choose id set I ̸= 0
2. (mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ)
3. (id∗,m0,m1, state)← AOKeyDer(·),ODec(·)(find,mpk)
4. compute C∗ ← Enc(mpk, id∗,mb)
5. b′ ← AOKeyDer(·),ODec(·)(guess, C∗, state)
6. if {m0,m1} /∈M(λ), return 0
if id∗ /∈ I and |m0| = |m1|, return b′, else return 0
A issues up to qks private key and qd decryption queries. The two oracles are defined
as follows:
OKeyDer(idi) : On input idi the oracle runs skidi r← KeyDer(mpk,msk, idi). It
outputs (skidi).
ODec(idi, C) : On input (idi, C), where (idi, C) ̸= (id∗, C∗), the oracle computes
skidi
r← KeyDer(mpk,msk, idi) and outputs m← Dec(mpk,C, skidi).
A’s advantage in attacking the IBE scheme is given by
AdvIBE−IND−CCA−bIBE,Aind (1
λ) =
∣∣Pr [ExpIBE−IND−CCA−1IBE,Aind (1λ) = 1]
−Pr [ExpIBE−IND−CCA−0IBE,Aind (1λ) = 1]∣∣.
Anonymity. An IBE scheme is anonymous if a ciphertext does not reveal any infor-
mation about the identity to the receiver. We present now the anonymity experiment
for IBE− ANO−CCA security and show the changes in IBE− ANO−CPA security
in contrast to the former.
ExpIBE−ANO−CCA−bAano (1
λ)
1. choose id set I ̸= 0
84 Public Key Encryption with Distributed Keyword Search
2. (mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ)
3. (id0, id1,m∗, state)← AOKeyDer(·),ODec(·)ano (find,mpk)
4. compute C∗ ← Enc(mpk, idb,m∗)
5. b′ ← AOKeyDer(·),ODec(·)ano (guess, C∗, state)
6. if m /∈M(λ), return 0
if {id0, id1} /∈ I , return b′, else return 0
Aano issues up to qks private key and qd decryption queries. The two oracles are
defined as follows:
OKeyDer(idi) : On input idi the oracle runs skidi r← KeyDer(mpk,msk, idi). It
outputs (skidi).
ODec(idi, C) : On input (idi, C), where (idi, C) ̸= (id0, C∗) and (idi, C) ̸=
(id1, C
∗), the oracle generates skidi
r← KeyDer(pk,msk, idi) and outputs m ←
Dec(mpk,C, skidi).
Aano’s advantage in attacking the IBE scheme is given by
AdvIBE−ANO−CCA−bIBE,Aind (1
λ) =
∣∣Pr [ExpIBE−ANO−CCA−1IBE,Aano (1λ) = 1]
−Pr [ExpIBE−ANO−CCA−0IBE,Aano (1λ) = 1]∣∣.
Note: We say that an IBE system is IBE− IND−CPA or IBE− ANO−CPA se-
cure if an adversary issues up to qm queries to the key derivation oracle but A is
not allowed to issue any queries to the decryption oracle. The experiments for
IBE− IND−CPA and IBE− ANO−CPA are the same as those experiments of
IBE− IND−CCA and IBE− ANO−CCA security except access to decryption ora-
cle.
The first Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search was introduced by Boneh
et al. [30]. They studied a problem where a user, Bob is sending an encrypted email
to Alice. There is an email gateway which searches the email for keywords provided
by Alice. If the email contains corresponding keywords, the gateway routes the email
to Alice accordingly. If Alice does not want the gateway to learn the content of the
encrypted emails, there is a technique which enables the gateway to test whether the
emails contain the requested keywords or not without learning more information of the
email contents. This technique is called public key encryption with keyword search
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(PEKS). Formally this works as follows: If Bob wishes to sent an encrypted email
to Alice with keywords w1, . . . , wn, where n is relatively small, he sends a message
which consists of the following information:
[Epk(m), PEKS(pk, w1), . . . , PEKS(pk, wn)],
where pk is Alice’s public key and m is the content of the email. PEKS(pk, wi)
describes a ciphertext on keywords, such that the gateway can not learn keywords
are encrypted in the email. We note that while pk denotes the public key which is
used to encrypt a message m, the other public key pk is used to compute the PEKS
ciphertext on a keyword wi. When Alice wants the gateway search for the keywords,
she prepares first a short secret key Twi , called trapdoor and sends it to the mail server.
This trapdoor is produced by Alice using her secret key sk. The gateway tests then
PEKS together with trapdoors, whether the PEKS ciphertexts are the corresponding
encryptions for the required keywords.
Definition 31. A public key encryption with keyword search scheme from [30] consists
of the following four PPT algorithms:
KeyGen(1λ) : On input the security parameter 1λ it generates a public and a private
key, sk, pk.
PEKS(pk, w) : On input a public key pk and a keyword w it outputs a searchable
encryption of w, described as Φ.
Trd(sk, w) : On input user’s secret key sk, and a keyword w it produces a trapdoor
Tw.
Test(pk,Φ, Tw) : On input user’s public key pk, a searchable encryption Φ =
PEKS(pk, w′), and a trapdoor Tw(sk, w) it outputs 1, if w = w′ and 0 other-
wise.
Abdalla et al. [2] were interested in an anonymous IBE scheme which enabled to
construct a secure PEKS scheme as a transform from the former scheme. They noticed
that anonymity of IBE leads to the indistinguishability property of a PEKS scheme in
the IBE-to-PEKS transformation. The indistinguishability property of an IBE scheme
is responsible for consistency of PEKS. We recall these two security properties of a
PEKS scheme - which were initially defined in [2] - in the following two experiments.
ExpPEKS−IND−CPA−bAind (1
λ)
1. WSet← ∅; (pk, sk) r← Setup(1λ)
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2. (w0, w1, state)
r← AOTrd(·)ind (find, pk)
3. C∗ r← PEKS(pk, wb)
4. b′ r← AOTrd(·)ind (guess, C∗, state)
5. if {w0, w1} ∩WSet = ∅
then return b′, else return 0.
Aind issues up to qt trapdoor share queries. The trapdoor oracle is defined as follows:
OTrd(wi) : On input wi the oracle runs Twi r← Trd(pk, sk, wi). It outputs (Twi).
The advantage of Aind is given by the following equation:
AdvPEKS−IND−CPA−bPEKS,Aind (1
λ) =
∣∣Pr [ExpPEKS−IND−CPA−1PEKS,Aind (1λ) = 1]
−Pr [ExpPEKS−IND−CPA−0PEKS,Aind (1λ) = 1]∣∣.
Abdalla et al. [2] showed that the original PEKS scheme [30] is not perfectly
consistent. The authors introduced two other consistency notions, namely statistically
and computationally consistency and showed that the scheme from [30] meets the
latter condition. We recall the definition of consistency of a PEKS scheme from [2],
assuming existence of an adversary Acon against this property and associate to the
attacker Acon the following experiment:
ExpPEKS−CONSAcon (1
λ)
1. (pk, sk) r← Setup(1λ)
2. (w,w′) r← Acon(pk)
3. C∗ r← PEKS(pk, w); Tw′ = Trd(sk, w′)
4. if w ̸= w′ and Test(Tw′ , C∗) = 1
then return 1, else return 0.
The advantage of Acon is given by the following equation:
AdvPEKS−CONSPEKS,Acon (1
λ) = Pr[ExpPEKS−CONSPEKS,Acon (1
λ) = 1].
The scheme is said to be perfectly consistent if this advantage is 0 for all adversaries
Acon. It is called statistically consistent if the advantage is negligible for all adver-
saries. Finally we call a scheme computationally consistent if the defined advantage is
negligible for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries Acon.
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Abdalla et al. [2] provided a transformation from an IND−CPA secure and
anonymous IBE scheme to an IND−CPA secure PEKS scheme. Formally the PEKS
transform sets the public key and the secret key of the receiver as the master public and
master secret key of the IBE. The keyword w and the corresponding trapdoor Tw of
PEKS are associated with the identity id and the secret key skid of IBE, respectively.
That means that the Trd algorithm equals to the KeyDer algorithm of IBE. PEKS
encryption of a keyword w is done by choosing a random R r← {0, 1}λ and com-
puting C ← Enc(pk, w,R). The output is the ciphertext (C,R). The test algorithm
Test(Tw, (C,R)) outputs 1, if Dec(Tw, C) = R.
We also recall the theorem which states the security of transformed PEKS from
([2], Theorem 4.2):
Theorem 7. Let PEKS be a transformation from an IBE scheme. If an IBE scheme is
IBE− IND−CPA secure then PEKS is computationally consistent. If an IBE scheme
is IBE− ANO−CPA secure, then PEKS is PEKS−IND− CPA secure.
4.3 Anonymous Identity-Based Threshold Decryption
We start with the definitions of Identity-Based Threshold Decryption (IBTD) along
with its security properties: indistinguishability and anonymity. Our IBTD model
extends the model from [11], where this primitive along with the indistinguishability
property was introduced, by the additional anonymity requirement, which also requires
some small modifications to the assumed syntax of the IBTD decryption process in
comparison to [11].
4.3.1 IBTD Syntax and Security Goals
We formalize the IBTD syntax in Definition 32. In contrast to [11], we treat the
validity checking process for decryption shares implicitly as part of the decryption
algorithm Dec, whereas in [11] this property was outsourced into a separate verification
algorithm, aiming at public verifiability of individual decryption shares. In our case,
where we additionally require the IBTD scheme to be anonymous, such syntax change
is necessary, as discussed in Remark 4.
Definition 32 (Identity-Based Threshold Decryption (IBTD)). An IBTD scheme con-
sists of the following algorithms (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, ShareDec, Dec):
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Setup(n, t, 1λ) : On input the number of decryption servers n, a threshold parameter
t, (1 ≤ t ≤ n) and a security parameter 1λ, it outputs a master public key mpk and a
master secret key msk.
KeyDer(mpk,msk, id, t, n) : On input a public master key mpk, master secret key
msk, identity id, and threshold parameters t, n, it computes secret key skid on the
identity id and its secret shares {(i, skid,i)}i∈[n] for servers Si, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Enc(mpk, id,m) : On input mpk, an identity id and a message m it outputs a
ciphertext C.
ShareDec(mpk, (i, skid,i), C) : On input a master public key mpk, secret shares
(i, skidi) for servers 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ciphertext C, it outputs decryption shares δi for
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Dec(mpk, {δi}i∈Ω, C) : On input a master public key mpk, a set of decryption shares
{δi}i∈Ω, where |Ω| ≥ t and a ciphertext C, it combines t-out-of-n decryption shares
to a secret key skid and computes the decryption of m under skid, it outputs a message
m, or 0.
The following Definition 33 formalizes IBTD indistinguishability against chosen-
ciphertext attacks (IBTD−IND−CCA) and bears similarities with the corresponding
definition for IBE [31]; namely, our experiment takes into account the threshold nature
of the decryption algorithm allowing the adversary to reveal up to t − 1 secret key
shares. We note that the following game considers up to t − 1 secret key queries
on each identity, to avoid the reconstruction of a secret key by issuing more than by
issuing more then t− 1 queries on the same id.
Definition 33 (IBTD Indistinguishability). Let Aind be a PPT adversary against
the IBTD−IND−CCA security of the IBTD scheme, associated with the following
experiment
ExpIBTD−IND−CCA−bIBTD,Aind (1
λ)
1. (mpk,msk) r← Setup(1λ, t, n)
2. LetList be a list comprising (id, Sid), where Sid := {(1, skid,1), . . . , (n, skid,n)}
and (i, skid,i) are the outputs of KeyDer(mpk,msk, id, t, n) algorithm.
Note: at the beginning of the experiment the list is empty.
3. (id∗,m0,m1, state)
r← AOKeyDer(·),ODec(·)ind (find,mpk)
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4. if (id∗, Sid∗) /∈ List,
run (skid∗ , (1, skid∗,1), . . . , (n, skid∗,n))
r← KeyDer(mpk,msk, id∗, t, n),
set Sid∗ := {(1, skid∗,1), . . . , (n, skid∗,n)}, add (id∗, Sid∗) to List
5. compute C∗ r← Enc(mpk, id∗,mb)
6. b′ r← AOKeyDer(·),ODec(·)ind (guess, C∗,mpk, state)
The experiment outputs b′ if all of the following holds:
• id∗ /∈ ID, where ID is the list of all queried identities,
• A issued at most t− 1 queries OKeyDer(id, i) on each id,
• Aind did not query ODec(id∗, C∗),
where the two oracles are defined as follows:
OKeyDer(id, i) : On input (id, i) check whether (id, Sid) ∈ List. If (id, Sid) /∈
List run Sid
r← KeyDer(mpk,msk, id, t, n). Add (id, Sid) to List, output (i, skid,i)
and a counter cid = 1. If (id, Sid) ∈ List and counter cid < t − 1, parse Sid as
{(1, skid,1), . . . , (n, skid,n)}, output (i, skidi) and increase the counter to cid + 1. If
cid ≥ t, output ⊥.
ODec(id, C): On input (id, C) check whether (id, Sid) ∈ List. If so, parse Sid
as {(1, skid,1), . . . , (n, skid,n)}, run δi r← ShareDec(mpk, (i, skid,i), C) for i ∈ [n].
Take at least t-out-of-n decryption shares δi, run Dec(mpk, {δi}i∈Ω, C), where |Ω| ≥ t
and output m or 0. If (id, Sid) /∈ List, compute Sid r← KeyDer(mpk,msk, id, t, n)
add (id, Sid) to the List. Compute δi
r← ShareDec(mpk, (i, skid,i), C), where i ∈ [n].
Take at least t-out-of-n decryption shares δi, run Dec(mpk, {δi}i∈Ω, C), output m or
0.
Aind’s success is given as
AdvIBTD−IND−CCAIBTD,Aind (1
λ) =
∣∣Pr [ExpIBTD−IND−CCA−1IBTD,Aind (1λ) = 1]
−Pr [ExpIBTD−IND−CCA−0IBTD,Aind (1λ) = 1]∣∣
The scheme is IBTD−IND−CCA secure if AdvIBTD−IND−CCAIBTD,Aind is negligible.
In the following Definition 34 we model anonymity as a new property for IBTD
schemes. Our definition bears some similarity with the anonymity property for IBE
schemes as defined, e.g. in [2], except that we consider chosen-ciphertext attacks by
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providing access to the decryption oracle. We also extend the single server definition
to the threshold setting by allowing the anonymity adversary to reveal up to t−1 secret
key shares. The threshold setting is particularly important for achieving protection
against keyword guessing attacks during our transformation from IBTD to TPEKS.
Analogously to the definition of indistinguishability, we allow up to t− 1 secret key
queries on the same identity, introducing a counter cid during those queries.
Definition 34 (IBTD Anonymity). Let Aano be a probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary against the IBTD−ANO−CCA security of the IBTD scheme, associated with
the following experiment:
ExpIBTD−ANO−CCA−bAano (1
λ)
1. (mpk,msk) r← Setup(1λ, t, n)
2. LetList be a list comprising (id, Sid), where Sid := {(1, skid,1), . . . , (n, skid,n)}
and (i, skid,i) are the outputs of KeyDer(mpk,msk, id, t, n) algorithm.
Note: at the beginning of the experiment the list is empty.
3. (id0, id1,m∗, state)
r← AOKeyDer(·),ODec(·)ano (find,mpk)
4. if (id0, ·) /∈ List:
run (skid0 , (1, skid0,1), . . . , (n, skid0,n))
r← KeyDer(mpk,msk, id0, t, n),
set Sid0 := {(1, skid0,1), . . . , (n, skid0,n)}, add (id0, Sid0) to List
5. if (id1, ·) /∈ List:
run (skid1 , (1, skid1,1), . . . , (n, skid1,n))
r← KeyDer(mpk,msk, id1, t, n),
set Sid1 := {(1, skid1,1), . . . , (n, skid1,n)}, add (id1, Sid1) to List
6. C∗ r← Enc(mpk, idb,m∗)
7. b′ r← AOKeyDer(·),ODec(·)ano (guess, C∗,mpk, state)
If {m0,m1} /∈ M(λ), return 0. Otherwise, the experiment outputs b′ if all of the
following holds:
• id0, id1 /∈ ID, where ID is the set of all queried identities.
• Aano issued at most t− 1 queries OKeyDer(id, i) on each id,
• Aano did not query ODec(id0, C∗) or ODec(id1, C∗),
where the two oracles are defined as follows:
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OKeyDer(id, i) : On input (id, i) check whether (id, Sid) ∈ List. If (id, Sid) /∈
List run Sid
r← KeyDer(mpk,msk, id, t, n). Add (id, Sid) to List, output (i, skid,i)
and a counter cid = 1. If (id, Sid) ∈ List and counter cid < t − 1, parse Sid as
{(1, skid,1), . . . , (n, skid,n)} output (i, skidi) and increase the counter to cid + 1. If
cid ≥ t, output ⊥.
ODec(id, C): On input (id, C) check whether (id, Sid) ∈ List. If so, parse Sid as
{(1, skid,1), . . . , (n, skid,n)}, compute δi r← ShareDec(mpk, (i, skid,i), C) for i ∈ [n].
Take at least t-out-of-n decryption shares δi, run Dec(mpk, {δi}i∈Ω, C), where |Ω| ≥ t
and output m or 0. If (id, Sid) /∈ List, compute Sid r← KeyDer(mpk, ,msk, id, t, n)
add (id, Sid) to the List. Compute δi
r← ShareDec(mpk, (i, skid,i), C), where i ∈ [n].
Take at least t-out-of-n decryption shares δi, run Dec(mpk, {δi}i∈Ω, C), output m or
0.
The advantage of Aano is defined as
AdvIBTD−ANO−CCAIBTD,Aano (1
λ) =
∣∣Pr [ExpIBTD−ANO−CCA−1IBTD,Aano (1λ) = 1]
−Pr [ExpIBTD−ANO−CCA−0IBTD,Aano (1λ) = 1]∣∣
The scheme is IBTD−ANO−CCA secure if AdvIBTD−ANO−CCAAano is negligible.
In the following remark we point to the changes of our IBTD construction in
comparison with the construction of Baek and Zheng [11].
Remark 4. Without the aforementioned change to the IBTD syntax of the decryption
process, in comparison to [11], we would not be able to allow adversarial access to up
to t− 1 decryption shares for the challenge ciphertext in the above anonymity experi-
ment. The ability to publicly verify individual decryption shares using the challenge
ciphertext and a candidate identity (as in [11]) would rule out any meaningful defini-
tion of anonymity; in particular, a single decryption share for the challenge ciphertext
would suffice to break its anonymity property. In fact, it can be easily verified that the
IBTD construction in [11] is not anonymous according to our definition.
Robustness of IBTD The security of encryption schemes requires apart of indistin-
guishability and anonymity properties also robustness. Without this property, security
of IBTD would dismiss the basic communication correctness. We demonstrate it in
the following description: A sender sends a message to a particular receiver. To hide
the identity of this receiver, he anonymously encrypts his identity under the receiver’s
public key. We assume that he might also be willing to broadcast the ciphertext to a
larger group. As a member of this group the receiver needs to know whether he is
92 Public Key Encryption with Distributed Keyword Search
the real receiver or not. Since the encryption is anonymous it is impossible to decide
just by looking at it, whom it is addressed to. However if the encryption is robust,
the decryption procedure allows to decide whether the receiver is the correct one
or not. Robustness, denoted by IBTD−ROB−CCA can be achieved by including
the encryption key to the ciphertext and checking for this key during the decryption
process. In the strong robustness experiment, the adversary outputs a pair id0, id1 and
a ciphertext C∗. Adversary wins the game if decryptions of C∗ under the decryption
keys skid0 , skid1 corresponding to the encryption keys are both non-⊥. For more
details we refer to Abdalla et al. [3].
In the following definition we formalize IBTD robustness, meaning that the decryp-
tion algorithm will output ⊥ with overwhelming probability if an IBTD ciphertext
computed for some id is decrypted using skid′ for id′ ̸= id. Our definition of strong
robustness extends the definition of robustness for IBE schemes in [3] to the threshold
setting.
Definition 35 (IBTD−ROB−CCA). Let Arob be a probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary against the IBTD−ROB−CCA security of the IBTD scheme, associated
with the following experiment ExpIBTD−ROB−CCAArob (1
λ):
1. (mpk,msk) r← Setup(1λ, t, n), List := ∅, I = ∅
2. Let List be a list comprising (id, S, I), where S := {(1, skid,1), . . . , (n, skid,n)},
with (i, skid,i)← KeyDer(mpk,msk, id, t, n)
3. Let I be the index set of indices of the secret shares for an id.
4. (id0, id1, C∗)
r← AOKeyDer(·),ODec(·)rob (mpk)
5. (i) If id0 = id1 then return 0.
(ii) If (id0, S0, I0) /∈ List or (id1, S1, I1) /∈ List, return 0.
(iii) If |I0| ≥ t or |I1| ≥ t, then return 0. Else compute decryption shares
δ0,i
r← ShareDec(mpk, (i, skid0,i), C∗), m0 r← Dec(mpk, {δ0,i}i∈Ω , C∗) and
δ1,i
r← ShareDec(mpk, (i, skid1,i), C∗), m1 r← Dec(mpk, {δ1,i}i∈Ω , C∗). If
m0 ̸= 0 and m1 ̸= 0 return 1.
OKeyDer(id, i) : On input (id, i) check whether (id, Sid, I) /∈ List. If so, compute
S
r← KeyDer(mpk,msk, id, t, n), where Sid := {(1, skid,1), . . . , (n, skid,n)} and I ⊂
[1, n], add (id, Sid, I) to List. Then add i to I and return (i, skid,i).
ODec(id, C): On input (id, C) check whether (id, Sid, I) /∈ List. If so, compute
Sid
r← KeyDer(mpk,msk, id, t, n) add (id, Sid, I) to List. Finally compute δi r←
ShareDec(mpk, (i, skid,i), C), i ∈ [n], m ← Dec(mpk, {δi}i∈Ω, C), where |Ω| ≥ t.
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Output m.
We have: AdvIBTD−ROB−CCAIBTD,Arob (1
λ) =
∣∣Pr [ExpIBTD−ROB−CCAIBTD,Arob (1λ) = 1]∣∣ .
The scheme is IBTD−ROB−CCA secure if AdvIBTD−ROB−CCAIBTD,Arob is negligible.
4.3.2 An Anonymous IBTD Scheme based on BF-IBE
We propose a concrete IBTD construction, based on Boneh-Franklin IBE (BF-IBE)[31]
where we apply secret sharing to individual private keys and using these secret share
distribute the decryption procedure. In particular, upon receiving at least t decryption
shares, the decryption algorithm outputs either the message m or 0 (to indicate a
failure). There is already an IBTD scheme presented by Baek and Zheng [11] which
is also based on the BF-IBE scheme. Our idea is to provide an improvement and
simplification of their construction. Therefore we are interested in an IBTD construc-
tion from BF-IBE scheme. In contrast to Baek and Zheng’s IBTD scheme [11], our
construction is anonymous, which is achieved by modifying the algorithm which is
responsible for computing of decryption shares. Our scheme simplifies the decryption
share algorithm of [11] and removes the algorithm which is responsible for verification
of decryption shares. With our approach we provide a cryptographic tool with an
important property - anonymity - such that our scheme can be used for significant
cryptographic construction such as the threshold public key encryption with keyword
search.
Definition 36 (Anonymous IBTD Scheme). An anonymous IBTD scheme consists of
the following algorithms:
Setup(n, t, 1λ) : On input a security parameter 1λ, the algorithm specifies G,GT
of prime order q ≥ 2λ and chooses a generator g ∈ G. It specifies a bilinear map
e : G×G→ GT , random oracles H1, H2, H3, H4 such that H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗; H2 :
GT → {0, 1}ℓ; H3 : {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}ℓ → Z∗q; H4 : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}ℓ. The message
space is M = {0, 1}ℓ. The ciphertext space is C = G∗ × {0, 1}ℓ. The algorithm
picks a random x r← Z∗q and computes Y = gx. It returns the master public key
mpk = (G,GT , q, g, e,H1, H2, H3, H4, Y ) and the master secret key msk = x.
KeyDer(mpk,msk, id, t, n) : On input an identity id, the algorithm computes Qid =
H1(id) ∈ G∗ where 1 ≤ t ≤ n < q and using msk = x it computes skid =
Qxid = H1(id)
x. Then, it picks a1, . . . , at−1
r← Zq and defines a polynomial f(u) =
f(0) +
∑t−1
i=1 aiu
i, where f(0) = x. It outputs n master key shares (i, skid,i), where
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skid,i = Q
f(i)
id for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. To derive the private key let λ1, . . . , λt ∈ Zq be the
Lagrange coefficients, such that x =
∑t
j=1 λjf(j).
Enc(mpk, id,m) : On input the public key mpk, a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and an
identity id ∈ {0, 1}∗, it computes Qid = H1(id) ∈ G∗, chooses σ r← {0, 1}ℓ, sets
r = H3(σ,m). It computes U = gr, V = σ ⊕ H2(κid),W = m ⊕ H4(σ), where
κid = e(Qid, Y )
r and returns C = ⟨U, V,W ⟩.
ShareDec(mpk, (i, skid,i), C) : On input a ciphertext C = ⟨U, V,W ⟩ and a secret
key share (i, skid,i), the algorithm returns the decryption share δi = e(skid,i, U) =
e(Q
f(i)
id , U).
Dec(mpk, {δj}j∈Ω, C) : Given a set of decryption shares {δj}j∈Ω, where |Ω| = t
and a ciphertext C = ⟨U, V,W ⟩ the algorithm computes Lagrange coefficients λj =∏
k∈Ω,k ̸=j
−k
j−k and reconstructs
κid : =
∏
j∈Ω
δ
λj
j =
∏
j∈Ω
e(skid,j, U)
λj =
∏
j∈Ω
e(skλiid,j, g
r) = e
(∏
j∈Ω
Q
f(j)λj
id , g
)r
= e
(
Q
∑
j∈Ω f(j)λj
id , g
r
)
= e(Qxid, g
r) = e(Qid, Y )
r
The algorithm computes σ = V ⊕H2(e(κid)), m = W ⊕H4(σ), and r = H3(σ,m).
Then, if U = gr it outputs m; otherwise it outputs 0.
4.3.3 Security Analysis
For the security analysis of our IBTD scheme we require the well-known Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption, defined in the following.
Definition 37 (BDH Assumption). The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption
in the bilinear map setting (q,G,GT , e, g), where e : G × G → GT and g is the
generator of G states that for any PPT distinguisher A the following advantage is
negligible
AdvBDH,A =
∣∣Pr [A(g, ga, gb, gc) = e(g, g)abc]∣∣ ,
where the probability is taken over the random choices of a, b, c r← Z∗q and the random
bits of A.
Theorem 8 (IBTD Indistinguishability). Our IBTD scheme from Definition 36 is
IBTD−IND−CCA secure under the BDH assumption in the random oracle model.
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Proof. Let Aind be an adversary that participates in the IBTD−IND−CCA− β ex-
periment, and ABDH let be an adversary for the BDH problem. ABDH are given BDH
parameters (G,GT , e, q) and a random instance (g, ga, gb, gc) of the BDH problem for
these parameters. That means g r← G∗ and a, b, c r← Z∗q are random and ABDH’s aim
is to compute e(g, g)abc, where abc ∈ Z∗q . As stated in Definition 36 the adversary
can obtain up to t − 1 secret shares associated with an identity id ∈ ID and any
i ∈ [n] of her choice and Aind is challenged on id∗ of her choice. Aind issues at most
qH1 , qH2 , qH3 , qH4 queries to the oracles H1, H2, H3, H4 and at most qks, qd signature
share queries and decryption queries, respectively.
ABDH uses Aind as follow:
Setup: ABDH generates IBTD master public key mpk = (G,GT , q, g, e,H1, H2,
H3, H4, Y ) by setting Y = ga and Qid∗ = gb. We note that the unknown secret
key associated to mpk is represented by skid = Qaid = g
ab. ABDH gives mpk
to Aind. H1, . . . , H4 are random oracles controlled by ABDH . The queries to the
oracles are described below. Pick id∗ ∈ ID as a guess for challenge identity, and
q∗H2 ∈ {1, . . . , qH2}.
H1 oracle queries: Let H1List be a list used for storing the results of queries to the
H1 oracle. The list consists of following tuples (id,Qid). The list is initially empty.
Whenever H1 is queried with id ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, ABDH does the following: If (id,Qid) ∈
H1List, it returns Qid to Aind. For id ̸= id∗, ABDH sets Qid = H1(id) = gr for a
random r r← Zq. For id = id∗ sets Qid = H1(id) = gb using BDH challenge.
H2 oracle queries: Let H2List be a list consisting of all pairs (κid, H2(κid)). When
Aind sends its q∗H2 th query to H2 oracle, ABDH outputs κid as its solution to the BDH
challenge. Otherwise ABDH checks whether the queried value is in the H2List, if so
it returns H2(κid). Otherwise it chooses a random H ′2 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, adds (κid, H ′2) to
H2List and gives H ′2 to Aind.
H3 oracle queries: Let H3List be a list consisting of elements (σ,m,H3(σ,m)),
where σ r← {0, 1}l. When Aind issues queries on input (σ,m) it invokes ABDH
that checks whether (σ,m,H3(σ,m)) ∈ H3List. If so it returns the corresponding
H3(σ,m). Otherwise ABDH chooses a random H ′3 ∈ Z∗q adds (σ,m,H ′3) to H3List
and gives H ′3 to Aind.
H4 oracle queries: Let H4List consist of all pairs (σ,H4(σ)). When Aind issues a
query on (σ, ·), ABDH checks, whether σ ∈ H4List. If so, it returns the corresponding
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H4(σ), otherwise it chooses H ′4 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ adds (σ,H ′4) to H4List and gives H ′4 to
Aind.
Phase 1: Aind issues up to qks, qd queries to the key derivation and decryption
oracles, respectively.
Queries to OKeyDer(id, i): When Aind submits a key derivation query on input
(id, Sid), ABDH checks whether (id, Sid) ∈ List. If so, ABDH returns the correspond-
ing secret share skid,i for index i to Aind.
If (id, Sid) /∈ List, and (id, ·) /∈ H1List, ABDH computes Qid as for the H1List
queries and adds it to the H1List. ABDH picks a random set J = {j1, . . . , jt−1}
as a guess for indices of corrupted servers. ABDH picks t − 1 random integers
α1, . . . , αt−1 ∈ Zq, computes secret shares skid,ji = Qαiid for all ji ∈ Jand builds set
Sid = {(1, skid,1), . . . , (n, skid,n)} such that skid,ji appears on positions ji and ∅ on
remaining positions. ABDH adds (id, Sid) to List.
In response to key derivation query ABDH finds (i, skid,i) ∈ Sid. If skid,i = ∅ then
ABDH aborts, else it returns skid,i.
Queries to ODec(id, C): Aind issues a decryption query on input (id, C), where
C = (U, V,W ), to its decryption oracle. ABDH simulates the decryption oracle
without knowing the decryption shares. It does the following:
1. ABDH checks whether (id,H1(id)) ∈ H1list. If so, it fixes the corresponding
Qid = H1(id).
2. The simulator searches the H3List and looks for a triple (σ,m, r), where gr = U
and U is given from the received ciphertext C. After fixing the matching r, ABDH .
3. Using the fixed r and σ from the previous step the simulator computes κid =
e(Qid, Y )
r and searches the H2List for the corresponding value H2(κid). It checks,
whether V = σ ⊕H2(κid).
4. Taking σ,m from step 2, the simulator searches H4List for the corresponding H4(σ)
entry. Upon finding the matching value it checks whether W = m⊕H4(σ).
If one of the computations in the above 5 steps fails, the simulator responds with
invalid message 0. Otherwise if all 5 steps finished successful, ABDH returns m to
Aind.
Note: in order to avoid confusion with exponent b from the BDH challenge we will
use in the following steps the notations β and β′ instead of b and b′ from the IBTD-
IND-CCA experiment.
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Challenge ciphertext: At some point Aind outputs two messages m0,m1 and an
identity id∗ on which it wishes to be challenged. ABDH aborts if it didn’t guess id∗
correctly. Otherwise, ABDH simulates the ciphertext C∗ = (U∗, V ∗,W ∗) as follows.
He sets U∗ = gc from its BDH instance. Pick s ∈ {0, 1}l and H2(Z) at random and
add (·, H2(Z)) to H2List. Compute V ∗ = s ⊕ H2(Z). Then pick H4(s) at random,
add (s,H4(s)) to H4List and compute W ∗ = mβ ⊕H4(s).
Phase 2: Aind issues further queries as in Phase 1, to which ABDH responds as
before except that no queries on (id∗, C∗) will be processed by ODec.
Guess: Eventually Aind outputs β′. ABDH picks a random pair (Z,H2(Z)) from
H2List and outputs Z as its solution to the BDH challenge.
Analysis: We show that if Aind wins the game, ABDH can solve the BDH problem
with non-negligible probability. We claim that Aind cannot win with probability better
than 1/2 unless it queries κid∗ = e(g, g)abc to the H2 oracle. The argument for this
claim proceeds as follows: In order to win with probability better than 1/2, Aind
must be able to obtain information about mβ from W ∗ = mβ ⊕ H4(s). Without
querying s to H4 oracle this probabilibity is negligible. The probability that Aind
obtains information about s from V ∗ = s⊕H2(κid∗) without knowledge of H2(κid∗)
is negligible. Considering Enc specification, in order to increase this probability Aind
must query κid∗ to H2 oracle. According to our simulation, namely U∗ = gc, Qid∗ =
gb, Y = ga we get κid∗ = e(Qid∗ , Y )c = e(gb, ga)c = e(g, g)abc.
This claim implies thatABDH wins if it correctly guesses q∗H2 th query to H2 oracle
containing κid∗ and doesn’t abort. The probability for the correct guess of q∗H2 (which
we denote as event E1) is 1/qH2 . ABDH doesn’t abort if it guesses id∗ correctly
and it guesses set J correctly on each query (id, i) with fresh id to OKeyDer. The
corresponding event of the correct guess of id∗ is denoted by E2. The probability of
E2 is given by Pr[E2] = 1/|ID|. The event of guessing J correctly is denoted by
E3. The probability of E3 is given by Pr[E3] = 1
( nt−1)
max{|ID|,qks} , where
(
n
t−1
)
is the
number of all possible sets J and qks is the number of secret share queries toOKeyDer.
Since all three events are independent we obtain
AdvABDH ≥
1
Pr[E1] · Pr[E2] · Pr[E3]AdvAind .
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Conjecture 2 (IBTD Anonymity). Our IBTD from Def. 36 is IBTD−ANO−CCA
secure under the BDH assumption in the random oracle model.
Proof. Note: in order to avoid confusion with exponent b from the BDH challenge
we will use in the following steps the notations β and β′ instead of b and b′ from the
IBTD-ANO-CCA experiment.
We provide a conjecture which shows how to prove the anonymity of our scheme.
We assume existence of random oracles OKeyDer and ODec. The simulation of the
public key in the first phase is the same as in the proof of previous theorem, namely
ABDH sets Y = ga. It responds to the key derivation and decryption queries like
to the corresponding queries in the indistinguishability proof. Upon finishing phase
1, Aano outputs a message m and two identities id0, id1 it wants to be challenged
on. The challenge ciphertext is simulated as follows: ABDH sets U∗ = gc from its
BDH instance. Pick s ∈ {0, 1}l and H2(Z) at random and add (·, H2(Z)) to H2List.
Compute V ∗ = s ⊕ H2(Z). Then pick H4(s) at random, add (s,H4(s)) to H4List
and compute W ∗ = m ⊕ H4(s). At some point Aind outputs a messages m and
an two identities id0, id1 on which it wishes to be challenged. In the second phase,
Aano picks a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and a randomiser which depends on that bit,
γβ, γ1−β ∈ Z∗q and sets the parameters Qidβ =
(
gb
)γβ , Qid1−β = (gb)γ1−β and Y = ga
as before such that e(Qidβ , Y ) = e(g
b, ga)γβ , e(Qid1−β , Y ) = e(g
b, ga)γ1−β . Algorithm
Aano issues further queries as in Phase 1, to which ABDH responds as before except
that no queries on (idβ, C∗), where β ∈ {0, 1}, will be processed by ODec. The
final decision, whether ABDH succeeds in simulating the outputs for Aano is made
as follows: As showed before, U is chosen uniformly at random by the encryption
algorithm. V depends on the randomly chosen s ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and H2(Z). Since H2(Z)
is randomly chosen, it does not depend on idβ. Also W is independent of idβ and
therefore the ciphertext has the same distribution for both β ∈ {0, 1} and Aano will
have 0 advantage to distinguish whether the ciphertext has been generated on id0 or
on id1.
Conjecture 3 (IBTD Robustness). Our IBTD from Def. 36 is IBTD−ROB−CCA
secure.
Proof. We show that IBTD−ROB−CCA property holds in the random oracle model.
Assume Arob be a IBTD−ROB−CCA adversary that is given the master key x. He
can receive at most t− 1 secret shares from OKeyDer. We note, that H1 is a map to
G∗, where all the outputs of this map are elements of order q. That means that the
probability of finding two different identities id1 ̸= id2 such that H1(id1) = H1(id2)
is negligible. Since Y = gx ∈ G∗ we have that κid1 and κid2 are not equal and of order
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q. Since H3 maps into Z∗q , then κrid1 and κ
r
id2
are different. Assuming H2 as a random
oracle, means that H2(κrid1) ̸= H2(κrid2). Decryption under different identities yields
therefore two different values σ1 ̸= σ2. In order for the ciphertext to be valid for both
id’s it should hold that r = H3(σ1,m1) = H3(σ2,m2), which happens with negligible
probability. It follows that our IBTD scheme is IBTD−ROB−CCA secure.
4.4 Threshold Public Key Encryption with Keyword
Search
We start this section by definition of TPEKS syntax and its security goals. Towards the
end of this section we propose a general transformation for building a secure TPEKS
scheme from an anonymous IBTD scheme. We note that such a transformation is also
possible from an identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (IDKEM) as showed by
Fuhr and Paillier [70]. A searchable encryption based on IDKEM enables decryption
as an additional future.
4.4.1 TPEKS Definitions and Security Model
The model for TPEKS assumes a sender who can encrypt keywords and at least t out
of n servers, each equipped with its own trapdoor share who participate in the search
procedure. The servers compute only test shares on input a trapdoor share. The final
test procedure is made by an honest party. This is the main syntactical difference to
single-server based PEKS schemes.
Definition 38 (Threshold Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search). A TPEKS
scheme consists of the following five algorithms (Setup, PEKS, Trd, ShTrd, Test):
Setup(1λ) : On input a security parameter 1λ, the algorithm generates a private/pub-
lic key pair (sk, pk).
PEKS(pk, w) : On input the public key pk and a keyword w, the algorithm outputs a
PEKS ciphertext Φ.
ShTrd(pk, sk, w, t, n) : On input a private key sk and a keyword w, the algorithm
computes a trapdoor Tw and generates a list of trapdoor shares Tw := {(1, Tw,1), . . . ,
(n, Tw,n)} for this trapdoor Tw.
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ShTest(pk, (i, Tw,i),Φ): On input a public key pk, a trapdoor share Tw,i, and a
PEKS ciphertext Φ, the algorithm outputs a test share τi.
Test(pk, {τi}i∈Ω ,Φ) : On input a public key pk, a set of test shares {τi}i∈Ω, where
|Ω| ≥ t and a PEKS ciphertext Φ(w), the algorithm outputs 1 if Φ encrypts w;
otherwise it outputs 0.
In Definition 39 we define TPEKS indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext
attacks (TPEKS−IND−CCA), aiming to protect privacy of the encrypted keywords
in presence of an attacker who may learn up to t− 1 trapdoor shares. Apart from the
access to the trapdoor share oracle our scheme allows the adversary to issue up to t− 1
queries to the test oracle. It follows that the adversary does not see the test shares for a
keyword search, because the Test algorithm which collects all the test shares is run
by an entity which is supposed to be honest. This means that the servers do not need
to cooperate to test if a single ciphertext matches with the trapdoor. Thus, it prevents
offline guessing attacks and avoids a huge communication between the servers. In
order to control the number of issued share trapdoor queries on the same keyword, we
introduce a counter cw, which leads the share trapdoor oracle to output ⊥ if the value
of this counter is greater or equal t.
Definition 39 (TPEKS Indistinguishability). Let Aind be a PPT adversary against the
TPEKS−IND−CCA security of the TPEKS scheme, associated with the following
experiment
ExpTPEKS−IND−CCA−bTPEKS,Aind (1
λ)
1. (pk, sk) r← Setup(1λ, t, n).
2. LetList be a list comprising a keywordw and a set Tw = {(1, Tw,1), . . . , (n, Tw,n)},
where (i, Tw,i) are the outputs of ShTrd(pk, sk, w, t, n) algorithm.
At the beginning of the experiment the list is empty.
3. (w0, w1, state)
r← AOShTrd(·),OTest(·)ind (find, pk)
4. if (w0, Tw0) /∈ List,
run Tw0 := {(1, Tw0,1), . . . , (n, Tw0,n)} r← ShTrd(pk, sk, w0, t, n),
add (w0, T0) to List
5. if (w1, T1) /∈ List,
run Tw1 := {(1, Tw1,1), . . . , (n, Tw1,n)} r← ShTrd(pk, sk, w1, t, n),
add (w1, Tw1) to List
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6. Φ r← PEKS(pk, wb)
7. b′ r← AOShTrd(·),OTest(·)ind (guess,Φ, state)
The experiment outputs b′ if all of the following holds:
• Aind asked at most t− 1 queries to OShTrd(w, i) for any w
• Aind didn’t query OTest (w0,Φ) or OTest (w1,Φ)
Otherwise the experiment outputs 0.
The two oracles are defined as follows:
OShTrd(w, i) : On input (w, i) check whether (w, Tw) ∈ List. If (w, Tw) /∈ List,
run Tw r← ShTrd(pk, sk, w, t, n). Add (w, Tw) to List, output (i, Tw,i) and a counter
cw = 1. If (w, Tw) ∈ List and cw < t− 1 parse Tw as {(1, Tw,1), . . . , (n, Tw,n)} and
output (i, Tw,i). increase the counter to cw + 1. If cw ≥ t output ⊥.
OTest (w,Φ): On input (w,Φ) check whether (w, Tw) ∈ List. If so, parse Tw
as {(1, Tw,1), . . . , (n, Tw,n)}, compute τi r← ShTest(pk, (i, Tw,i),Φ). Take at least
t-out-of-n test shares τi, run Test(pk, {τi}i∈Ω ,Φ), where |Ω| ≥ t, output 1 or 0.
If (w, Tw) /∈ List, compute Tw r← ShTrd(pk, sk, w, t, n), add (w, Tw) to the List.
Compute τi
r← ShTest(pk, (i, Tw,i),Φ), where i ∈ [n]. Take at least t-out-of-n test
shares τi, run Test (pk, {τi}i∈Ω,Φ), output 1 or 0.
The advantage of Aind is defined as
AdvTPEKS−IND−CCATPEKS,Aind (1
λ) =
∣∣Pr [ExpTPEKS−IND−CCA−1TPEKS,Aind (1λ) = 1]
−Pr [ExpTPEKS−IND−CCA−0TPEKS,Aind (1λ) = 1]∣∣ .
The scheme is TPEKS−IND−CCA secure if AdvTPEKS−IND−CCA−bTPEKS,Aind is negligible.
In Definition 40 we model computational consistency of TPEKS schemes, by
extending the corresponding property for PEKS schemes from [2, Sec.3]. Our defini-
tion allows the adversary to test polynomially-many keyword-ciphertext pairs, thus
modeling chosen-ciphertext attacks, and accounts for the threshold setting by allowing
the adversary to learn up to t − 1 trapdoor shares for keywords that will be used to
mount a successful attack.
Definition 40 (TPEKS Consistency). Let Ac be a probabilistic polynomial-time ad-
versary against the TPEKS−CONS security of the TPEKS scheme, associated with
the following experiment
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ExpTPEKS−CONSAc (1
λ)
1. (pk, sk) r← Setup(1λ, t, n).
LetList be list which store a keywordw and a set Tw = {(1, Tw,1), . . . , (n, Tw,n)},
where (i, Tw,i) are the outputs of ShTrd(pk, sk, w, t, n) algorithm.
At the beginning of the experiment the list is empty.
2. (w,w′) r← AOShTrd(·),OTest(·)con (pk)
3. Φ∗ r← PEKS(pk, w)
4. If (w′, (i, Tw′,i)) /∈ List run Tw′ := {(1, Tw′,1) , . . . , (n, Tw′,n)} r← ShTrd(pk,
sk, w′, t, n) and add (w′, Tw′) to List.
The experiment outputs 1 if all of the following holds:
• OTest(w′,Φ∗) = 1
• w ̸= w′
• Acon asked at most t− 1 queries to OShTrd (w, i) for any w.
where the two oracles are defined as follows:
OShTrd(w, i) : On input (w, i) check whether (w, Tw) ∈ List. If (w, Tw) /∈ List,
run Tw r← ShTrd(pk, sk, w, t, n). Add (w, Tw) to List, output (i, Tw,i) and a counter
cw = 1. If (w, Tw) ∈ List and cw < t− 1 parse Tw as {(1, Tw,1), . . . , (n, Tw,n)} and
output (i, Tw,i), increase the counter to cw + 1. If cw ≥ t output ⊥.
OTest (w,Φ): On input (w,Φ) check whether (w, Tw) ∈ List. If so, parse Tw
as {(1, Tw,1), . . . , (n, Tw,n)}, compute τi r← ShTest(pk, (i, Tw,i),Φ). Take at least
t-out-of-n test shares τi, run Test(pk, {τi}i∈Ω ,Φ), where |Ω| ≥ t, output 1 or 0.
If (w, Tw) /∈ List, compute Tw r← ShTrd(pk, sk, w, t, n), add (w, Tw) to the List.
Compute τi
r← ShTest(pk, (i, Tw,i),Φ), where i ∈ [n]. Take at least t-out-of-n test
shares τi, run Test (pk, {τi}i∈Ω,Φ), output 1 or 0.
The advantage of Acon is defined as
AdvTPEKS−CONSTPEKS,Acon
(
1λ
)
= Pr
[
ExpTPEKS−CONSTPEKS,Acon
(
1λ
)
= 1
]
.
The scheme is TPEKS−CONS secure if AdvTPEKS−CONSTPEKS,Acon is negligible.
Note: It is obvious that the correctness property of our TPEKS is satisfied. Cor-
rectness ensures that the test algorithm always outputs the correct answer.
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4.4.2 A General TPEKS Construction from an Anonymous IBTD
Scheme
In order to illustrate the design rationale of our transformation from anonymous IBTD
to TPEKS we recall the transformation from [2] with which single-server PEKS can be
obtained from any anonymous IBE. We presented an overview of this transformation
in Section 5.2.
Our transformation from anonymous IBTD to TPEKS, given in Definition 41,
follows a similar approach where TPEKS keywords correspond to IBTD identities and
the search procedure of TPEKS is realized using the distributed decryption procedure
of IBTD. In terms of security we obtain similar implications as in [2]; namely, the
anonymity property of IBTD implies the indistinguishabilty property of the resulting
TPEKS construction, except that our definition of indistinguishability also takes into
account keyword guessing attacks, and the indistinguishability property of the IBTD
scheme implies the computational consistency of the TPEKS scheme.
Definition 41 (IBTD-to-TPEKS Transform). A transformation from an IBTD scheme
to a TPEKS is described as follows:
Setup(1λ) : On input a security parameter 1λ, the algorithm runs the parameter
generation algorithm of the IBTD scheme (msk,mpk) r← Setup(n, t, 1λ) and outputs
sk = msk and pk = mpk.
PEKS(pk, w) : On input a public key pk and a keyword w, the algorithm runs the
encryption algorithm of the IBTD scheme C r← Enc(pk, w,R), where R r← {0, 1}λ is
picked randomly. The algorithm returns the TPEKS ciphertext Φ = (C,R).
ShTrd(pk, sk, w, t, n) : On input a secret key sk and a keywordw, the algorithm runs
the key derivation procedure (Tw, (i, Tw,i))
r← KeyDer(pk, sk, w, t, n) of the IBTD
scheme where sk is the master key msk and keyword w is used as id. The trapdoor
Tw associated to the keyword w corresponds to the secret key skid generated by the
IBTD scheme. The algorithm outputs {(1, Tw,1), . . . , (n, Twn)} which correspond to
the secret shares {(i, skid,i), . . . , (n, skid,n)} of the IBTD scheme.
ShTest(pk, (i, Tw,i),Φ) : On input a public key pk, a trapdoor share (i, Tw,i), and
a TPEKS ciphertext (C,R), the algorithm outputs τi
r← ShareDec(pk, (i, Tw,i),Φ)
using the distributed decryption algorithm of the IBTD scheme.
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Test(pk, {τw,i}i∈Ω, (C,R)) : On input of at least t test shares {τw,i}i∈Ω, where
|Ω| ≥ t and (C,R) is a TPEKS ciphertext, it computes R′ r← Dec(pk, {δi}i∈Ω, C) and
outputs 1 if R′ = R, and 0 otherwise.
4.4.3 Security Analysis
With regard to security, in Theorem 9, we establish similar implications for TPEKS
indistinguishability as in [2], namely we rely on the anonymity of the IBTD scheme.
In Theorem 10 we show that for TPEKS consistency the underlying IBTD scheme
must be indistinguishable.
Theorem 9 (TPEKS−IND−CCA). If IBTD scheme is IBTD−ANO−CCA secure
then the obtained TPEKS scheme in Definition 41 is TPEKS−IND−CCA secure.
Proof. We use a TPEKS−IND−CCA adversary Bind against the TPEKS scheme
to construct a simulator that breaks the assumed IBTD−ANO−CCA properties of
the IBTD scheme. That is, simulator acts as Aano attacking the IBTD−ANO−CCA
security. The simulation of the view of Bind distinguishes two cases Φ ̸= Φ∗ and
Φ = Φ∗, where Φ = (C,R) and Φ∗ = (C∗, R∗) denotes the TPEKS ciphertext for
a randomly chosen R r← {0, 1}λ. We describe the simulation using game hopping
technique. The initial game describes the original experiment from Definition 39.
The first game differs from initial game by simulation of trapdoor share and test
queries, which might effect the calculation of TPEKS ciphertext. When Bind issues
trapdoor share queries on (w, i) and test queries on Φ = (C,R), which is not equal
to the challenge ciphertext Φ∗, the simulation of those queries is executed by IBTD
adversary Aano. In case that Bind issues test queries on the challenge cipehrtext Φ∗,
the simulation aborts. This leads to the next game which differs from the first one by
the simulation of test queries on the challenge ciphertext. We start with Game0 as
described below:
Game0 The initial game is the Game0 which describes the real attack. First the
challenger runs the Setup of the TPEKS scheme on input a security parameter λ,
threshold parameter t and number of servers n. The challenger gives Bind the public
key pk. Bind issues trapdoor share on an identity id and test queries on the PEKS
ciphertext Φ and identity id. In the challenge phase Bind outputs two keywords w0, w1
it wants to be challenged on. The challenger flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1} and responds with
the challenge PEKS ciphertext Φ∗. In the challenge phase Bind outputs two challenge
keywords w0, w1. The challenger picks a random bit b and computes the corresponding
PEKS ciphertext Φ(pk, wb). Bind issues more trapdoor share and decryption queries
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to which the OShTrd and OTest respond as in the first phase. Bind also issues up to
t− 1 trapdoor share queries on w0, w1 but no decryption queries on these challenge
keywords. Finally Bind outputs a random bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} which is a guess for b. We
denote by E0 the event b = b′. Since the Game0 is the same as in the real attack, we
have
Pr[E0] = 1/2 +AdvTPEKS−IND−CCATPEKS,Bind (1λ).
Game1 The first game (Game1) differs from the previous one by simulation of
trapdoor share and test queries. If these shares are involved in computing the PEKS
ciphertext, the simulator modifies the challenge ciphertext. Aano is given as input the
master public keympk of IBTD scheme which it gives toBind. WhenBind corrupts t−1
trapdoor share servers, it means thatAano obtains trapdoor shares (ij, Tw,ij)ij∈[i1,...,it−1]
of these corrupted server. Let List be a list consisting of pairs (w, Tw), where Tw
is a list of all trapdoor shares for a keyword w, i.e., Tw := {(1, Tw,1), . . . , (n, Tw,n).
Algorithm Aano breaks anonymity of IBTD by interacting with Bind as follows:
Queries to OShTrd: At any time algorithm Bind can issue trapdoor share queries to
its oracle on input (w, i). To respond to these queries, Aano checks if (w, i) ∈ List
and if the counter cw < t− 1. If so, it picks the corresponding trapdoor share, returns
it to Bind and increases the counter by one: cw + 1. Otherwise sets id = w, sets the
counter cw = 1 and forwards the query on input (id, i) to its own OKeyDer oracle.
The oracle returns (i, skid,i) to Aano who sets (i, skid,i) = (i, Tw,i) and forwards it as
a trapdoor share to Bind.
Queries to OTest: When Bind issues test queries on input (w,Φ), where Φ ̸= Φ∗
the IBTD adversary Aano sets id = w. We note that according to Definition 41,
Φ = (C,R), where C is IBTD ciphertext and R r← {0, 1}λ. Aano omits the last λ bits
of Φ and queries its own decryption oracle on input (id, C). The ODec oracle returns
to Aano either m or 0. Aano checks whether m = R from the PEKS ciphertext. If so,
it returns 1 to Bind.
Challenge: Once Bind decides that phase 1 is over, it outputs two keywords w0, w1.
Algorithm Aano sets id0 = w0 and id1 = w1 and picks a random λ-bit string R∗ r←
{0, 1}λ and sends it as a challenge in its anonymity game to its own challenger of the
IBTD scheme. Aano receives a ciphertext C∗. It then assigns Φ∗ = (C∗, R∗) and sends
it back to the Bind adversary.
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Phase2: In the second phase, Bind issues additional queries to the trapdoor share
and test oracles to which Aano responds as before. Bind is allowed to issue up to
t− 1 trapdoor share queries but no test queries on challenge keywords w0, w1. When
Bind issues test queries on (w,Φ), where Φ = Φ∗, i.e. challenge ciphertext, we
distinguish between two cases. If w ̸= w0 and w ̸= w1, Aano sets id = w, takes the
first component of Φ∗ = (C∗, R∗) and forwards (id, C∗) as input to its decryption
oracle ODec. Eventually Bind outputs its guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b. Aano forwards b′ to
its challenger and wins the game if b = b′.
Analysis: In order to provide adversary Bind’s advantage to break the indistinguisha-
bility of TPEKS scheme we note that Bind can’t query OShTrd more than t− 1 times
on any keyword w according to Definition 39 and Aano can’t query OKeyDer more
that t − 1 times on any id according to Definition 34. Therefore, Aano can pass all
OShTrd queries of Bind for w to its OKeyDer oracle, without aborting the simulation
and setting id = w since it will have the same restrictions as Bind. Therefore follows
that the advantage of Aano of winning the game is at least as big as the advantage of
Bind of winning its indistinguishability experiment in Definition 39:
Pr[ExpIBTD−ANO−CCA−bIBTD,Aano (λ) = 1] ≥ Pr[ExpTPEKS−IND−CCA−bTPEKS,Bind (1λ) = 1].
Theorem 10 (TPEKS Consistency). If IBTD scheme is IBTD−IND−CCA secure
then the obtained TPEKS scheme in Definition 41 is TPEKS−CONS secure.
Proof. We use a TPEKS−IND−CCA adversary Bcon against the TPEKS scheme to
construct a simulator that breaks the assumed IBTD−IND−CCA properties of the
IBTD scheme. That is, the simulator acts as Aind attacking the IBTD−IND−CCA
security. The simulation of the view of Bcon distinguishes by two cases C ̸= C∗ and
C = C∗. We describe the simulation using game hopping technique. The intuition of
this proof is the same as in proof of Theorem 9, therefore we start immediately with
the description of games.
Game0 The initial game is the Game0 which describes the real attack. First the
challenger runs the Setup of the TPEKS scheme on input a security parameter λ,
threshold parameter t and number of servers n. The challenger gives Bcon the public
key pk. Bcon issues trapdoor share on an keyword w and test queries on the PEKS
ciphertext Φ and identity id. The challenger responds with the challenge PEKS
ciphertext Φ∗. In the challenge phase Bcon outputs two challenge keywords w,w′. The
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challenger computes the corresponding PEKS ciphertext Φ on w. Bcon issues more
trapdoor share and decryption queries to which the OShTrd and OTest respond as
in the first phase. Bcon also issues up to t− 1 trapdoor share queries on w and on w′.
Finally Bcon outputs a random bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} which is a guess for b. We denote by E0
the event b = b′. Since the Game0 is the same as in the real attack, we have
Pr[E0] = AdvTPEKS−CONSTPEKS,Bcon (1λ).
Game1 The first game (Game1) differs from the previous one by simulation of trap-
door share and test queries. If these shares are involved in computing the PEKS cipher-
text, the simulator modifies the challenge ciphertext. Aind is given as input the master
public key mpk of IBTD scheme which it gives to Bcon. When Bcon corrupts t−1 trap-
door share servers, it means that Aind obtains trapdoor shares (ij, Tw,ij)ij∈[i1,...,it−1] of
these corrupted server. Let List be a list consisting of pairs (w, Tw), where Tw is a list
of all trapdoor shares for a keyword w, i.e., Tw := {(1, Tw,1), . . . , (n, Tw,n). Algorithm
Aind breaks indistinguishability of IBTD by interacting with Bcon as follows:
Queries to OShTrd: At any time algorithm Bcon can issue trapdoor share queries
to its oracle on input (w, i). To respond to these queries, Aind checks if (w, i) ∈ List
and if the counter is less than t− 1. If so, it picks the corresponding trapdoor share
returns it to Bind and increases the counter to cw + 1. Otherwise sets id = w and
cw = 1 and forwards the query on input (id, i) to its own OKeyDer oracle. The oracle
returns (i, skid,i) to Aind who sets (i, skid,i) = (i, Tw,i) and forwards it as a trapdoor
share to Bcon.
Queries to OTest: When Bcon issues test queries on input (w,Φ), the IBTD adver-
sary Aind sets id = w. We note that according to Definition 41, Φ = (C,R), where C
is IBTD ciphertext and R r← {0, 1}λ. Aind omits the last λ bits of Φ and queries its
own decryption oracle on input (id, C). The ODec oracle returns to Aind either m or
0. Aind checks whether m = R from the PEKS ciphertext. If so, it returns 1 to Bcon.
Challenge: Once Bcon decides that phase 1 is over, it outputs two keywords w,w′.
AlgorithmAind sets id = w and picks two random λ-bit strings R0, R1 r← {0, 1}λ and
sends (w,R0, R1) as a challenge in its indistinguishability game to its own challenger
of the IBTD scheme. Aind receives a ciphertext C∗. It then sets id′ = w′ and queries
(id′, C∗) to its decryption oracle and receives m∗ (that can also be 0) in return. If
m∗ = R1 then Aind outputs 1, else Aind outputs 0.
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Analysis: Similarly to the previous proof we conclude that Bcon can not query
OShTrd more than t − 1 times on any keyword w in Definition 40 and Aind can’t
query OKeyDer more that t− 1 times on any id in Definition 33. Therefore, Aind can
pass all OShTrd queries of Bcon for w to its OKeyDer oracle setting id = w because
of having similar restrictions as Bcon. According to the provided reduction if Bcon is
successful then IBTD adversary Aind would receive m∗ = R1 if b = 1 and win the
experiment with at least the same success probability as algorithm Bcon. Otherwise
Aind receives m∗ = R0 if b = 0. If Bind is not successful then Aind will still output
b = 0 and win with probability 1/2. The probability to win the indistinguishability
experiment of the IBTD scheme is bounded by the size of the message space (we
recall, R0, R1 ∈ {0, 1}λ). Therefore: Pr[ExpIBTD−IND−CCA−0IBTD,Aind (λ) = 1] ≤ 12λ .
4.4.4 Application to Cloud Setting and E-mail Transfer
In the introduction of this Chapter 4 we mentioned the applicability of TPEKS to
distributed cloud data storage and email transfer, as a solution to mitigate the single
point of trust with regard to the search procedure and the insecurity of single-server
PEKS schemes against keyword guessing attacks. Together with its properties, TPEKS
seems to be particularly attractive for these applications, as presented in the following
description.
Scenario: In the first use case we assume an user who wishes to upload his data files
to the cloud servers to have access to these file at a later point in time. We assume
an user who uploads m encrypted data files with m PEKS ciphertexts to the n cloud
servers where each of these files is encrypted on l different keywords w1, . . . , wl, (we
assume that in our Definition 38 the PEKS algorithm takes as input a set of keywords,
instead of one keyword), i.e. PEKS ciphertext for a file is given by {Φ := PEKS(pk,
wi1 , . . . , wid)}id∈[l], where d denotes the size of a subset of l. It means that the PEKS
ciphertext is computet on different subsets of the keywords w1, . . . , wl. Let f be the
number of PEKS ciphertexts being uploaded to each cloud server. When the user
wants to download files which contain a keyword wi, he computes trapdoor shares for
each server on that keyword, i.e. he sends trapdoors Twi,1, . . . , Twi,n on wi to the n
servers, where i ∈ {1, . . . , l} denotes the index of the l keywords. Each cloud server
Sk, k ∈ [n], computes test shares taking as input each of f different PEKS ciphertext
and the trapdoor for this server τk,j ← ShTest(Φ, Twi,k). It means that each server
outputs f test shares {τk,j}j∈[f ], such that the user obtains in total f × n different test
shares (where n is the number of servers). The user takes the outputs of least t-out-of-n
servers in order to run the test algorithm. Since the user does not know which test
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shares correspond to which keywords, he has to run f t-times the test algorithm to
find the right combination of files which contain the same keywords. For the ease of
analysis, we observe 2 cloud servers and therefore 2f different test shares. Then it
runs Test(τ (j)1 , τ
(j′)
2 , pk)j where j, j
′ ∈ [f ], such that we get in total f 2 test outputs,
where only one of these results will be 1 (which means that the test was taken over the
correct combination of test shares). This scenario has a total complexity of O(f 2) and
guarantees privacy of the user, because the trapdoors do not reveal anything about the
keywords. The servers do not learn anything about the keywords because they take
ciphertext and trapdoors of those keywords without getting any information about the
content of inputs.
Improvement of Complexity: To reduce the complexity the user can use an index
for each uploaded PEKS ciphertexts on the l different keywords which can be used
during the search process to combine the correct test shares. That means that he
would need to upload (j, {Φ := PEKS(pk, wi1 , . . . , wid)}id∈[l]) to each server, where
j denotes an index for the ciphertext Φ on a set of keywords wi1 , . . . , wid , with
i1, . . . , id ∈ [l] which encrypt a file j ∈ [f ] and f denotes the number of uploaded
files. Finally, if the user wants to download data files with keyword wi, i ∈ [l], he
computes n trapdoor shares for all n servers and sends them to the servers. Each
server computes f test shares (τk)← ShTest(Φ, Twi,k) for all stored f files and sends
the results (j, τk) to the user. Upon receiving the test shares together with the index,
the user can recognize which test shares he can combine to run test algorithm. If the
output of the algorithm is 1, the user sends the randomness to one of the servers to get
access for the download of a file. Since the user knows which test shares he has to
combine he needs to run f test algorithms in total. The complexity in this scenario can
be reduced to the linear size O(f). This example still guarantees privacy of the user
because a randomness is prepared for a set of keywords, such that an adversary can
not link the files with keywords.
4.5 Two-Server Case: Dual Server PEKS vs. 2-out-of-
2 TPEKS
In this section we compare our TPEKS scheme from Chapter 4 with the dual server
PEKS (DS-PEKS) construction by Chen et al. [50]. Since all previously constructed
PEKS schemes are not secure against keyword guessing attacks, one of the advantages
of our scheme and the scheme in [50] is that they are resistant against those attacks.
Our TPEKS construction requires at least t-out-of-n uncorrupted servers such that an
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adversary can succeed. The DS-PEKS scheme also provides security against keyword
guessing attacks, where the two servers can be untrusted as long as they do not collude.
Keyword Guessing Attack. The security of PEKS states that the server can only
locate the message specified with encrypted keywords using the trapdoors received
by receiver but cannot learn anything else about the content of the message or of the
keywords. None of the traditional PEKS schemes mentioned earlier in the introduction
of this chapter is secure against keyword guessing attacks issued by malicious server.
The attack works as follows: given a trapdoor, the malicious server can choose a
keyword from the keyword space and generate for this keyword a PEKS ciphertext.
Using the ciphertext, the adversarial server can then test if the guessed keyword is
correct or not. Such kind of attack has also been considered in password-based systems,
but because of a smaller size of a keyword space, the attack is used more often against
PEKS schemes. It is obvious that the KGA is a serious vulnerability for traditional
PEKS schemes, where only one server is involved. Therefore one possible solution
is to apply the PEKS framework to a number of servers, such that the correctness of
PEKS keeps unharmed.
Our constructed TPEKS from Section 5.4 involves n servers, where at least t−out-
of-n servers are required to test the keywords succesfully. Our scheme allows up to
t − 1 corrupted servers. If a corrupted server guesses a keyword and computes the
PEKS ciphertext, it cannot test by itself the keyword for correctness, because the test
algorithm is run an honest party, which takes a minimal number of t valid test shares.
The scheme of Chen et al. [50] also overcomes the problem of KGA vulnerability of
traditional schemes by making the trapdoor generation algorithm public and dividing
the test algorithm into two algorithms BTest and FTest, which are run by two different
servers.
Two-Server TPEKS In this paragraph we apply our construction of TPEKS scheme
to the two server case. The scheme consists of the following algorithms:
Setup(1λ, 2, 2) : On input a security parameter 1λ, and the values t = n = 2, the
algorithm generates a private/public key pair (sk, pk).
PEKS(pk, w) : On input the public key pk and a keyword w, the algorithm outputs a
PEKS ciphertext Φ.
ShTrd(pk, sk, w, 2, 2) : On input a private key sk, a public key pk and a keyword w,
the algorithm generates the two trapdoors (1, Tw,1), (2, Tw,2).
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ShTest(pk, (i, Tw,i),Φ): On input a public key pk, a trapdoor share Tw,i and a PEKS
ciphertext Φ, the algorithm outputs a test share τi, where i ∈ {1, 2}.
Test(pk, τ1, τ2,Φ(w)) : On input a public key pk, a set of test shares τ1, τ2 and a
PEKS ciphertext Φ(w), the algorithm outputs 1 if Φ encrypts w; otherwise it outputs
0.
Dual-Server PEKS In this paragraph we give a description of our TPEKS for only
two servers that we use to compare it with the dual-server PEKS introduced in [50].
Definition 42 (DS-PEKS [50]). A DS-PEKS scheme is defined by the following six
algorithms:
Setup(1λ) : On input the security parameter 1λ, outputs the system parameters I .
KeyGen(I) : On input the system parameters I , outputs the public/secret key pairs
(skFS, pkFS) and (skBS, pkBS) for the front server and the back server respec-
tively.
dsPEKS(I, pkFS, pkBS, w1) : On input I , the front server’s public key pkFS , the back
server’s public key pkBS and the keyword w1, outputs PEKS ciphertext Φw1 of
w1.
dsTrd(I, pkFS, pkBS, w2) : On input I , the front server’s public key pkFS , the back
server’s public key pkBS and the keyword w2, outputs trapdoor Tw2 .
FTest(I, skFS,Φw1 , Tw2) : On input I , the front server’s secret key skFS , PEKS
ciphertext Φw1 , trapdoor Tw2 , outputs the internal testing-state ciphertext ΦITS .
BTest(I, skBS,ΦITS) : On input I , the back server’s secret key skBS and the internal
testing-state ciphertext ΦITS , outputs 0 or 1.
Correctness: For any keyword w1, w2 and Φw1 ← dsPEKS(I, pkFS, pkBS, w1),
Tw2 ← dsTrd(I, pkFS, pkBS, w2) we have
BTest(I, skBS,ΦITS) =
{
0, if w1 = w2
1, if w1 ̸= w2.
where ΦITS ← FTest(I, skFS,Φw1 , Tw2).
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Server S1 Receiver Server S2
Input: Input: Input:
Φw ← PEKS(pk,w) pk, sk, w Φw ← PEKS(pk,w)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
computes:
Tw,i ← ShTrd(sk, w)
Tw,1 Tw,2
τ1 ← ShTest(pk, Tw,1,Φ) τ2 ← ShTest(pk, Tw,2,Φ)
τ1 τ2
Output:
Test(pk, τ1, τ2,Φ)
Fig. 4.1 Threshold PEKS with n = t = 2
Receiver Front Server Back Server
Input: Input: Input:
pkFS , pkBS , w2 skFS , pkFS ,Φw1 skBS , pkBS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tw2 ← ShTrd(·)
Tw2
ΦITS ← FTest(skFS ,Φw1 , Tw2)
ΦITS
Output: BTest(skBS ,ΦITS)
Fig. 4.2 Dual-Server PEKS
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Comparison DS-PEKS with TPEKS We provide in this paragraph a comparison
between our TPEKS scheme for two servers and the DS-PEKS scheme. We visualize
the schemes in the following two figures 4.2 and 4.1. In the TPEKS scheme the
receiver is in possession of the public and secret key pair. He uses the secret key to
compute the trapdoor shares. The sender of a message takes the receiver’s public key
to compute PEKS ciphertext on keywords, which he sends to the servers.
In contrast to TPEKS, the receiver in a DS-PEKS scheme does not possess a secret
key, but both of the servers possess their own public and secret key pairs. The sender
of a message uses the public keys of the servers to generate DS-PEKS ciphertext
on a keyword w1. The receiver generates the trapdoor on a keyword w2 using the
both public keys of back and front server and sends the generated trapdoor to the
front server. The front server computes the internal testing-state ciphertext using the
provided trapdoor received from receiver and the DS-PEKS ciphertext received from
sender. Then, the front server sends this internal ciphertext to the back server. Using
its own secret key and the received internal ciphertext, the back server runs the test
algorithm and outputs either 1 or 0.
In contrast to DS-PEKS scheme, a special number of servers of a TPEKS scheme
compute the test shares using the corresponding trapdoor shares received by the
receiver and return the test shares to the receiver. The final procedure, the test pro-
cedure has then to be done by the honest receiver, who has received 2 valid test
shares. The test algorithm outputs 1 if the test shares are valid, otherwise it outputs
0. After the successful output of test algorithm, receiver sends a request to one of
both servers to obtain the corresponding encrypted e-mail. Finally the e-mail will be
decrypted by the decryption algorithm of the underlying public key encryption scheme.
Conclusion. We conclude that the two compared schemes are both useful for proto-
cols with keyword search. In case of DS-PEKS scheme the functionality of testing
trapdoors is performed by two or more servers, while the in TPEKS servers help the re-
ceiver to run the test algorithm according to Figure 4.1. We also state that the schemes
cannot substitute each other because of their different functionalities. In contrast to
DS-PEKS our TPEKS scheme defines consistency additionally to the privacy property.
Chen et al. [50] do not provide an explicit definition of consistency of their scheme,
but we can explicitly say that their concrete construction is consistent too. To see this
we provide the following short description Consistency means that it is not possible to
run successfully the test algorithm on input a ciphertext and a trapdoor, where both of
them were generated using different keywords. In [50] in the concrete construction of
DS-PEKS, the ciphertext is an operation of two projective hash functions and a colli-
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sion resistant hash function on input keyword w1. The trapdoor is generated using two
new projective hash functions and the inverse of the collision resistant hash function
on input keyword w2. The correction analysis shows that the test runs successfully
only if w1 = w2. From this fact we can follow consistency of DS-PEKS.
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